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Abstract 
In this thesis, I give a philosophical account of pluralities in scientific 
inquiry. The pluralist argument I present here is the rejection of the 
monist assumption that the aim of science is to provide a single, 
complete and coherent account of phenomena. Instead, I argue that 
monist assumptions must be challenged and replaced with the 
following pluralist tenets: there are multiple aims in science; different 
approaches have distinct aims, focusing on different aspects of 
phenomena; and each account is particular to the specific questions 
and aims of an approach.  
Herein I focus on current efforts of the World Health Organisation to 
eliminate Human African Trypanosomiasis – in particular, the 
development of new anti-parasitic drugs. I argue that drug discovery 
and development requires a plurality of approaches, each focusing on 
different aspects of phenomena. The pluralist argument I present here 
is normative in the sense that scientific inquiry ought to be pluralist 
(instead of monistic), in which a multiplicity of accounts and 
approaches is necessary to explain and explore different aspects of 
phenomena. Moreover, I argue that the plurality of approaches and 
accounts employed to achieve a certain aim is bounded by pragmatic 
values. I argue that pragmatic values determine the best way to 
achieve a specific aim within the broader socio-economic and political 
context of scientific inquiry. In my thesis, I argue that the extent of 
plurality in scientific practices involved in developing new drugs to 
eliminate HAT must be understood with respect to the pragmatic 
values that define the best way to eliminate HAT in its current socio-
economic and political context.  
In this thesis, I provide a normative argument for pluralism, challenging 
monist assumptions about scientific practices and their aims. 
Moreover, I provide a pragmatic framework within which to understand 
and explain the extent of pluralities in scientific practices.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
In this thesis, I wish to provide a philosophical account of pluralities in 
scientific inquiry, by studying scientific practices with respect to their 
broader context. Using several case studies from scientific practices, I 
argue that multiple approaches (each with distinct aims and sets of 
questions) focus on multiple aspects of phenomena, providing partial 
accounts. Moreover, I build a normative argument for pluralism, where 
I argue that scientific inquiry ought to be pluralistic to explain and 
explore different aspects of phenomena.  
The pluralist thesis I present here is motivated by the apparent 
pluralities in scientific practices. Herein, I follow the philosophy of 
science in practice approach, arguing that the subject matter of 
philosophy of science must include all aspects of scientific inquiry, 
including scientific practices and scientific accounts of the world. I 
argue that in order to build a philosophical account to understand 
scientific inquiry and scientific knowledge, it is necessary to consider 
scientific practices. Moreover, I argue that broadening the subject 
matter of philosophy of science to include scientific practices reveals 
that the there are multiple approaches and accounts in scientific 
inquiry, as well as revealing that there are multiple aims and sets of 
values shaping that inquiry. Herein, I argue that the apparent 
multiplicities in scientific practices are an important characteristic of 
scientific inquiry. 
Coupled with the acceptance of pluralities as an important 
characteristic of scientific inquiry, herein I present an argument against 
monism. I take monism to be the notion that the aim of scientific inquiry 
is to provide a single, complete and coherent account of the world, 
from which all knowledge can be derived. While it is difficult to find a 
proponent of monism, I argue that monist assumptions about science 
are prevalent in how scientific inquiry is understood by philosophers, 
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historians, scientists etc. In this thesis, I identify three monist 
assumptions (metaphysical, epistemic and methodological) that lead to 
a monist understanding of scientific inquiry, in which pluralities in 
scientific practices are seen as temporary states of affairs, resulting in 
different accounts and approaches being eliminated in pursuit of the 
monist account. Here, I argue that the monist assumptions about 
science unnecessarily restrict the ability of scientific practices to 
explain and explore different aspects of phenomena. Thus, I argue that 
it is necessary to challenge monist assumptions from a philosophy of 
science point of view, given that the plurality of approaches is an 
important characteristic of scientific practices.  
The pluralist thesis I develop here focuses on three pluralist arguments 
put forward by Kellert et al. (2006), Chang (2012) and Mitchell (2002). 
These three pluralist theses focus on scientific practices, aiming to 
provide a philosophical account of pluralities in scientific practices. 
Kellert et al. put forward the pluralist stance as an empirical account of 
the pluralities in scientific practices. Kellert et al. define pluralities as 
the state of affairs in scientific practices, in which the pluralist stance is 
the philosophical interpretation of such a state. In building the pluralist 
stance, Kellert et al. reject monism in scientific inquiry in favour of 
‘openness to the ineliminability of multiplicity in some scientific 
contexts’ (Kellert et al., 2006: xiii). Similarly to Kellert et al., Mitchell 
(2002) argues that a plurality of accounts and approaches scientific 
practices is an important characteristic of scientific inquiry. She further 
argues in favour of the way in which multiple approaches and accounts 
interact with each other to address particular questions. Chang (2012) 
goes further, arguing for the benefits of pluralism and stating that 
plurality is more beneficial to science when one considers the aims and 
values of science. Chang’s argument focuses on actively promoting 
plurality in scientific practices in order to reap the benefits of having 
multiple systems with which to explore and explain phenomena. For 
Chang, the role of pluralists is to challenge monism by actively 
promoting plurality, either through pluralist historiography (studying 
forgotten systems of practices, such as phlogiston), or removing 
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obstacles to existing systems of practices that are limited by monist 
assumptions.  
Similar to Chang, I wish to argue that scientific inquiry ought to be 
pluralistic in order to explain and explore different aspects of 
phenomena. However, I also argue that the extent of plurality is 
bounded by pragmatic values. I argue that pragmatic values are 
specific to the broader context of scientific practices and determine the 
best way to achieve an aim in that context. The extent of pluralism 
must be understood, taking the particular aims of science and 
pragmatic values into consideration. Thus, I argue that scientific inquiry 
must be understood with respect to its broader context, proposing a 
pragmatic framework of values that can be used to assess the benefits 
of pluralities in scientific practices.  
The main question I wish to address is how we make sense of 
pluralities in scientific practices with respect to their broader context. 
Here I use several case studies, mainly from life sciences, to illustrate 
my argument. However, I mainly focus on the current efforts organised 
by the World Health Organisation to eliminate Human African 
Trypanosomiasis by the year 2030. Human African Trypanosomiasis 
(HAT) is a parasitic disease prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, mostly 
affecting rural areas. In this thesis, I argue that eliminating HAT can be 
achieved in multiple ways, presenting historical approaches through 
which near-elimination was achieved using vector controls or other 
environmental approaches (such as displacement of population from 
disease-endemic areas). Current efforts to eliminate HAT organised by 
the WHO rely on mobile screening teams that are tasked with 
screening populations in disease-endemic areas and treating patients 
with HAT. The rationale behind the deployment of the active screening 
campaigns is that HAT is epidemiologically vulnerable and thus the 
transmission cycle of the parasite can be disrupted through effective 
treatment of the human population with HAT. However, there are 
multiple barriers to the implementation of the active screening 
campaigns, mostly due to inadequacies of the current diagnostic and 
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therapeutic tools available to the screening teams. Thus, anti-parasitic 
drug discovery and development research are prioritised over other 
approaches that can be used to eliminate HAT. Moreover, anti-
parasitic drug discovery and development is managed and regulated 
carefully to ensure that the end product matches patients’ needs and 
can be used effectively by mobile screening teams.  
In the first part of my argument, I focus on the benefits of multiple 
approaches in anti-parasitic drug discovery processes to develop new 
drugs to treat HAT. I argue that, by employing multiple approaches, 
scientists can study different aspects of the parasite’s metabolism and 
drug interactions, allowing them to develop drugs that match patients’ 
needs. In the second part of my argument, I broaden my approach to 
look at the extent of plurality involved in the scientific practices 
employed to eliminate HAT. Here, I argue that there is a limit to the 
extent of plurality, where anti-parasitic drug discovery approaches are 
prioritised over alternatives (such as environmental approaches or 
vector control approaches). Furthermore, I explore the limits of plurality 
in scientific practices employed to fulfil the WHO’s aim, using 
pragmatic values that originate in the socio-economic and political 
context of HAT. I argue that the socio-economic and political context of 
HAT determine the aims of scientific practices, and the extent of 
plurality in scientific inquiry.  
In chapter 2, I outline the philosophy of science in practice approach, 
arguing for a broadening of the subject matter of philosophy of science, 
asserting that this is necessary and will allow closer attention to be 
paid to scientific practices. Moreover, I present preliminary arguments 
for pluralism and values in science. 
In chapter 3, I focus on the clinical and epidemiological details of HAT, 
as well as providing an overview of the historical attempts to combat 
HAT and the current efforts to eliminate it. The aim of this chapter to 
provide my reader with the necessary background on HAT, arguing for 
the need to prioritise anti-parasitic drug discovery. 
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In chapter 4, I provide a detailed argument for pluralism, with detailed 
overviews of Kellert et al. (2006), Chang (2012) and Mitchell (2002). In 
this chapter I develop the argument that pluralities are an important 
characteristic of scientific practices. Moreover, I argue against possible 
monist objections to pluralities in science.  
In chapter 5, I further my discussion of the normative aspects of 
pluralism, arguing that scientific practices ought to be pluralistic in 
order to explain and explore different aspects of phenomena. In this 
chapter, I identify three assumptions that lead to monist views of 
science, arguing that it is the role of pluralists to oppose these 
assumptions, replacing them with pluralist tenets. Moreover, in this 
chapter I argue that there is a limit to the extent of plurality in scientific 
practices. I argue that the boundaries of pluralism posed by these 
pragmatic values do not lead to monism.  
Finally, in chapter 6, I define pragmatic values, proposing a pragmatic 
framework to understand the role of values in scientific practices. In 
this chapter I aim to show how the broader context of scientific inquiry 
shapes scientific practices and their aims. Using contemporary 
accounts of John Dewey’s logic of inquiry, I argue that values play an 
important role in determining the aims of scientific inquiry and shaping 
scientific practices by determining the extent of plurality.  
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Chapter 2 
2.1 Philosophy of science in practice approach 
The Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice (SPSP) was 
established in 2005 in order to promote an approach in philosophy of 
science that is more engaged with scientific practices and uses of 
scientific knowledge (SPSP 2015, Ankeny et al. 2011). The new 
approach promoted by SPSP is in response to the traditional forms of 
philosophy of science (PoS) that focus on ‘the relation between 
scientific theories and the world, oftentimes to the neglect of scientific 
practice’ (Ankeny et al. 2011: 304). Ankeny et al. (2011) argue that the 
focus on the relationship between the theories and the world limits the 
philosophical accounts of science. Instead, Ankeny et al. (2011) argue 
that pursuit of PoS must ‘consider theory, practice and the world 
simultaneously and never in isolation form one another’ (Ankeny et al. 
2011: 304).  
I will argue that in order to have a better philosophical understanding of 
science it is essential to explore not only the theories (or other products 
such as models, explanations, etc.), but also the practices that produce 
them. That is, traditional questions in PoS (including metaphysical, 
epistemological and methodological) must be answered in such a way 
as to take all aspects of scientific inquiry into account: the world as its 
subject of study, scientific accounts of the world (including theories, 
models, explanations, etc.) and practices as organised activities with a 
distinct aim. Ankeny et al. (2011) further articulate the philosophy of 
scientific practice (PSP) approach as follows: 
Rather than asking abstract or theoretical questions about the 
appropriate scientific standards for evidence, recasting the 
questions of interest in terms of activities allows us to explore 
various (and often competing) approaches to the generation and 
weighing of evidence. Examining the goals underlying the 
activities associated with science also forces us to focus not 
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only on epistemological considerations but also on the values, 
norms, and ideals inherent in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. 
Further, it encourages us to question the metaphysical and 
ontological assumptions underlying these practices rather than 
taking them as obvious or as unquestionable ‘givens.’ In short, 
focusing on practice allows philosophy of science to return to 
fundamental issues which have increasingly become neglected 
in favour of a relatively narrow preferred approach to the field 
which is largely epistemic, highly theoretical, and often 
overlooks the implications of the sciences as practiced. (Ankeny 
et al. 2011: 305) 
The aim of this chapter is to defend the PSP approach in detail and set 
out the main philosophical questions I will address later in this 
dissertation. The two main questions I will address later are how to 
interpret the pluralities in science (chapters 4 and 5) and the role of 
values in science (chapter 6), and can only be answered by attending 
to the relevant scientific practices and their broader context. In the first 
half of this chapter (section 2.1), I will present an argument for adopting 
a PSP approach, focusing on the importance of broadening the subject 
matter of philosophy of science to include scientific practices. 
Moreover, I present a preliminary argument for both epistemic 
pluralism and a pragmatic framework for understanding the role of 
values in science. The argument I put forward in the second part of this 
chapter (section 2.2) is that scientific practices, particularly their aims, 
must be studied with respect to their broader socio-economic and 
political context. I further argue that it is essential to understand how 
the aims of different practices are shaped by their broader context. 
Thus, the main goal of this chapter is to outline the PSP approach and 
its benefits.  
Section 2.1.1 describes the traditional view in philosophy of science, 
which is often used in philosophy of scientific practice literature, 
referring to a view shared by a diverse group of philosophers, 
characterised by their focus on the relationship between theories and 
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the natural world, while disregarding scientific practices. It is difficult to 
articulate a precise definition of the traditional view, since it is not clear 
which philosophers to include as exemplars, nor is it easy to define a 
time window in which the traditional view was prominent.1 Thus, I will 
focus on the traditional view characterised in PSP literature, as the 
position to which the PSP approach responds. 
In section 2.1.2, I will focus on Thomas Kuhn’s ‘normal science’, where 
he argues that philosophy of science must go beyond study of theories 
and look at paradigms as a whole. Although there are many 
discussions on the precise meaning of a paradigm, here I focus on a 
paradigm as a disciplinary matrix. Kuhn argues that philosophy of 
science must study paradigms, which consists of theories, practices, 
values, assumptions etc. Kuhn’s emphasis on the importance of the 
extra-theoretical aspects challenges the traditional view, underlining 
the importance of philosophical study of everyday practices in science. 
In section 2.1.3  I move on to discuss the works of the so-called 
Stanford School, particularly those of Ian Hacking (1983) and Peter 
Galison (1987). I focus on Hacking and Galison given their close 
engagement with scientific practices, particularly experimentation, in 
order to address traditional questions in philosophy, including the 
realism and anti-realism debates. The Stanford School represents an 
approach in philosophy of science that productively engages with 
scientific practices in order to answer traditional philosophical question. 
In line with Kuhn, members of the Stanford School argued for the 
importance of studying scientific practices in order to address 
philosophical questions regarding scientific knowledge, the subject 
matter of science and the scientific method.  
                                               
1 1 Exemplars of the traditional view include the works of Nagel (1961) and 
Maxwell (1962). Both authors focus on theories as the main unit of analysis 
for philosophy of science. (Nagel’s work on the reduction of theories is later 
discussed in section 4.4.1 in light of the contemporary debate on reductive 
explanations in life sciences). 
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I take the arguments put forward by Kuhn and the members of the 
Stanford School as (noteworthy) predecessors of the PSP approach, 
given that both positions argued for broadening the subject matter of 
philosophy of science to include scientific practices. That is, Kuhn and 
members of the Stanford School argue that the theory-centric view in 
PoS is inadequate for understanding science, and the subject matter of 
philosophy of science must be broadened by including extra-theoretical 
aspects of scientific inquiry, especially scientific practices.  
In section 2.2, I introduce both the values debate and the pluralism 
debate. In section 2.2.1, I review the values debate, illustrating the role 
of values in scientific practices. In particular, I focus on how the aims of 
particular scientific practices are determined with respect to their 
broader socio-economic and political context. Here I provide a 
preliminary argument for a pragmatic framework, which I will discuss in 
detail in chapter 6. In section 2.2.2 I provide the preliminary argument 
for contextual pluralism, which I will further discuss and develop in 
chapters 4 and 5. The two questions I set out here are treated 
together, in the sense that I use the values literature to address 
problems that arise in the pluralist arguments I review. 
2.1.1 Traditional View 
The traditional form of Philosophy of Science (PoS), as referred to by 
Ankeny et al. (2011), is not a unified position that can be defined in a 
straight forward way.2 It refers to a multifaceted body of work produced 
by a diverse group of philosophers. My aim here is not to provide a 
comprehensive history of philosophy, but to characterise the traditional 
forms of PoS, criticised in the PSP literature. In order to characterise 
the traditional view, I will follow Hacking (1983), who identifies the 
                                               
2 Ankeny et al. can be regarded as a manifesto for the PSP approach: it was 
written as an introduction to a special edition of the European Journal of 
Philosophy of Science on the PSP approach, defining it and listing the broad 
motivations and goals of the SPSP. 
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traditional view by comparing the works of Rudolf Carnap and Karl 
Popper. Hacking’s characterisation is succinct and identifies the basic 
premises of the traditional form that PSP rejects (I will discuss 
Hacking’s work in detail in section 2.1.3).3 
Hacking (1983) identifies Carnap and Popper as two philosophers who 
shared the traditional view and compares their philosophies, attending 
particularly to their disagreements to build the same basic view of 
science that they share. Hacking argues that the disagreements 
between Carnap and Popper were only possible because they have 
the same fundamental view of science (Hacking 1983: 5). Herein, I will 
follow how Hacking constructs the traditional view by reviewing the 
disagreements between Carnap and Popper.  
Hacking argues that both Carnap and Popper regard natural sciences 
(especially physics) as the best example of human rationality (Hacking 
1983: 5). Thus, both Carnap and Popper aimed to develop criteria to 
demarcate science from ‘ill speculation’. For Carnap the demarcation 
criterion is verifiability, where scientific statements must be empirically 
verifiable; otherwise, they are meaningless. However, Popper argues 
that scientific statements can never be verified because of their wide 
scope. For Popper, a statement is scientific if it is testable and thus 
might be shown to be false, i.e. falsifiable (this will be further discussed 
in section 2.1.2). 
Carnap takes observation as the foundation of scientific knowledge, in 
which observation statements can be used to verify (or support) a 
hypotheses using inductive logic. Thus, Carnap argues that good 
reason relies upon howthe way in which empirical observation confirms 
a hypothesis. For Popper, there are no foundations of knowledge and 
all knowledge is fallible. Popper argues that the rationality of science is 
not due to how well scientific knowledge is supported by evidence, but 
                                               
3 Hacking is cited as one of the precursors of the PSP approach in the 
Mission Statement of (Brown 2013, p.837)  
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the method by which it is acquired. The Popperian method involves 
scientific theories being subjected to constant and rigorous testing. 
That is, if a theory fails a test, it is refuted; if it passes the test, it is only 
corroborated.  
Hacking argues that Carnap and Popper disagree on so many points 
because they have a shared image of science: 
whenever we find two philosophers who line up exactly opposite 
on a series of half a dozen of points, we know that in fact they 
agree about almost everything. They share an image of science 
(Hacking 1983: 5).  
For Hacking, Carnap and Popper share an image of science that 
constitutes the traditional view. That is to say, Carnap and Popper can 
have different opinions on so many aspects of science because they 
share common ground. Hacking summarises the main features of the 
traditional view as follows (Hacking 1983: 5):4 
 there is a sharp distinction between theory and observation. 
 there is a scientific method that must be employed by all 
sciences.  
 scientific development is cumulative, approaching towards the 
truth (or approximation of the truth). 
 there is a difference between the context of discovery and the 
context of justification.  
In order to explain the theory-focused approach in the traditional view 
of PoS, Hacking attends to the distinction between the context of 
                                               
4 These features are characterised by Hacking, and must be regarded 
as analysts’ categories. Therefore, it is not a definite list and can be 
interpreted in different ways. 
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discovery and the context of justification. This distinction was put 
forward by Reichenbach (1938), arguing that the role of philosophy is 
to reconstruct scientific reasoning in a way that can be subject to 
logical analysis. Reichenbach’s work has been discussed in detail by 
Howard (2006) and Richardson (2006).  
According to this distinction, the context of discovery includes intuitive 
or irrational processes (such as serendipity, inspiration, luck, etc.) that 
may lead to the conception of a new theory. However, the context of 
justification involves verification and testing of the new theory, in which 
theories are validated and knowledge is acquired as a result of logical 
reasoning. The distinction has been discussed widely in philosophy of 
science literature, particularly how this distinction must be drawn (c.f 
Kordig 1978, Gutting 1980, Hoyningen-Huene 1987, Schickore and 
Steinle 2006).  
Hacking argues that the distinction between context of discovery and 
context of justification underlines the lack of attention to practice in 
philosophy of science. Specifically, Hacking argues that the traditional 
view holds that philosophy of science is about ‘justification, logic, 
reason, soundness, methodology’ (Hacking 1983: 6), and therefore 
philosophy of science is interested in the processes within the context 
of justification. The context of discovery needs to be studied by 
historians and sociologists, questioning the ‘circumstances of 
discovery, psychological quirks, the social interactions, and economic 
milieu’ (Hacking 1983: 6). That is to say this distinguishes philosophy 
of science from history of science and social studies of science. The 
distinction between context of discovery and context of justification can 
be seen as a reason for scientific practice being ignored by philosophy 
of science: the traditional view did not include everyday practices of 
science as a subject of study.  
I will now shift my focus to how Kuhn differed from the traditional view 
and how his ideas made novel contributions to the history and 
philosophy of science, making a difference to the methodology of 
philosophy of science. It is worth underlining the importance of Kuhn’s 
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break from the traditional view is significant for the PSP approach I am 
arguing for here, given that Kuhn argued that the everyday activities of 
scientists are as important for making philosophical sense of science 
as particular instances that are traditionally discussed.  
2.1.2 Kuhn: Normal Science 
Thomas Kuhn’s body of work is distinct from the traditional forms of 
PoS described in section 2.1.1. Kuhn provides a different picture of 
science, making a clear distinction between two phases of science: 
normal science and revolutionary science. Kuhn’s work has been 
scrutinised by both history and philosophy of science literature and 
social studies of science literature (c.f. Lakatos and Musgrave 1970, 
Barnes 1982, Longino 1994, Nickles 2003, Bird 2005). Here I argue 
that Kuhn’s picture of science takes everyday activities in science and 
scientific theories as the subject matter. That is, Kuhn argues for the 
importance of studying scientific practices and theories: 
History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or 
chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the 
image of science by which we are now possessed. That image 
has previously been drawn, even by scientists themselves, 
mainly from the study of finished scientific achievements as 
these are recorded in the classics and, more recently, in the 
textbooks from which each new scientific generation learns to 
practice its trade […] This essay attempts to show that we have 
been misled by them in fundamental ways. Its aim is a sketch of 
the quite different concept of science that can emerge from the 
historical record of the research activity itself. (Kuhn 2012: 1) 
Here Kuhn argues for a change in the subject matter of philosophy 
(and history), shifting from reconstruction of science that one finds in 
text books, to research activity itself. As Rouse (2002) asserts, ‘Kuhn 
reorients the philosophy of science toward an account of scientific 
practices rather than scientific knowledge. In line with Rouse, I will 
underline Kuhn’s emphasis on the need to broaden the subject matter 
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of philosophy of science to include extra-theoretical aspects of science. 
Here I focus on Kuhn (2012) and Kuhn (1970b), in which he argues for 
the need to study the everyday activities of scientist to have a better 
(philosophical and historical) understanding of scientific inquiry. Kuhn 
puts forward his view on how science progresses, as follows: 
normal science – crisis – scientific revolution – normal 
science 
Kuhn defines normal science as periods in which scientists adhere to a 
paradigm, which can be thought of as a disciplinary matrix consisting of 
accepted theories, models, methods and metaphysical assumptions. It 
is important to note that there is a rich literature on the precise 
definition of Kuhnian paradigms. Here I am using the definition of 
paradigm Kuhn provided in the postscript (Kuhn 2012: 181), in which 
he argues for the importance of extra-theoretical factors in 
understanding science. For Kuhn, paradigms provide necessary tools 
for scientists to explore certain aspects of phenomena allowed by the 
limitations of that particular paradigm.5 Kuhn describes normal science 
as ‘puzzle solving’, arguing that periods of normal science correspond 
to periods in which scientists do not always aim to produce major 
conceptual changes or revolutionary breakthroughs (Kuhn 2012: 35).6 
Kuhn asserts that: 
Bringing a normal research problem to a conclusion is achieving 
the anticipated in a new way, and it requires the solution of all 
sorts of complex instrumental, conceptual, and mathematical 
puzzles. The man who succeeds proves himself an expert 
                                               
5 Kuhn argues that in a disciplinary matrix, scientists use multiple tools 
(theories, methods, values, metaphysical assumptions and so on) to answer 
the questions the paradigm poses.  
6 This point can be seen as a response to Popper’s picture of science in 
which scientists are constantly testing their theories stringently, trying to 
falsify them. I return to this point later in this section.   
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puzzle-solver, and the challenge of the puzzle is an important 
part of what usually drives him on. (Kuhn 2012: 36) 
Furthermore, Kuhn argues that the failure to achieve anticipated results 
during normal science is regarded as the failure of scientists, not a 
failure of the theory or method (Kuhn 2012: 79). Kuhn repeatedly 
states that in case of failures in normal science, scientists do not blame 
their tools, but their ability.7 However, in cases of persistent failure and 
anomalies, a crisis can emerge. Kuhn argues that in times of crisis, the 
paradigm comes under scrutiny, and new paradigms emerge and 
replace old ones. Kuhn calls this process scientific revolution that 
results in paradigm shift.  
Kuhn’s picture of science has been widely criticised, particularly for the 
way in which normal science is described. For instance, normal 
science is compared to religious dogma in the sense that scientists do 
not criticise paradigms until problems mount and the paradigm falls into 
crisis (Popper 1970, Watkins 1970). Stephen Toulmin (1970) asserts 
that the sharp distinction between normal science and scientific 
revolutions are not as clear as Kuhn argues. 
Here, instead of focusing on Kuhn’s argument on how science 
progresses, I focus on Kuhn’s description of normal science, and 
particularly his argument (1970b) that philosophy of science should 
attend to normal science and the research activities as much as it does 
to scientific revolutions. The argument put forward by Kuhn is similar to 
that of Ankeny et al. (2011), in the sense that they both argue that 
philosophy of science must not be restricted to only studying theories 
(or rational reconstructions of science in textbooks), but also attend to 
scientific practices.   
                                               
7 Kuhn likens scientist blaming the paradigm for failure during normal science 
to a bad carpenter blaming his/her tools (Kuhn, 2012: 79). 
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Kuhn argues for the importance of normal science in response to his 
critics, in particular Popper’s criticism (1970).8 Kuhn argues that he and 
Popper have many things in common, including their interest in the 
dynamic process in science: 
We are both concerned with the dynamic process by which 
scientific knowledge is acquired rather than with the logical 
structure of the products of scientific research. Given that 
concern, both of us emphasize, as legitimate data, the facts and 
also the spirit of actual scientific life, and both of us turn often to 
history to find them. (Kuhn 1970b: 1) 
Kuhn also points out that he and Popper oppose the same classical 
positivist thesis: 
the intimate and inevitable entanglement of scientific 
observation with scientific theory; we are correspondingly 
sceptical of efforts to produce any neutral observation language; 
and we both insist that scientists may properly aim to invent 
theories that explain observed phenomena and that do so in 
                                               
8 Kuhn argues that his and Popper’s argument have a common ground: both 
are interested in the dynamic processes involved in the development of 
scientific knowledge. The idea that Kuhn and Popper have a common ground 
might seem at odds with Hacking’s analysis of Popper discussed in the 
previous section (2.1.1). It is important to note the origins of Kuhn’s 1970 
paper in the the 1965 International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science 
(held at Bedford College, Regent's Park, London). At this colloquium, Kuhn 
was directly responding to Popper in person. Taking this fact into 
consideration, Kuhn’s aim was to show the commonality between his and 
Popper’s position in order to build his response which I discuss in the 
remainder of this section. On the other hand, Hacking’s analysis aimed to 
show how Popper’s theory centric view (taking theories as the sole subject 
matter for philosophy of science) is in line with the traditional view in 
philosophy of science. While they might share a common ground (interest in 
dynamic processes in science), Kuhn’s analysis of scientific inquiry goes 
beyond theories and focused broadly on paradigms as subject matter in 
philosophy of science. Thus, Kuhn’s and Hackings view of Popper’s works 
are not at odds.  
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terms of real objects, whatever the latter phrase may mean. 
(Kuhn 1970b: 2) 
Moreover, Kuhn argues that they both emphasise the importance of 
understanding scientific life: 
Among the most fundamental issues on which Sir Karl and I 
agree is our insistence that an analysis of the development of 
scientific knowledge must take account of the way science has 
actually been practiced. (Kuhn 1970b: 8) 
Despite these similarities, Kuhn argues that Popper arrives at different 
conclusions from his own: 
Sir Karl and I do appeal to the same data; to an uncommon 
extent we are seeing the same lines on the same paper; asked 
about those lines and those data, we often give virtually identical 
responses, or at least responses that inevitably seem identical 
in the isolation enforced by the question-and-answer mode. 
(Kuhn 1970b: 3) 
As discussed in section 2.1.1, Popper argues that scientists must 
subject their theories to constant testing, in which each test is aimed at 
falsifying the theories. For Popper, no test can fully verify a theory, but 
can falsify it. Popper argues that theories that pass the tests are only 
corroborated, not validated. The examples Popper uses are Lavoisier’s 
calcination experiments and the eclipse expedition of 1919 (Popper 
1963). In summary, for Popper, scientific progress is possible through 
conjecture and refutation: scientist making bold conjectures and trying 
to falsify them. Kuhn points out that Popper’s examples for supporting 
conjectures and refutations are rare and can only be seen during 
scientific revolutions in which established theory is overthrown. 
However, Kuhn argues that such revolutionary events are very rare in 
the history of science. That is to say, Kuhn does not completely 
disregard Popper’s conjectures and refutations, but limits it to times of 
crisis. 
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In contrast to Poppers’ conjecture and refutation model, Kuhn argues 
that testing in normal science aims to describe phenomena and match 
them with theory. The aim is not to test the limits of the theories, but to 
further articulate them. The key difference is their view of theory 
change. Kuhn points out that Popper’s conjectures and refutations can 
only explain how some theories may be accepted or rejected in 
idealised scenarios that are rare in scientific practice. Kuhn argues that 
philosophers of science are not likely to understand the development of 
knowledge or science in general by focusing on special instances in 
the history of science:  
neither science nor development of knowledge is likely to be 
understood if research is viewed exclusively through the 
revolutions it occasionally produces. (Kuhn 1970a: 6) 
Kuhn argues that periods of normal science are as important as times 
of revolution, and deserve the attention of philosophers of science. 
Kuhn further argues that the historical and philosophical accounts of 
science must go beyond theories and look at paradigms as a whole.9 
Kuhn asserts that theories or sets of theories are shared within the 
community of scientists. However, scientists conceptualise theories 
differently from philosophers of science:  
As currently used in philosophy of science, however, ‘theory’ 
connotes a structure far more limited in nature and scope than 
the one required here. Until the term can be freed from its 
current implications, it will avoid confusion to adopt another 
[term]. (Kuhn 2012: 181) 
Instead of focusing on theories as the only subject matter, Kuhn argues 
that historians and philosophers of science must consider paradigms, 
which he describes paradigms as disciplinary matrices. A disciplinary 
                                               
9 I would like to thank Yafeng Shan for his comments and discussion on this 
topic.  
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matrix is a collection of scientific groups that work on common 
problems and share similar goals (Kuhn 2012, p.182). Thinking about 
science and scientific knowledge in terms of paradigms (instead of 
theories) allows historians and philosophers to take extra-theoretical 
factors into account.  
More broadly, Kuhn argues that his aim is to provide an account of 
science that emerges from the ‘historical record of the research activity 
itself’ (Kuhn 2012: 1). Thus, Kuhn argues that such a philosophical 
account cannot rely on logical analysis only, but must consider the 
disciplinary matrix. In contrast to Popper’s rational model of testing and 
theory change, Kuhn explains theory changes using perceptual 
psychology experiments (such as Gestalt switches) in his account of 
scientific development. That is to say that the everyday practices of the 
scientist are not merely dictated by logic and experiment alone, but 
social values and psychological imperatives shared within the 
community. In summary, Kuhn argues that rather than understanding 
scientific practice as rational reconstructions (as they are often 
understood in the traditional forms of PoS, as discussed in section 
2.1.1), philosophers of science must think about everyday activities 
within science as a disciplinary matrix in order to prove a more 
comprehensive picture of scientific inquiry. 
Kuhn’s ideas that challenged the theory-focused philosophy of science 
were taken up by groups of philosophers interested in scientific 
practices, particularly experimentation, values and pluralism. Moreover, 
he opened up avenues of discussion between philosophers of science 
and historians of science and social studies of science (see Barnes 
1982; Nickes 2003). It is important to note the impact of Kuhn on 
philosophy of science: his challenges to the traditional view led to 
discussions of the subject matter of philosophy of science and how to 
interpret scientific practices as a whole (discussed in the second part of 
this chapter). Before moving onto these topics, I will discuss the 
Stanford School, consisting of philosophers who challenged the 
traditional view in a similar way to Kuhn.  
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The Stanford School challenged the theory-centric view in philosophy 
of science, as well as the unity of science thesis (in its various forms), 
arguing for a philosophical understanding of science that is built 
bottom-up, focusing on scientific practices as their subject matter. 
2.1.3 Stanford School  
The Stanford School consists of philosophers Nancy Cartwright, John 
Dupré, Peter Galison, Ian Hacking, and Patrick Suppes, all of whom 
worked at Stanford University at various times. Members of the 
Stanford School are known for the methodological, epistemic and 
metaphysical arguments they developed against the unity of science 
thesis. Broadly, members of Stanford School reject restrictive accounts 
of inquiry, opposing arguments that scientific method and knowledge is 
universal and the phenomena is uniform (Cat 2017). Arguments put 
forward by the members of the Stanford School are significant for the 
development of the PSP approach for engaging directly with scientific 
practices to address traditional philosophical questions. For instance, 
Patrick Suppes (1978) focuses on scientific practices and scientific 
journals to argue that different subject matters, methods and 
languages used in different scientific disciplines are not reducible to 
one unified subject matter, method and language. Using case studies 
from scientific practices (including neuroscience and quantum physics), 
Suppes argues that scientific activity is an act of perpetual problem-
solving, in which scientists are confronted with new problems, which 
they approach with, ‘a potpourri of scientific methods, techniques, and 
concepts, which in many cases we have learned to use with great 
facility’” (Suppes 1978: 14).  
John Dupré (1993) and Nancy Cartwright (1999) provide metaphysical 
arguments against the unity of science thesis, providing metaphysical 
foundations for the disunity thesis and pluralism (further discussed in 
section 4.1). Both Dupré and Cartwright have a bottom-up approach, 
starting from scientific practices to build their metaphysical arguments: 
promiscuous realism (Dupre 1993) and the dappled world (Cartwright 
1999). While much can be said about both the promiscuous realism 
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and dappled word arguments, here I limit my discussion to 
methodological and epistemic questions. I am interested in building an 
account that addresses epistemic and methodological questions 
(plurality in scientific practices and the role of values in science) while 
remaining agnostic about metaphysical questions.  
Ian Hacking (1983) and Peter Galison (1987) address methodological 
and epistemological questions, while underlining the importance of 
understanding scientific practices, in particular experiments. In this 
section I am going to focus on Hacking’s experimental realism and 
Galison’s work on the experimental life, given their emphasis on the 
everyday activities of scientists. Both philosophers argue for the 
importance of extending philosophical inquiry beyond scientific theories 
and look at scientific practices as a whole.10 Here I focus on Hacking 
and Galison as two representatives of the Stanford School who 
approached methodological and epistemic questions by focusing on 
scientific practices. 
2.1.3.1 Experimental Realism 
Ian Hacking argues that philosophy of science has focused on theories 
and representations of reality and has disregarded experiments 
(Hacking 1983: 149). Moreover, Hacking argues that the history of 
natural sciences has become the history of theory. The consequence 
of this theory-focused approach is the dismissal of pre-theoretical 
activities and experimental observation by philosophers (Hacking 1983: 
150). Hacking attends to experimental science, which according to 
Hacking, has a life of its own. He argues that ‘the relationship between 
theory and experiment differ at different stages of development’ 
(Hacking 1983: 154).  
                                               
10 It is important to make it clear that the need to expand the subject matter of 
philosophy to include everyday practices in science (as opposed to only 
focusing on theories and the rational reconstruction of scientific inquiry) is 
shared by all members of the Stanford School.   
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Hacking underlines that this may be an obvious statement, but it is 
often denied by the traditional view described above. Popper (2002), 
for instance, argues that theorists formulate a sharp, falsifiable 
question that acts as a guide for the experimenter, stating that, ‘theory 
dominates the experimental work from its initial planning up to the 
finishing touches in the laboratory’ (Quoted in Hacking 1983: 155) 
For Popper, the aim of an experiment is to test and attempt to falsify a 
theory (discussed in section 2.1.1). The reason for recalling Popper 
here is to demonstrate how Hacking’s argument diverges from the 
traditional view. Hacking rejects the notion that the aim of an 
experiment is to test a theory; instead, Hacking argues that the 
relationship between theories and experiments can differ (as quoted 
above). Moreover, Hacking argues that the relationship between 
experiments and theories must be examined case-by-case. For 
instance, Hacking uses David Brewster’s experimental work in optics to 
illustrate the complex relationship between theory and experiment 
(Hacking 1983: 157). Hacking describes Brewster as a prolific 
experimenter who was a major figure in experimental optics in the first 
half of the nineteenth century. Brewster’s work (including laws of 
reflection and refraction of polarised light), according to Hacking, 
produced the experimental results that were used in the development 
of the wave theory. Hacking argues that Brewster was not testing or 
comparing theories in his experiments. Brewster’s experiments 
focusing on how light behaves contributed towards development of the 
wave theory of light, even though Brewster himself supported the 
Newtonian corpuscular theory of light. Hacking asserts that  
Brewster firmly held the ‘wrong’ theory while creating the 
experimental phenomena that we can understand with the ‘right’ 
theory, the very theory he vociferously rejected. (Hacking 1983: 
157).  
That is, Brewster’s experimental work was not aiming to test the wave 
theory of light. In order to understand Brewster’s contribution to the 
development of wave theory, one must study his experimental work.  
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Hacking’s main question is the relationship between theory and 
experiment. Hacking argues that theory and experiment can develop 
independently from one another. Moreover, Hacking rejects the notion 
that theories precede experiment, where the goal of experimentation is 
to test or further theory. Hacking argues that the relationship between 
theories and experiment differs from case to case:  
Some profound experimental work is generated entirely by 
theory. Some great theories spring from pre-theoretical 
experiment. Some theories languish for lack of mesh with the 
real world, while some experimental phenomena sit idle for lack 
of theory. There are also happy families, in which theory and 
experiment coming from different directions meet. (Hacking 
1983: 159) 
This underlines Hacking’s overall argument: experimental aspects of 
scientific inquiry are not subsidiary to scientific theories in our 
philosophical understanding of science. The relationship between 
theories and experiments are just two aspects discussed by Hacking; 
we might add other aspects such as values, assumptions etc. as 
important aspects that require scientific inquiry. Hacking’s argument is 
informed by the history of science that focuses on scientific practice 
and experiment, rather than theories. Hacking later addresses the 
realism/anti-realism debate, building his experimental realism. In line 
with the PSP approach, Hacking argues that theory-centric approaches 
in philosophy of science neglect the essential aspects of scientific 
inquiry, namely experimentation. Hacking’s argument is a prime 
example of how the traditional questions in philosophy of science can 
be adequately addressed by broadening the subject matter of 
philosophy. This broadening allows for the recasting of philosophical 
questions and building philosophical accounts that are closely engaged 
with scientific practices, making the philosophical account of scientific 
inquiry relevant to scientists, policy-makers etc.  
2.1.3.2 The Life of Experiments  
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Similar to Hacking, Galison (1987) argues that philosophical and 
historical accounts of science are incomplete or inadequate due to this 
asymmetrical emphasis on theory. Galison (1987) tracks the lives of 
experiments, looking at intermediate states between first suspicion and 
the final argument. Galison’s account focuses on the ‘actual practices’ 
in the lab including ‘twisting of wire, the shielding of chambers, the 
hoisting of thousand-pound steel plates’ (Galison 1987: 19)  
Galison (1987) questions the scope of experimental autonomy, a 
question he addresses by focusing how different levels of theory 
influence experimental work. Galison argues that prioritising theory 
over experiment or vice versa is not definite since priorities change 
from case to case: 
it is necessary to avoid some of the pitfalls of a view that wants 
to put observation or theory ‘first’. Both of these views […] 
reveal partial insights into the character of experimentation. 
(Galison 1987: 12) 
Galison’s work is significant from a PSP perspective due to the 
emphasis he puts on the daily activities of scientists, and how they 
prioritise different factors in establishing scientific facts. Galison’s work 
focuses on three different periods of experimental physics in the 
twentieth century, demonstrating the different forms the relationship 
between experiments and theories take. Galison particularly studies 
the experiments on microphysics, focusing on the debates and 
assumptions that lie behind decisions made by experimenters. 
Concentrating on everyday practices, Galison demonstrates the 
influence of the social and psychological factors embedded in everyday 
scientific practice on knowledge production. Galison argues that the 
daily practices in the lab are heterogeneous processes that cannot be 
explained merely by logical reconstructions or psychological models.  
Galison recalls Kuhn’s (and to an extent Hanson’s [1958]) use of 
perceptual psychology, namely Gestalt images as a way to 
understanding the everyday aspects of scientific practices. Galison 
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argues that while the use of psychological models encourages 
interesting questions regarding scientific practices, abstract models 
(such as Gestalt images) fail to adequately explain the mechanism in 
which psychological factors (such as theoretical presuppositions) 
influence experimental life. For Galison, psychological models alone 
are too simplistic to describe the relationship between theories and 
experiments, especially Kuhn’s Gestalt switch that suggests scientists 
see different things based on theoretical presuppositions (Galison 
1987: 68). Galison argues that: 
The task of understanding the relation of theory to experiment is 
contingent on grasping the different levels theory that are 
involved in the experimenter’s work and on analysing the 
various mechanism that connect the experimental work with the 
elements of theory. (Galison 1987: 69)  
The argument here is similar to one put forward by Hacking, in the 
sense that in order to understand the relationship between experiments 
and theories, it is necessary to study them case by case. Galison 
describes the task of unravelling theoretical and experimental factors 
shaping scientific practice as a historical enterprise that has no fixed 
rules: 
experimental physics cannot be re-written as a logical fantasy in 
which all theorising is forbidden until ‘facts’ clinch the argument. 
Nor can experimentation be parodied as if it were no more 
grounded in reason than negotiation over the price of a street 
fair antique. (Galison 1987: 277) 
In summary, Galison argues that in order to have a better 
understanding of scientific inquiry, philosophy of science must study 
scientific theories and experiments. Moreover, he argues that scientific 
practices (and the knowledge they produce) are shaped by various 
intellectual and social factors. The way in which Galison engages with 
scientific practices is important to underline here. Galison engages in 
ethnographic study of the lab following the social and the intellectual 
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life in the laboratory in order to address the epistemic and 
methodological questions. Galison’s work is in stark contrast with the 
traditional view in terms of the way that Galison follows the everyday 
activities of scientists in everyday lab work, as opposed to relying on 
the rational construction of theory testing. Moreover, Galison’s 
audience is not only philosophers of science but also historians, 
sociologist and the scientists themselves. Galison (like Hacking) 
engages directly with scientists, following scientific practices, making 
philosophical accounts of scientific inquiry more pertinent and far-
reaching. 
2.1.4 What comes after the Practice Turn 
The arguments I discussed in the first part of the chapter are to 
describe and support the PSP approach that I will adopt in this 
dissertation. Here, I argued that the theory-focused traditional view 
leads to the neglect of important aspects of scientific inquiry. Moreover, 
I now argue that scientific theories must not be regarded as special 
among other scientific accounts of phenomena, such as models, 
explanations etc. The PSP approach aims to study and understand 
scientific inquiry as a whole, in which scientific practices are as 
important as the accounts (including theories, models, explanations) as 
a subject of study for philosophers of science.  
The broadening of the subject matter allows the reframing of traditional 
questions in philosophy of science (such as the realism/anti-realism 
debate), but also motivates new questions. In this dissertation, I focus 
on two: the role of values in science, and how to interpret the pluralities 
in scientific practices and accounts. In the second part of this chapter I 
provide provisional arguments for scientific pluralism and the role of 
values in science. I will explore both questions using a case study, 
looking at Neglected Tropical Disease (NTD) research. The aim of the 
second part of this chapter is to set out the two philosophical questions 
I will address later, as well as providing a background to the main case 
study I will use to further the philosophical discussion. 
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2.2 Contextual Pluralism 
2.2.1 Context and the Uses of Knowledge  
In section 2.1.1, I defined scientific practices as organised activities, 
working towards achieving certain aims. I will argue that scientific 
practices have multiple aims, and that particular aims must be 
understood in their broader context. These aims are not exclusively 
epistemic (i.e. the production of knowledge), but also the production of 
knowledge to serve a purpose. Here, I argue that the PSP approach 
must acknowledge the plurality of aims in scientific practices; 
moreover, particular aims must be understood in the broader context of 
scientific inquiry. This is in line with the PSP approach outlined by 
Ankeny et al. (2011): 
Practice, of course, happens in the real world, and SPSP is 
eager to encourage investigations not only of the acquisition and 
validation of knowledge, but also of the use of such knowledge 
in the material and social world. Our concern is not only about 
how pre-existing knowledge gets applied to practical ends, but 
also about how knowledge itself is fundamentally shaped by its 
intended uses. (Ankeny et al. 2011)  
Herein, I argue that in order to understand how knowledge is shaped 
by its intended use, we need to pay closer attention to the socio-
economic and political contexts of scientific inquiry. My argument is 
grounded in the values literature, initially challenging the notion that 
science is value-free, arguing that values play an important role in 
science (see McMullin 1982, Kuhn 1977, Longino 1990, Douglas 2000, 
Douglas 2009, Lacey 2005, Laudan 1984, Kitcher 2003). According to 
the traditional view (discussed in 2.1.1), the context of justification is 
free from values, meaning that the rational processes in science such 
as theory choice were also free from values. Contrary to the traditional 
view,  Kuhn (1977) argued that scientists appeal to a set of epistemic 
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values in order to assess theories.11 The epistemic values described by 
Kuhn (accuracy, simplicity, consistency, fruitfulness and a broad 
scope) are constitutive and internal to science, i.e. they characterise a 
good scientific theories, allowing scientists to choose (Kuhn 1977). 
Although Kuhn acknowledges that scientist use values in the way they 
assess theories, these values were thought to be particular to science, 
still maintaining the notion that non-epistemic (social, political etc.) 
values had no role to play in science. Longino (1990) argues that in 
addition to epistemic values, contextual values also play a role in 
scientific practices, and that the role of values in science arises from 
the underdetermination of scientific theories. Longino asserts that 
underdetermination is: 
the semantic gap between hypotheses and data that precludes 
the establishing of formal relations of derivability without 
employing additional assumptions […] I take the general lesson 
of underdetermination to be that any empirical reasoning takes 
place against a background of assumptions that are neither self-
evident nor logically true. Such assumptions, or auxiliary 
hypotheses, are the vehicles by which social values can enter 
into scientific judgement. (Longino 2004: 132)  
Longino argues that unless the background assumptions are 
eliminated from scientific practices, values (both constitutive and 
contextual) cannot be eliminated from science. Longino’s contextual 
empiricism holds that the evidential relevance of data can only be 
secured by background assumptions, asserting that these assumptions 
can differ from context to context. Longino asks ‘what controls 
background assumptions?’ (Longino 1996 : 40). Longino argues that 
there is no justification to privilege a set of values (usually referred to 
                                               
11 Kuhn is not the first philosopher to argue that scientists appeal to sets of 
values to assess theories and hypotheses. Hempel, Churchman and Levi 
also argued similar points. Douglas (2009) provide a detailed overview of the 
values debate in the history of philosophy of science.  
  44 
as epistemic) over others. Longino builds her argument using cases 
from feminist epistemology where different sets of values are used by 
feminist scientists to further their research (Longino 1996). I discuss 
Longino’s argument further in section 6.2.  
Douglas (2000) focuses on the concept of inductive risk to argue for 
values in science. Douglas defines inductive risk as the ‘risk of error in 
accepting or rejecting hypotheses’ (2000: 561). Douglas argues that 
values are necessary for scientific reasoning, in which scientists 
consider a range of values to assess the inductive risk. Moreover, 
Douglas argues that both epistemic and non-epistemic values are used 
by scientists, where values play an important and legitimate role in 
directing the scientific research efforts: 
To place the idea of inductive risk in context, it should be noted 
that there are three decision points in the scientific process 
where non-epistemic values are widely recognized as having a 
legitimate role (here, Douglas follows Longino 1990, 83-85). 
First, values (both epistemic and non-epistemic) play important 
roles in the selection of problems to pursue. Second, the direct 
use to which scientific knowledge is put in society requires the 
consideration of non-epistemic values. For example, if science 
enables the development of a new technology, values are (or 
should be) consulted to determine whether such a technology is 
desirable. Third, non-epistemic values place limitations on 
methodological options, such as limitations on how we can use 
humans in experimentation. (Douglas 2000: 563-564) 
Douglas adds that although values have a direct role in decision-
making, they do not directly dictate what should be taken as true. 
Instead, Douglas argues that values allow scientists to assess the 
consequences of the possible error in accepting or rejecting a 
hypothesis, following one method over another or framing the problems 
and questions to pursue. In summary, values are used by scientists to 
consider the consequences of errors in arguments concerning 
evidence (Douglas 2009). I will discuss this further in section 6.2.1. 
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Understanding the role of values in science requires close engagement 
with scientific practices, in which values are used by scientists to make 
decisions, define problems and questions and set aims. Here (and later 
in chapter 6) I focus only on Longino’s and Douglas’s argument for why 
values are required even in the ‘internal’ and supposedly value free 
part of scientific inquiry. However, it must be noted this is not the 
complete account of values in science presented by either author. In 
this thesis, I am interested in how different values determine the aims 
of scientific inquiry and shapes the scientific practices. In the following 
section (2.2.2), I provide an overview of the current efforts coordinated 
by WHO to combat Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs). My aim here 
is to show how the broader context of NTDs shapes and influences the 
scientific and medical practices in this field. Chapter 3 is reserved for a 
detailed discussion of the case study, focusing on a particular NTD: 
Human African Trypanosomiasis (HAT).  
2.2.2 Neglected Tropical Diseases 
NTDs are a medically diverse group of diseases that mainly affect the 
poorest populations. The term ‘NTDs’ was coined by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) in the aftermath of the United Nations’ Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which is a framework to galvanise and 
direct international efforts to fight global poverty. NTDs feature in 
MDGs as ‘other diseases’: goal six is to ‘combat HIV/AIDS, malaria 
and other diseases’. While this goal received a global response from 
policy-makers, they were mostly focused on HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
tuberculosis,12 while ‘other diseases’ remained neglected. In response, 
Molyneux (2004) asserts that: 
                                               
12 It led to the establishment of the international organisation The Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.  It also led to development of the 
policy document known as PEPFAR, the President’s Emergency Plan For 
AIDS Relief. 
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The Millennium Development Goals and a plethora of initiatives 
have focused on the control of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria (…) The focus of health policy-makers on HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria, as well as emerging or re-emerging 
diseases causes funding for neglected diseases to be 
overlooked, with deleterious effects on the social and economic 
wellbeing of the poorest quintile of populations in the least 
developed and low-to-middle income countries. (Molyneux 
2004: 380) 
Although these ‘other diseases’ were neglected by policy circles, the 
first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed an increase in 
advocacy for these diseases by scientists working on tropical diseases, 
aiming to increase awareness on these diseases and the need for 
research. Hotez et al. (2007) list thirteen parasitic and bacterial 
infections that affect approximately 2.7 billion people who live on less 
than $2 per day. Diseases listed by Hotez et al. (2007), referred to as 
NTDs, are all prevalent in rural and poor urban settings of low-income 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
Deaths caused by NTDs are substantially fewer than deaths caused by 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and diarrheal diseases. However, when numbers of 
years lost to disability and premature deaths caused by NTDs are 
calculated, they constitute the most significant chunk of the global 
disease burden. Furthermore, in addition to being a major health 
problem, authors argue that lack of action against these diseases 
perpetuates the poverty in these regions by reducing worker 
productivity. Hotez et al. (2007) assert that: 
the poverty results from disfigurement or other sequelae of long-
term illness, impaired childhood growth and development, 
adverse outcomes of pregnancy and reduced productive 
capacity (Hotez et al. 2007: 1019) 
In 2010, the WHO published their first report on NTDs, identifying 
seventeen such diseases (adding four to the original list), caused by 
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different pathogens (viruses, bacteria, protozoa and helminths). In this 
report, NTDs are defined as follows: 
Neglected tropical diseases are a group of communicable 
diseases which thrive in impoverished settings and blight the 
lives of around one billion people worldwide, while threatening 
the health of millions more. Of the world’s poorest 2.7 billion 
people (defined as those who live on less than US$ 2.00 a day), 
more than 1 billion are affected by one or more neglected 
tropical disease. These diseases not only survive and spread in 
conditions of poverty, they also exacerbate and perpetuate the 
poverty of affected communities. (WHO 2010: 1) 
What these seventeen diseases have in common is not biological, but 
the socio-economic and political contexts in which they occur. The 
common features of these diseases are further articulated by the WHO 
(2010) as those that: 
 are a proxy for poverty and disadvantage;  
 affect populations with low visibility and little political voice;  
 do not travel widely;  
 cause stigma and discrimination, especially affecting girls and 
women;  
 have an important impact on morbidity and mortality;  
 are relatively neglected by research; and  
 can be controlled, prevented and possibly eliminated using 
effective and feasible solutions.  
Therefore, the term NTDs can be thought of as an advocacy term to 
draw attention to a diverse group of diseases that require urgent 
political attention as well as scientific and medical research. The term 
NTD brought together different efforts to eradicate these diseases, 
providing a united platform for further advocacy and galvanising 
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political and financial support. Commitment to unite different efforts to 
combat NTDs was expressed in the London Declaration on Neglected 
Tropical Diseases, a declaration endorsed by the WHO, the World 
Bank, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, thirteen pharmaceutical 
companies and government representatives from multiple countries 
(WHO 2012a). The London Declaration sets out a collaborative effort 
to control, eliminate and eradicate NTDs by 2020:13 
we believe there is a tremendous opportunity to control or 
eliminate at least 10 of these devastating diseases by the end of 
the decade. But no one company, organization or government 
can do it alone. With the right commitment, coordination and 
collaboration, the public and private sectors will work together to 
enable the more than a billion people suffering from NTDs to 
lead healthier and more productive lives – helping the world’s 
poorest build self-sufficiency. (London Declaration on Neglected 
Tropical Diseases 2012) 
The important point here is that the socio-economic and political 
context of these diseases play an important role in framing scientific 
questions and the ways in which scientific practices are organised to 
address these questions. In this dissertation, I mainly focus on the 
pharmaceutical research developing new drugs to treat NTDs, in order 
to show how values play an important role in scientific practices. 
Current drugs that treat parasitic diseases are not ideal due to their 
high toxicity and acquired drug resistance of the parasites (Nwaka and 
Ridley 2003). However, the need for new drugs for NTDs is not 
matched by the pharmaceutical industry: only 13 of 1,300 drugs 
developed between 1975 and 1999 were directed at tropical diseases 
                                               
13 Exact dates and goals vary for each disease, I will discuss particular dates 
and goals for Human African Trypanosomiasis later in section 3.1. 
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(Trouiller et al. 2001, Pink et al. 2005).14 The lack of research and 
development in NTDs is explained through the lack of market potential 
for such treatments, due to the patients’ (or healthcare systems’) 
inability to pay for any new treatments, resulting in the disengagement 
of the pharmaceutical industry (Moran 2005). In order to reverse this 
trend, public-private partnerships (PPPs) were established by 
organisations including the WHO, Médecins Sans Frontières, the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, bringing academia, private industry, 
governmental and non-governmental organisations together (Pink et al. 
2005).  
Public private partnerships are non-profit organisations that bring 
together the different expertise required to develop new treatments for 
NTDs. PPPs are often described as virtual pharmaceutical companies, 
in which different stages of the drug discovery and development 
process are outsourced to different partners. This allows distribution of 
the economic burden of drug development among partners involved. 
The Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi) is an example of a 
PPP (established in 2003 by Médecins Sans Frontières) working on an 
alternative research and development model. DNDi’s collaborative 
model is described as follows:   
DNDi does not operate its own research facilities to develop 
new treatments. It functions based on a collaborative research 
model […] whereby research is outsourced but actively 
managed and directed by DNDi personnel, highly experienced 
in pharmaceutical R&D […] A team is set up for each project, 
under the leadership of a DNDi Head of Programme, to 
coordinate all relevant partners and expertise. Such 
collaboration is governed by various types of contractual 
                                               
14 These values were taken from (Pink et al. 2005) The list of tropical 
diseases referred to in their numbers include six NTDs plus malaria. This is 
used to show the general trend in market-driven pharmaceutical research.  
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agreements, ranging from research funding collaborations, to 
technical service agreements, to long-term co-development 
partnerships with industrial partners. (DNDi 2011: 19) 
Partners share different responsibilities at different stages of the 
process of developing a new drug. In the following section I will focus 
on the discovery and development process, aiming to develop anti-
parasitic drugs, as it is a clear demonstration of how the socio-
economic and the political context of diseases shape the way in which 
the scientific inquiry is organised. Moreover, this is a case in which it is 
clear to see how the range of values that guide scientists are 
constructed and selected. In the following subsection, I will give an 
overview of the drug discovery and development pipeline that entails 
development of a registered drug from scratch. I will return to this 
example multiple times, but here I would like to provide an overview to 
familiarise the reader with the overall process. 
2.2.2.1 Drug Discovery and Development Pipeline 
The anti-parasitic drug discovery process is a lengthy one that can take 
ten or twenty years, with the ultimate aim being the development of a 
new drug that has considerable benefits over existing treatments. This 
process entails development of a small molecule that is able to 
manipulate a specific target (often a macromolecule such as a specific 
nucleic acid) in a parasite that is necessary for its growth and survival.  
The drug discovery process is described as a pipeline that is divided 
into different phases. In DNDi’s case, it is divided into four phases: 
discovery, pre-clinical, clinical and implementation. The discovery 
phase can be divided further into three major tasks: (i) target validation, 
(ii) lead identification, (iii) lead optimisation.  
 
Discovery and 
Development
• Target Validation
• Lead identification
• Lead optimisation
Pre-Clinical 
Development
• in vitro studied
• in vivo studies
• Chemical 
optimisation
Clinical Trials
• Randomised 
Control Trials 
(RCTs):
• Phase I&II
• Phase III
Implementation
• Registration
• Phase IV (RCTs)
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Figure 1. A typical drug discovery pipeline 
During Target Validation, a macromolecule is identified in a parasite’s 
metabolism necessary for its survival. The identified molecule is called 
the ‘target’. Lead Identification is the phase in which a molecule that 
can interact with the target is identified. This step often yields a group 
of molecules, called ‘lead’, that can be developed into drugs that can 
be used on patients. Lead Optimisation is the phase in which lead 
molecules are modified to optimise and enhance their desired effects 
and minimise any potential adverse effects they may cause in humans. 
At the end of this stage the lead is called a ‘drug-candidate’. 
The following stage is the pre-clinical phase, in which the drug 
candidate is studied in vivo using cell cultures and animal models. Next 
is the clinical phase, in which clinical trials are conducted, and this is 
the first time the drug candidate is studied in humans. If the drug 
candidate is shown to be safe in humans and has the desired 
therapeutic effects, it is approved and considered as a drug. Finally, 
the implementation phase entails studies of the approved drug. The 
drug discovery process is long and complex. 15  I return to different 
stages of the drug discovery pipeline in my discussion in sections 2.2.3 
and 4.2. However, in this section, I give an overview of the whole 
process, with a focus on the ways in which it is managed in order to 
minimise the risks of failure, in particular failure for a lead to match the 
properties of a desired drug. The drug discovery and development 
process I described here is a high-cost and high-risk process, in which 
the chance of leads making it to the final stage of approval is low. The 
reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the process of extrapolating 
molecules’ behaviour in vivo from the drug discovery and development 
                                               
15  See Nwaka and Hudson (2006) for a detailed overview of the drug 
discovery pipeline. Frearson et al. (2007) provide a detailed description of the 
target assessment and validation (discussed in detail in section 4.2). Torlee et 
al. (2010) discuss the pre-clinical development and the clinical trial stages for 
the NCE Fexinidazole for HAT treatment in great detail.    
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phase where drug candidates are studied in vitro means that drug 
candidates that might show high potency for targets, but then might not 
be as potent when they are tested in animal models or humans. 
Secondly, and specific to NTDs, the research approach of DNDi is 
focused on developing drugs that meet specific patients’ needs (see 
section 6.1.3 for a detailed discussion on patients’ needs), and 
therefore making the conditions in which drug candidates can be 
approved more stringent. The specifications for a drug derived from 
patients’ needs are listen in a Target Product Profile (TPP).16 TPPs are 
defined at the beginning of the process to guide decision-making 
during the drug discovery process. For instance, a molecule is 
identified a ‘lead’ (and a lead is considered a drug candidate) only if it 
fulfils the criteria listed in the TPP . As stated in Wyatt et al., 
The TPP can be used during the earlier phase of the drug 
discovery process to define the attributes required for drug 
development candidates or compound series to pass from one 
phase of the drug discovery process to the next.  (Wyatt et al. 
2011: 1276) 
The usual components of TPPs are a drug’s pharmacological 
properties (desired efficiency, tolerable toxicity, dosage), target patient 
population, cost, and modes of delivery (oral, intravenous, 
intravascular). All components of the TPP are determined using 
existing knowledge of the parasite; disease epidemiology; patient 
demographics and patient groups’ perception of disease; social factors 
(such as stigma) that influence health-seeking behaviour; and broader 
institutional, political and economic structures that provide healthcare 
services. TPPs are not static and need to be reassessed throughout 
the process, based on the outcome of the different stages. I will 
discuss TPPs in detail in section 3.2.  
                                               
16 TPPs are also called therapeutic product profiles in some contexts. 
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The TPPs guide and influence scientific practices in the drug discovery 
and development process.  Furthermore, the TPPs are formulated 
based on our knowledge of diseases from biological, pharmacological, 
epidemiological and socio-economical perspectives. TPPs can be 
thought of as tools for scientists to assess the inductive risk of a lead 
molecule to match TPP at the end of the process (discussed in detail in 
section 6.1.2). Moreover, TPPs promote plurality of approaches in 
order to increase the confidence that the drug candidates will match 
the TPP. Target validation is a step in which a plurality of approaches 
to explain and explore phenomena is beneficial, as different 
approaches provide complementary and confirmatory evidence as to 
whether a target is essential for parasite growth. For instance, potential 
targets can be identified either by looking at the parasite’s genome 
(they are often analogous to known molecules that play essential roles 
in metabolic pathways that are well understood in similar organisms) or 
using biochemical information about the parasite’s metabolism.  
Assessment of a potential target entails the use of various methods to 
prove that it is essential for parasite growth and survival. Two different 
validation methods are defined by Wyatt et al. (2011): Chemical and 
Genetic. Chemical validation involves using known drugs or 
experimental compounds to show that specific inhibition of the potential 
target is detrimental to parasite growth and survival. If the potential 
target is an enzyme with a known activity, for instance a kinase,17 
known kinase inhibitors are used to see if inhibition of the target is 
detrimental to parasite growth and survival. Genetic validation employs 
a genetic engineering method called ‘gene knock-out’. This technique 
disables a given gene from functioning, resulting in the elimination of 
its product from the cell mechanism. So if the potential target X is 
assessed by genetic validation, the gene coding for X, called GENEX, 
is disabled. Once GENEX is disabled its product X is no longer 
                                               
17 Kinases are common proteins in all organisms that catalyse 
phosphorylation reactions.  
  54 
available in the parasite. If the parasite ceases to grow or survive in the 
absence of X, it is accepted as a valid target for drug development. 
Both chemical and genetic validation have distinct advantages; 
however neither is sufficiently robust to provide the conclusive result 
required at this stage. As a consequence, both methods are used 
when possible. I will discuss this further in section 4.2 
In addition to chemical and genetic target validation methods, further 
tests are employed to assess the potential target. In the Drug 
Discovery Unit at the University of Dundee, five other criteria are used 
in addition to target validation. These criteria are described by 
(Frearson et al. 2007) as follows: 
 Durability looks at the presence of features that favour 
interaction with known structures.  
 Assay feasibility is concerned with the development of assays 
that can be used in the next step of the research (this will 
become more evident in the following paragraphs).  
 Toxicity is concerned with selectivity, i.e. if a homologue of the 
parasite target is present in the human genome, it may mean 
that a drug for such a target may be toxic for humans. An ideal 
target is one that is unique to the parasite. 
 Resistance Potential is a problem caused by the presence of 
possible mechanisms to surpass the effects of manipulation of 
the target. The presence of these mechanisms can be predicted 
to a degree in this stage.   
 Structural information is necessary for structure-based drug 
discovery as described below. This criterion examines if any 
information about the target is available.  
Based on information gathered on potential targets in the light of target 
validation (genetic and chemical) and the five criteria above, potential 
  55 
targets are evaluated using the ‘traffic light’ system where each 
criterion is assessed individually. For instance, if we take target 
validation: 
i) Red: no or weak evidence that the target is essential for 
parasite survival.  
ii) Amber: evidence from either genetic or chemical validation 
methods suggests that the target is essential for survival.  
iii) Green: evidence from both genetic and chemical validation 
methods suggests that the target is essential for survival. 
The traffic light system is a management tool to prioritise potential 
targets and helps scientists to assess the feasibility of succeeding with 
a given target. Thus, this is an important step to maximise the 
possibility of success in later stages.  
The drug discovery and development pipeline is a useful case study to 
investigate the role of values in scientific practices. Moreover, it is an 
interesting case to use to understand the pluralities in scientific 
practices. I will return to the details of the pipeline later. In particular, I 
will focus on one specific NTD: Human African Trypanosomiasis 
(HAT), a parasitic disease prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
before going any deep into my case study, I will shift my focus to the 
second philosophical question I seek to answer in this dissertation. The 
drug discovery and development pipeline involves a plurality of 
approaches focusing on different aspects of phenomena, each 
providing an account that explores and explains specific features of 
phenomena. The second, and the major question I aim to address in 
this dissertation is how to make sense of such multiplicity. The final 
section of this chapter is reserved to providing a preliminary argument 
for epistemic pluralism, which I will develop in chapter 4 and chapter 5. 
2.2.3 Epistemic Pluralism 
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The shift from the theory-centred traditional view in philosophy of 
science to PSP also allowed for a better understating of the pluralities 
in scientific practices. The pluralist thesis I develop in this dissertation 
takes the pluralities in scientific practices as the starting point. I argue 
that plurality must be regarded as an important characteristic of 
scientific inquiry; moreover, I argue that the role of PSP is to make 
sense of these pluralities and further the way we understand scientific 
practices and knowledge in light of the pluralities.     
The scientific pluralism I put forward is the philosophical thesis that 
claims no single system or practice can explore and explain all aspects 
of some phenomena of interest. My argument follows directly from 
three pluralist arguments: those of Kellert, Longino, and Waters (2006), 
Chang (2012) and Mitchell (2003). While these three are not the only 
pluralist arguments, they align well with the pluralist theses I aim to put 
forward in this dissertation. These three pluralist arguments are directly 
engaged with current and historical scientific practices; moreover, they 
take the pluralities in scientific practices as evidence to pursue their 
pluralist arguments. The common feature of the three pluralist 
arguments put forward by Kellert, Longino, and Waters (2006), Chang 
(2012) and (Mitchell 2003) is the rejection of monist assumptions about 
science that can be broadly characterised as arguing that the aim of 
science is to provide a single complete and coherent account of the 
world. Instead, three pluralist theses acknowledge the multiplicity of 
aims in scientific practices, in which different systems of practices 
produce a partial account of phenomena. Section 4.1 provides an 
overview of the broader pluralist literature, followed by three sections 
discussing each work in detail before outlining the pluralist theses I aim 
to further. In the remaining part of this section, I would like to provide 
the reader with a preliminary argument for pluralism, by demonstrating 
the pluralities in pharmaceutical research that I take as evidence 
supporting pluralist arguments.  
The pluralism I develop is empirically motivated, arguing that both 
historical and current scientific practices point towards the natural 
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world as complex and inexhaustible with a single, complete and 
comprehensive account. I further develop my pluralist argument by 
dissecting pluralist arguments as descriptive and normative. 
Descriptive pluralism, a philosophical interpretation of the multiplicities 
in scientific inquiry, is best exemplified by Kellert, Longino, and Waters 
(2006). Kellert et al. identify their position as the Pluralist Stance 
(discussed in section 4.1.1), which they define as the commitment to 
avoid reliance on monist assumptions about science and openness to 
the ineliminability of pluralities in scientific inquiry (Kellert, Longino, and 
Waters 2006: xiii) 
Normative pluralism, on the other hand, aims to go beyond describing 
pluralities and argue for the benefits of plurality. Chang (2012) puts 
forward Active Normative Epistemic Pluralism, arguing that pluralism is 
more beneficial to science, given the aims and values in science. I 
focus on how the pluralist argument can be made normative. By 
comparing the two, I argue for a form of pluralism that is bounded by 
the context of inquiry (section 5.4). That is, while I argue that plurality 
of systems is beneficial in allowing us to produce and proliferate 
knowledge by tapping into different aspects of phenomena, the extent 
of the plurality of systems is also bounded by the broader context. 
Using the HAT case, I argue that the aims set by the WHO to eliminate 
this disease by 2020 leads to the prioritisation of anti-parasitic drug 
development, which in itself is a pluralistic enterprise.  
The pluralist thesis I develop here aims to understand pluralities within 
the broader context of scientific practices. While I argue that pluralism 
must be regarded as an important characteristic of scientific inquiry, 
the limits of plurality must be realised within the context of scientific 
practices (I will further develop this point in chapter 5). 
2.2.4 Anti Parasitic Drug Discovery and the Boundaries of 
Pluralism  
In this chapter, I argued that focusing exclusively on theories as the 
subject matter of philosophy leads to inadequate accounts of scientific 
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inquiry by ignoring important aspects such as scientific practices. 
Following Ankeny et al. (2011), I provided an overview of different 
arguments made by Kuhn and the members of the Stanford School, 
emphasising the importance of broadening the subject matter of 
philosophy of science. The philosophical approach I take here aims to 
understand scientific inquiry as a whole, where theories are among 
other accounts that scientific practices produce to explain and explore 
phenomena. I take scientific practices and the various types of 
accounts they produce as the subject matter. Moreover, I consider the 
broader context of scientific practices, arguing that scientific practices 
are influenced, and to a large extent shaped, by their broader context.    
This chapter also identified two questions to address in this 
dissertation: (1) how to interpret pluralities in scientific practices; and 
(2) the role of values in scientific practices. The preliminary argument 
presented in this chapter is that scientific practices must be studied in 
their broader context in order to understand how the aims and values 
operating in scientific practices are constructed. In the following 
chapter, I will provide a detailed overview of Human African 
Trypanosomiasis, attending to the broader context of current efforts to 
combat it and how the broader context shapes relevant medical and 
scientific practices.  
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Chapter 3 
3.1 Human African Trypanosomiasis 
In chapter 2 (section 2.2.2) I provided a brief introduction to Neglected 
Tropical Diseases, a group of diseases associated with poverty and 
neglected by both scientific medical research and policy debates (for 
instance, they are referred to as ‘other’ diseases in the Millennium 
Development Goals). In this chapter, I further develop my argument 
that the scientific practices (and accounts of the world produced by 
scientific practices) are to a large extent shaped by their broader 
context. I aim to argue that the current efforts to combat NTDs, 
particularly drug discovery and development programmes, serve as a 
good example of how the socio-economic and political context of 
diseases influence the aims of scientific practices and how they are 
organised. In addition, I will argue that the drug discovery and 
development process requires plurality of approaches in order to 
achieve their particular aims.  
In this chapter, I will focus on a specific NTD: Human African 
Trypanosomiasis (HAT), also known as the sleeping sickness, a 
disease prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa (MAP) and endemic in 36 
countries. HAT is a parasitic disease, caused by the Trypanosoma 
brucei and it is transmitted through the bite of tsetse fly. HAT is a fatal 
disease unless it is treated. Current tools used to diagnose and treat 
HAT are less than ideal, requiring intrusive techniques such as lumber 
puncture and archaic drugs with high toxicity. I will provide a historical 
perspective on HAT (from a Western scientific and medical point of 
view), followed by description of the causal agent and disease 
mechanism (3.1.2). I will also provide an overview of the current 
diagnostic methods (3.1.3), drugs available to treat HAT (3.1.4), 
epidemiological details of HAT and control methods. The second part 
of this chapter focuses on current efforts to eliminate HAT, and 
challenges to achieving this. The final section discusses the Drugs for 
Neglected Disease Initiative (DNDi), a public-private partnership that 
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focuses on developing new drugs to treat HAT that match patients’ 
needs.  
The main aim of this chapter to provide a background to the main case 
study used in this thesis. I am to provide a foundation for the rest of my 
argument by demonstrating how current research is influenced by the 
broader socio-economic and political context of this disease. Here, I 
argue that scientific practices are shaped by the broader context of the 
scientific inquiry. In order to understand the current scientific practices 
and broader efforts to eliminate HAT it is necessary to look both at the 
historical and current context of HAT. Here I will argue that the current 
aim to eliminate HAT, and the way to achieve this aim is determined by 
the current scientific and medical knowledge on this disease as well as 
the socio-economic and political context of the disease endemic 
region. In other words, I want to argue that WHO (and DNDi) put 
forward a set of pragmatic aims and values (based on the broader 
context and the current medical and scientific knowledge on HAT) in 
order to justify the aim of eliminating this disease by employing 
screening campaigns, and therefore prioritising the anti-parasitic drug 
discovery. Here I present the justificatory narrative for prioritising one 
set of approaches in scientific practices based on particular aims and 
values. 
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Figure 2. Map of HAT-endemic areas based on number of cases 
reported in 2009 (adapted from Simarro et al. 2011).  
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3.1.1 Historical Background of HAT 
The early twentieth century witnessed several HAT epidemics in 
central and eastern parts of Africa, bringing HAT to the attention of the 
colonial administrations. Lyons (2002), Headrick (2014) and Raadt 
(2005) argue that these epidemics were caused by changes to social 
structures in the disease-endemic region due to colonisation. In 
particular, Headrick (2014) argues that the expansion of colonial rule in 
central and East Africa led to an increase in migration and trade across 
the continent, changing the social and economic structures in the 
regions. Changes in social and economic structures also brought about 
changes in the physical environment, providing conditions that allowed 
infection rates to increase to epidemic levels (see Ford, 1971; Iliffe, 
1979; Giblin, 1990; Lyons, 2002; Headrick, 2014). 
Here I argue that a close attention to the colonial history of HAT 
outbreaks shows that the disease aetiology is complex and the causes 
of HAT outbreaks can be conceptualised in multiple ways. As 
described above the biological cause of HAT in a person is T.  brucei 
infection. However the conditions which people are exposed to the 
parasite depend on a range of factors. While disease was endemic in 
the area, changes in physical habitat and changes in social and 
political structures led to outbreaks at larger scales. Here I argue that 
the complexity of the aetiological picture leads to a plurality of 
approaches to control outbreaks and to the elimination of HAT. This is 
very clear in different ways in which colonial powers responded to 
outbreaks. In general, the colonial responses to epidemics had 
humanitarian, economic and scientific motivations (Lyons, 2002; 
Headrick, 2014). The colonial responses were ad hoc, depending on 
range of factors including political and economic interests of colonial 
powers, geographic features of disease endemic area, presence of 
other diseases (human diseases such as small pox or zoonic diseases 
such as rinderpest), etc. Treating this disease was seen as key to the 
development of Africa: HAT epidemics led to a shortage of manual 
labourer’s necessary for colonial economic expansion, and made large 
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areas of land uninhabitable (Raadt, 2005; Headrick, 2014). One 
significant impact of colonialism was expansion of human habitat into 
tsetse areas for industries set up by colonial regimes such as rubber, 
farming, mining etc. (Lyons, 2002). Thus, HAT posed political and 
economic problems for colonial regimes in the region as much as a 
humanitarian problem. Different colonial regimes employed various 
control methods, depending on their relationship with the local 
populations, available resources and environmental factors (Headrick 
(2014) provides a detailed overview of the different colonial responses 
in central and eastern Africa). One significant approach is an 
environmental approach which involved destroying tsetse breeding 
grounds and removing people from tsetse infested areas.  For 
instance, the British administration in Uganda employed environmental 
approaches including depopulating tsetse-infested areas (such as the 
islands and shores of Lake Victoria), destroying the tsetse breeding 
grounds and establishing camps in which patients could be treated 
(Headrick, 2014; Worboys, 1994; Soff, 1969).  
The French and German administration on the other hand, employed a 
biomedical approach where the aim was to identify and treat HAT. For 
instance, in French Equatorial Africa, mobile teams of French military 
doctors and local nurses (along with several soldiers and porters for 
logistics) were employed to travel from village to village to examine and 
treat the local population (attending examinations was compulsory). 
The treatment used by the French was atoxyl, also known as arsanilic 
acid: the first drug used specifically to treat HAT. Atoxyl was developed 
by Robert Koch during his scientific mission to eastern Africa in 1906, 
during which he experimented on human subjects, testing different 
arsenic-based compounds. Atoxyl was found to be effective against 
HAT; however, it had severe side effects, such as leaving patients 
blind (Beck, 1971; Headrick, 2014). Discovery of atoxyl was part of the 
German medical efforts in Tanganyika, which relied on Robert Koch’s 
recommendation to identify and treat with atoxyl. German 
administration used locals, named ‘glad feelers’ to identify patents and 
administer atoxyl. This programme had limited success owing to the 
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refusal of participation of the local population due to the high toxicity of 
atoxyl. The German approaches that focused on identification and 
treatment was cut short as German colonies were lost to Britain after 
the First World War. In keeping with this change in colonial 
administration following the First World War, the approach used in 
Uganda became largely environmental, including the widespread use 
of controlled burnings to clear wild bush.  
To highlight the importance of finding a cure (or a solution) for HAT, it 
is useful to look at the rhetoric used to describe the drug Germanin 
(now known as Suramin), developed by the German company 
Bayerische Farbwerke in 1916 (Raadt, 2005). The discovery of this 
drug was announced in 1922 by the former District Governor in 
German East Africa in 1922, describing it as ‘the key to tropical Africa, 
and consequently the key to all colonies’ (Pope, 1924: 413). 
Germanin’s formula was to be kept from other nations, unless 
Germany’s former colonies in East Africa (lost after Germany’s defeat 
in the First World War) were restored: 
its value is such that any privilege of a share in it granted to 
other nations must be made conditional upon the restoration to 
Germany of her colonial empire. (Pope, 1924: 413)18  
In addition to environmental approach (such as bush-clearing in British 
Uganda), identify and treat approach (as in French Equatorial Africa), 
an integrated medial approach was developed by the Belgian 
administration in Congo Free State (CFS). The medical approach 
entailed opening specialised rural clinics and implementation of 
                                               
18 Although its formula was kept secret, samples of this drug were 
provided for research purposes, and its formula was eventually 
revealed by Ernest Fourneau, working on HAT at the Institute Pasteur 
in France (see Raadt, 2005; Steverding, 2010). 
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compulsory screenings (Lyons 2002). Unlike the British, the Belgians 
did not attempt to separate the human habitat from tsetse, but instead 
aimed to eliminate T.brucei in human population by strict policing. This 
Belgian approach involved designation of a ‘cordon sanitaire’ around 
fly infested areas via the control of movements of people. Travellers 
were required to hold medical passports, and individuals suspected to 
have trypanosome were sent to medical camps, staffed by Catholic 
nuns, for treatment with atoxyl. These camps were unpopular due to 
their poor conditions, the side effects of atoxyl treatment, and the 
consequences of long-term removal from the community, and were 
thus guarded to preventpeople from escaping. This draconian 
approach was later replaced with medical corps which travelled to 
villages examining and treating people. Moreover, Belgian 
administration in CFS opened local clinics, hospitals and injection 
centres. This medical approach in CFS allowed screening of 70% of 
the population, leading to a significant reduction in the number of cases 
reported (Figure 3).  
These approaches to control epidemics were regarded as successful, 
given that by the 1960s less than 5,000 new cases of HAT were 
reported in the disease-endemic region (WHO 2000). It is important to 
note that while the control measures were successful in overcoming 
epidemics,  people living in the disease endemic areas had to live in a 
police state, forced to take part invasive medical checks and 
treatments with adverse side effects, displaced from their homes or 
witness destruction of the natural habitat where they live (Headrick 
2014; Lyons 2002). In section 3.2.2 I will further discuss patients’ 
perceptions of current control methods, underlining barriers and taboos 
associated with diagnostic and therapeutic measures.  
With de-colonialisation of the disease endemic region and the 
establishment of new independent states, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the number of cases reported, reaching 37,000 in 1998 
(WHO 2000). Ford (1971) argues that the control measures discussed 
above were not sustained in many cases (such as DRC) given that the 
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expertise in running the colonial control measures were confined to a 
‘dwindling group of ex-colonial civil servants’. The problem was 
exasperated by the lack of interest in the disease by market driven 
pharmaceutical research (as discussed in section 2.2.2), and the lack 
of local expertise in the new generation of researched pursuing HAT 
research in the global north. The third factor that contributed to 
interruption of control measures was the competing health priorities 
(such as HIV/AIDS) as well as war and internal conflict in the region. 
Currently, HAT is endemic in 36 Sub-Saharan countries, and in 2013 
87% of all HAT cases were reported in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DNDi 2014).  
Here, I descried three main approaches employed by different colonial 
powers in disease endemic regions. Here I demonstrated the 
multiplicity of methods for controlling and eliminating HAT. However, I 
want to take my argument further to underline the plurality in the way in 
which we can understand the causal picture. While HAT is in endemic 
in central and eastern Africa (figure 2), the epidemics recorded in 
twentieth century (figure 3) are cause by the changes in natural habitat 
due to rapid colonisation and the subsequent changes in the socio-
economic and political structure in the region. Different colonial 
responses were developed in particular socio-economic and political 
contexts. Moreover, these efforts were shaped by various 
environmental factors such as breeding grounds for tsetse fly, 
presence of other human (small pox) or zoonic diseases (rindpest). 
Each approach focused on the different part of the causal picture. For 
instance, the environmental approaches used by the British mainly 
focused on the entomological aspects of the disease targeting tsetse 
breeding grounds disrupting the parasite life cycle. Belgian biomedical 
approaches on the other hand focused on eliminating the parasite in 
human population through policing population movement and forced 
drug treatments.   
The current challenge is to implement control measures to reverse the 
increasing trend of new patients. As discussed above there are 
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multiple ways in which disease aetiology can be conceptualised in 
current environmental conditions and socio-economic and political 
context. Thus, there are multiple ways in which HAT can be controlled 
and eliminated. Different approaches (environmental, biomedical, etc.) 
must be assessed in light of the boarder context of HAT outbreak . 
Here I will focus on the current efforts which focuses on screening 
campaigns aiming to diagnose and treat patients. However, it is also 
acknowledged that the screening methods cannot achieve control and 
elimination (as defined by WHO)  without new diagnostic and 
therapeutic tools better suited to patients' needs. I will discuss current 
efforts to control and eliminate HAT in section 3.1.5. However, first I 
wish to provide a biological and clinical overview of HAT (3.1.2) and an 
overview existing diagnostic and therapeutic tools (3.1.3 and 3.1.4), 
underlining the shortcomings of such tools. With these overviews, I 
wish to provide my reader with the difficulties faced by the medical and 
scientific practices combating HAT, where these difficulties will explain 
the new efforts headed by WHO, which I will describe in section 3.2.   
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Figure 3 Number of cases reported versus population screened 
between 1940 and 1998. Data reported by the national African 
trypanosomiasis control programmes and published in WHO 
(2010)  
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3.1.2 Parasite and Disease 
Human African Trypanosomiasis is a protozoan disease, caused by the 
unicellular organism Trypanosome brucei. This parasite belongs to the 
phylogenetic order Kinetoplatida, which also includes Trypanosoma 
cruzi, which causes Chagas Disease in South America, and 
Leishmania which causes leishmeniasis (Barrett et al. 2003; Stuart et 
al. 2008; Brun et al. 2010). In this section I underline that the T. brucei 
is a sophisticated organism, with complex cellular biology and defence 
mechanisms against the host immune system, and describe the clinical 
aspects of the disease to argue that HAT is clinically and 
epidemiologically complex, posing many challenges for current control 
and elimination efforts (discussed in section 3.2).   
T. brucei has two sub-species, T.b. gambiense and T.b. rhodesiense. 
These sub-species are separated geographically, with gambiense 
prevalent in central and west Africa, and rhodesiense prevalent in 
south and east Africa (WHO 2000). The two subspecies are 
morphologically identical and cannot be differentiated under the 
microscope, but rather with in vitro methods using molecular markers 
(WHO 2013: 42), or via clinical observation: T.b. gambiense causes 
chronic illness, whereas T.b. rhodesiense causes acute illness. This 
difference can be linked to the difference in parasitaemia (presence of 
the parasite in blood stream, measured as parasite per ml of blood). In 
T.b. gambiense infections, there is often low parasitaemia, whereas 
T.b. rhodesiense has a rapid rate of infection and high parasitaemia 
(WHO 2013: 48).  
Trypanosome parasites are extracellular and live freely in the bodily 
fluids, including the bloodstream, lymph and cerebrospinal fluid (Fenn 
and Matthews 2007). T. brucei has a unique cellular mechanism to 
evade the host immune system, whereby the parasite’s cell surface is 
covered with variant surface glycoproteins (VSG), providing protection 
from both innate and acquired immune system (MacGregor et al. 
2012). The VSG acts as a sieve, only allowing nutrients to reach the 
cell membrane while inhibiting larger molecules of the innate immune 
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system (such as antibodies). T. brucei can also adapt the VSG once 
the acquired immune system develops an antigenic response. T. 
brucei has over 2,000 individual VSG genes that code for 
glycoproteins, which have same overall structure but unique amino 
acid sequences, allowing the parasite to avoid the antigenic response 
of the acquired immune system (Engstler et al. 2007). The ability of T. 
brucei to neutralise the hosts’ innate and acquired immune system 
makes it unfeasible to develop a vaccine, and untreated HAT is often 
fatal. 
HAT is known as the sleeping sickness due to its most characteristic 
symptom. HAT infection has two stages: the haemo-lymphatic stage, 
and the meningo-encephatitivc stage. In the first stage, the parasite 
infects the blood and the lymphatic system causing clinically non-
specific symptoms (WHO 2013: 103). In the second stage of the 
disease, parasites invades the central nervous system (CNS), leading 
to more specific symptoms, such as disturbances in the sleep pattern 
(Kennedy 2006a). The symptoms for HAT are the same in both T.b. 
gambiense and T.b. rhodesiense forms of the disease. As stated 
above, both forms of the disease are fatal, varying only in the 
frequency and the duration of illness. Rhodesiense is acute, leading to 
death within six months (reaching the second stage in a few weeks), 
whereas gambiense is chronic, leading to death within three years 
(roughly equally divided between the first and second stages) (Checchi 
et al. 2008). In the following sub-sections I will provide detailed 
descriptions of common symptoms in first and second stages of HAT 
infection. 
Stage 1: In the first stage of HAT infection, patients experience non-
specific symptoms such as fever and musculoskeletal pain (Blum et al. 
2006). Another common symptom is headaches, which starts in stage 
one and gets progressively worse as the disease progresses into the 
second stage. Enlargement of spleen and liver are also observed in 
patients in the first stage of HAT infection; however, these symptoms 
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non-specific and are common in many other infections (WHO 2013: 
103-105).  
Stage 2: Disturbances in the sleeping patterns are observed in the 
second stage of HAT infection, characterised by frequent episodes of 
sleep, which can occur both day and night, lasting for short periods of 
time. The sleep episodes are described in the following way by 
L’Hermitte (1910) (as quoted in WHO 2013): 
Sleep overcomes the patient in a rapid and brutal way: the 
patient sleeps during a conversation without finishing the 
sentence or during a meal with a full mouth, the head sinks to 
the breast and the sleep is complete. During the first crisis it is 
possible to awake the patient, but in repeated crisis attempts to 
awake the patient are fruitless. (WHO 2013: 105) 
HAT patients also develop neuropsychiatric disorders in the second 
stage. These include mood disorders, dementia, disturbance of 
consciousness, and epilepsy (Kennedy 2006a). Other common 
symptoms of the advanced disease are involuntary motor movement, 
tremor, weakness, slurred speech and difficulty walking (Blum et al. 
2006). Patients will eventually go into a coma and die unless they 
receive treatment. 
3.1.3 Diagnosis 
As described above, the clinical symptoms of HAT (particularly in its 
earlier stages) are non-specific. Therefore, clinical diagnosis alone is 
not enough and further tests are required to confirm HAT (especially in 
earlier stages). There are three different diagnostic methods available 
currently: antibody detection, parasite detection and molecular 
detection (WHO 2013). Here I focus on three major methods currently 
used by control programmes, but there are many other methods 
available to confirm HAT (see Chappuis et al. 2005; WHO 2013). The 
important point here is that even though the diagnostic methods 
described below are widely used, they are not ideal for use in the 
disease endemic areas due to lack of resources and qualified staff. For 
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instance, the only available test to confirm the second stage of HAT is 
lumber puncture, which is a painful and invasive process. Given that 
HAT occurs in rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa it is important that the 
diagnostic methods are cost effective, simple (does not require 
sophisticated equipment and process) and rapid. The current 
diagnostic methods are less than ideal for use in the disease endemic 
region (see 3.2 for detailed discussion). 
Antibody detection entails serological laboratory tests seeking the 
presence antibodies (IgG and IgM in particular) produced in high 
concentration in the presence of trypanosome in patients’ blood 
stream. The most common format is the card agglutination test for 
trypanosomiasis (CATT), which is used widely by control programmes 
due to its simplicity, low cost and reliability (WHO 2013: 119). 
Currently, antibody detection is available for diagnosis of T.b. 
gambiense, but not for T.b. rhodesiense. This is due to the high 
antigenic variation of T.b. rhodesiense infections, meaning there are no 
specific antibodies to indicate the presence of trypanosome (WHO 
2013: 128).  
Parasitological tests entail direct confirmation of parasites in body 
fluids using a microscope. This is labour intensive and requires 
specialised equipment, including the microscope and the equipment to 
prepare samples for microscopic investigation (e.g. a centrifuge). 
Parasitological tests are the main method of diagnosis for T.b. 
rhodesiense, and used as a confirmation for T.b. gambiense (WHO 
2013: 125). Therefore it is only used in T.b. gambiense cases when 
CATT test results are positive as a confirmation test.  
Molecular detection techniques are also available, which confirm the 
presence of trypanosome DNA and RNA; however, these methods 
cannot be used in the field as they require specialised laboratory 
practices that cannot be employed by mobile teams. However, these 
tests can be used on stored samples for further study.  
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After the initial diagnosis confirming the presence of parasite in 
patients’ bloodstream, it is necessary to see if the parasite invaded the 
central nervous system and determine the stage of the illness. 
Determining the stage of infection by investigating both vascular and 
central nervous system is necessary given the current treatments are 
different for first and second stages (discussed in detail in section 
3.1.4). The second stage is confirmed by examination of cerebrospinal 
fluid (CSF) for both forms of T. brucei (Lejon and Bücher 2005). CSF is 
acquired by lumbar puncture. The stage of disease is determined by 
looking at the count of white blood cells (WBC) and presence of 
parasite in CSF: 
Patients with ≤ 5 WBC/µl and no trypanosomes in the CSF are 
considered to be in the first-stage of the disease; those with > 5 
WBC/µl or trypanosomes in the CSF are defined as in the second-
stage. (WHO 2013: 131)  
The three diagnostic methods listed here are the most commonly used. 
The important point here is that the currently available diagnostic 
methods are not suitable for use across most of disease endemic 
region due to a shortage of qualified staff and limited resources (I will 
further discuss the inadequacies of diagnostic methods in section 
3.1.5) 
3.1.4 Treatment 
There are currently four drugs available for HAT treatment (Table 1). 
All four have severe side effects and only one can be used to treat both 
forms of T. brucei. All the currently available drugs are administered via 
injections over a period of time, which is undesirable in remote rural 
areas with limited access to clinical provisions. In this section, I provide 
an overview of all four drugs, with particular focus on their limitations.  
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Table 1. List of currently available drugs for HAT treatment.  
Suramin was developed in the early twentieth century (initially called 
Germanin as discussed in section 3.1.1) by the German dyestuff 
company Bayerische Farbwerke (Sneader 2005: 378). It is effective 
against both T.b. gambiense and T.b. rhodesiense; however, it is only 
used in the first stage of T.b. rhodesiense as it cannot pass the blood-
brain barrier, and Surmin’s use against T.b. gambiense is not 
recommended since it can lead to a severe allergic reaction in case of 
co-infection with onchocerciasis, a parasitic roundworm endemic to the 
East and Central Africa (WHO 2013: 163).  
Suramin’s action is slow, and treatment requires six injections, 
administered every seven days. Due to Suramin’s low stability, it must 
be administered quickly once it is prepared (diluted in water) (WHO 
2013: 155). Adverse side-effects of Suramin involve renal failure, bone-
marrow toxicity, anaphylactic shock, skin lesions and neurological 
complications. However, it must be noted that this depends on the 
nutritional status of patients and concomitant diseases.  
Pentamidine is used to treat the first stage of HAT T.b. gambiense. 
The treatment regimen entails daily injections for seven days (WHO 
2013: 162). Pentamidine is delivered with an intramuscular injection, 
Drug Name” Used During: Used Against: 
Route of 
Administration: 
Suramin First Stage T.b. rhodesiense Intravenous 
Pentamidine First Stage T.b. gambiense  Intramuscular 
Melarsoprol Second Stage T.b. rhodesiense 
T.b gambiense 
Intravenous 
Eflornithine Second Stage T.b. gambiense  Intravenous 
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since intravenous injections often cause hypotension. Pentamidine is 
well tolerated in general, with possible side effects including 
hypoglycaemia, gastrointestinal complications (nausea and diarrhoea) 
and pain and swelling at the site of injection. In addition, rare cases of 
leukopenia (raised liver function enzymes), hypoglycaemia and 
hyperglycaemia are reported (Sand et al. 1985). The range of side 
effects is due to high levels of pentamidine observed to be deposited in 
liver and renal cells. 
Melarsoprol was developed in the 1940s and was used as a treatment 
for the second stage of HAT from 1949 (WHO 2013: 150). Melarsoprol 
is an arsenic-based drug treatment for second-stage HAT (WHO 2013: 
157). Current Melarsoprol treatment for both T.b. gambiense and T.b. 
rhodesiense is 2.2mg/kg per day for ten days, administered 
intravenously. However, due to its low solubility in water it is 
administered with propylene glycol, which can cause irritation and pain, 
and therefore must be administered slowly via a drip. 
Melarsoprol is highly toxic and has severe side effects that are life 
threatening: 10% of the patients develop encephalopathy, and half of 
the patients who develop encephalopathy die as a result of it (WHO 
2013: 166). Melarsoprol also causes pyrexia, headache, 
gastrointestinal problems and cardiac failure (which leads to increases 
in the death toll). 
Eflornithine was initially developed as an anti-cancer drug and is 
currently used for the treatment of second stage T.b. gambiense 
infection (and hirsutism). Eflornithine’s efficacy against T.b. gambiense 
in animals was demonstrated in 1981 and its efficacy in humans in 
1985 (Burri and Brun 2003). It was approved by the FDA as a 
treatment for T.b. gambiense in 1990, but production of Eflornithine 
ceased in 1995 due to low profits. Re-supply of Eflornithine was not 
until 2001, due to the efforts of WHO and MSF (WHO 2013: 150-152). 
Eflornithine has considerable side-effects, including bone-marrow 
toxicity, alopecia and seizures.  
  76 
Eflornithine is administered intravenously every six hours for fourteen 
days. Although it is free to access this drug (due to donations by 
Sanofi) the administration of this drug is difficult in resource-poor 
settings due to the period of hospitalisation required. In order to reduce 
the treatment time, Eflornithine is co-administered with Nifurtimox, a 
drug used for the treatment of Chagas disease caused by 
Trypanosoma cruzi. The combination treatment is called NECT, which 
reduces the number of eflornithine infusions from 56 to 14, shortens 
the hospitalisation time and decreases the toxicity due to eflornithine 
exposure (DNDi 2014). Development of the NECT treatment is a result 
of the DNDi strategy and will be discussed in section 3.4.1.1.  
Besides the severe side-effects, existing drugs have other limitations, 
including delivery methods, lengthy treatment periods and cost (see 
section 3.2). There is a need for new drugs that have tolerable side 
effects, shorter treatment periods and that can be delivered with no 
need for specialist equipment or staff.  
3.1.5 Epidemiology and Control 
So far, this chapter has focused on the disease mechanism and tools 
to diagnose and treat HAT. In this section, I concentrate on the control 
and surveillance methods employed to combat HAT. As discussed 
above (3.1.1), the control mechanism employed by the colonial 
administrations were effective in eliminating HAT; however, the 
interruption of control and surveillance activities after the advent of 
independence led to the re-emergence of HAT at an alarming level in 
the disease endemic regions (see WHO 2000, Brun et al. 2010). This 
re-emergence has led the WHO to enhance its role as a coordinator 
and promote networking among different partners (Including the 
governments of disease-endemic countries, pharmaceutical companies 
and NGOs). The WHO’s efforts led to an increase in control and 
surveillance in the disease endemic regions, leading to a 69% 
reduction in cases reported, from 36,585 new cases to 11,382 new 
cases between 1997 and 2006 (Brun et al. 2010: 148). These figures 
must be regarded with caution, as there is a problem of under-
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reporting, and lack of patient participation in the control and 
surveillance programmes (see section 3.2.2). Moreover, the success of 
the control measures is not sustainable in the long term, given that 
interruption of the control and surveillance programmes can lead to the 
resurgence of HAT. Overall, the current control methods rely on 
inadequate tools (both diagnostic and therapeutic) and also are not 
favoured by people living in disease endemic areas due to high cost 
and other social factors (see section 3.2.2) Before I discuss efforts to 
improve the control methods, I provide a detailed overview of the 
methods themselves.  
The control methods used for T.b. rhodesiense and T.b. gambiense 
are different due to epidemiological differences between the two forms 
of the disease. The differences in the epidemiological characteristics 
are due to the known reservoirs of infection i.e. a species (or group of 
species) that permanently maintains the parasite population and from 
which the pathogen can be transmitted to the target population (WHO 
2013: 8). For T.b. gambiense, the main reservoir is humans.19 For T.b. 
rhodesiense, livestock and wild game animals act as additional 
reservoirs of infection. The existence or absence of an animal reservoir 
leads to significant differences in transmission patterns. The main 
purpose of control is to stop the transmission of parasites from 
reservoir to vector and from vector to host and other reservoirs. 
Therefore, the epidemiological differences between T.b. gambiense 
and T.b. rhodesiense lead to differences in how they can be controlled 
and eliminated.  
There are no vaccines available for HAT (see section 3.1.2) and due to 
high toxicity of the current drugs, prophylaxis is not possible (see 
section 3.1.4). Strategies to control and eliminate HAT rely on 
detecting and treating infected humans (hosts), control of animal 
reservoirs, and vector control. Control of both forms of HAT requires 
                                               
19 There is no conclusive study to rule out the presence of other unknown 
reservoirs in the disease-endemic region. 
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understanding of the habitat of the tsetse fly, the main reservoirs of 
infection in a specific region and the human interaction with the 
environment.   
Case Detection 
Case detection can be achieved through active or passive case 
detection methods. Active case detection relies on mobile teams to 
travel disease-endemic regions in order to screen a population at risk 
of infection using the aforementioned diagnostic tools (CATT for T.b. 
gambiense and parasitological tests for T.b. rhodesiense, followed by a 
lumber puncture to determine the stage) and treat patients who tested 
positive. Passive case detection relies on health centres and hospitals 
where patients can be tested and treated. It is important that health 
centres and hospitals have necessary resources and infrastructure to 
provide adequate services (refrigeration and sterilisation are just two 
things difficult to maintain in disease-endemic areas). Furthermore, 
because the clinical symptoms of HAT are non-specific, especially in 
the first stage (see sections 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2), patients who seek 
medical help often do so in the later stages of the disease, by which 
time the disease has had permanent effects on the neurological 
system.  
Active screening is put forward by the WHO as the main control 
method for T.b. gambiense. In the absence of animal reservoirs, 
population screening and treatment in humans can be very effective in 
reducing the rate of infection without any other environmental or vector 
controls. For example, a recent resurgence of gambiense HAT in Luba, 
Equatorial Guinea, was quelled, eliminating gambiense HAT from this 
region via a major screening campaign (Simarro et al. 2006).20 On the 
other hand, control programmes for rhodesiense HAT infections rely on 
passive case detection. Active case detection is not preferable in this 
                                               
20 Elimination of T.b. gambiense with current control methods is only plausible 
if these control programmes are well resourced and implemented frequently; 
see section 3.2.1   
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case due to the rarity of T.b. rhodesiense infection. Moreover, due to 
the acute progression of T.b. rhodesiense, infected patients develop 
specific symptoms much quicker, and thus seek medical help sooner.  
Control of Animal Reservoir 
For control of T.b. rhodesiense, the animal reservoir must also be 
targeted. The WHO state that in areas where there is a high 
prevalence of HAT in livestock, it is essential to prevent transmission 
from the animal reservoir to humans (WHO 2013: 195). For control of 
livestock and the domestic reservoir, chemotherapy or prophylaxis is 
used to complement passive case detection campaigns among the 
human population. Although wild animals act as a reservoir for HAT, it 
is not acceptable to intervene in their natural habitat, nor are such 
interventions are economically feasible to maintain on a large scale 
(WHO 2013: 196)  
Vector Control 
In addition to control in humans and animals, vector control is utilised 
in both forms of HAT. There are multiple ways to control the vector. 
Section 3.1.1 discussed clearance of vegetation and treatment of 
tsetse breeding sites with insecticide as the main methods of vector 
control methods in the first half of the twentieth century (WHO 2013: 
196). Although this proved effective, these methods are no longer used 
due to environmental concerns (Jordan 1986). Current methods 
include the use of tsetse traps and screens (Lindh et al. 2012) and 
insecticide-treated cattle as bait (Holmes 1997).  
Elimination of both forms of HAT requires interruption of transmission 
from reservoir to host. Due to the presence of animal reservoirs (both 
domestic and wild) in the case of rhodesiense HAT, the interruption of 
transmission is complex and deemed unfeasible by the WHO (WHO 
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2013).21 Humans constitute the major (and only known) reservoir of 
infection for gambiense HAT, which makes elimination of this form of 
HAT feasible. Elimination in this context has a precise definition 
provided by the WHO. In the following section I will focus on this 
definition of elimination, and sketch out the rationale put forward to 
eliminate gambiense HAT. Focusing on WHO rationale to eliminate 
HAT (in a particular way) will allow me to show the way the context of 
HAT shapes the scientific and medical practices employed to eliminate 
HAT. 
3.2 Elimination of HAT  
In this section I aim to provide a definition of elimination set out by the 
WHO for gambiense HAT, which they deem to be feasible. I will also 
sketch arguments outlining the current challenges to achieving 
elimination determined by WHO. 
The WHO’s current aim is to eliminate HAT by 2030. Elimination is 
defined as: 
reduction to zero of the incidence of infection caused by a 
specific pathogen in a defined geographical area, as a result of 
deliberate efforts; continued action to prevent re-establishment 
may be required. (WHO 2012b: 3) 
In addition, the WHO has an interim aim: elimination as a public health 
problem by 2020: 
detection of less than 1 new case per 10 000 inhabitants in at 
least 90% of endemic foci reporting less than 2000 new cases 
annually at continental level by 2020. (WHO 2012b: 3) 
                                               
21 Rhodesiense HAT is currently rare and does not pose a significant risk in 
disease endemic regions.  
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Elimination of gambiense HAT is deemed feasible by the WHO based 
on the fact that: 
T.b. gambiense is epidemiologically vulnerable. Humans are the 
significant reservoir, and the control strategies in use are 
effective. In an adequately resourced programme, a single 
round of active case detection and treatment through mass 
screening will result in identification of 50–80% of prevalent 
infections. Annual screening with or without supplementary 
vector control can reduce the prevalence to very low levels 
within a few years. (WHO 2013: 199) 
Moreover, elimination was almost achieved by colonial administrations 
(see section 3.1.1): 
Proof of principle exists for gambiense HAT. In the 1960s, near-
elimination was achieved with tools inferior to those currently in 
use, when the annual incidence in Africa dropped below 5000. 
Evidence that elimination is possible in some settings emerged 
more recently from Equatorial Guinea. (WHO 2013: 199) 
The geographical distribution of gambiense HAT is well-known, 
wherein disease foci remains stable unless there are significant 
environmental changes in disease-endemic regions (WHO 2000). 
Detailed geographic knowledge is extremely useful for active case 
detection campaigns. Moreover, the scope and distribution of HAT in 
the disease-endemic area is limited: 
Less than 10% of the land area of endemic countries is 
estimated to be at risk, and 97% of reported cases are in only 
five countries: Angola, the Central African Republic, Chad, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan (94), with a 
substantial majority in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
(WHO 2013: 200)  
In order to achieve elimination as described above, active case 
detection and screening are crucial. Active screening campaigns are 
necessary given that population under risk live in remote areas with 
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limited access to healthcare facilities, and patients only self-refer in 
later stages of the HAT (as discussed in section 3.1.5). Therefore, 
active screening teams are necessary to reach these populations in 
order to detect and treat patients. However, as mentioned above, the 
current control methods are limited due to deficiencies in diagnostic 
and therapeutic tools, posing challenges to the WHO elimination goal. 
In the following sections I will focus on these challenges, first from a 
public health perspective (i.e. the practitioners’ perspective), followed 
by challenges arising from public perceptions of screening 
programmes, particular diagnostic and treatment tools. These two 
issues are linked; however, here I discus them separately in order to 
highlight the variety of values from broader context taken into account 
in eliminating these challenges. This point is particularly important for 
my thesis, given that the main challenge is lack of drugs suitable for 
use in the disease-endemic regions. Thus, drug discovery and 
development projects aimed at developing drugs that overcome these 
challenges are guided by a broad range of values that I will discuss in 
sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.  
3.2.1 Structural Challenges to Elimination 
Controlling and eliminating HAT relies on sustained political support 
from disease-endemic countries and requires funding to implement 
surveillance activities. 22  One major challenge to implementing the 
surveillance and control measures necessary for elimination is the cost 
and availability of staff: 
The cost of intervention varies according to the accessibility of 
the foci but remains high due to the complexity of diagnosing, 
treating and following up patients. Intervention requires well 
trained staff and that mobile teams of specially trained health-
                                               
22 Detailed discussion of control and surveillance programmes between 2000 
and 2009 can be found in Simarro et al. (2011). 
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care workers and specialized treatment services be available. 
(WHO 2010: 87) 
It is important to note that the importance of sustaining the current 
control and screening methods, given that lapses in implementation of 
control and screening in the past has led to re-emergence of disease. 
However, implementation of the control methods is expensive and 
often compromised due to competing health priorities (see Simarro et 
al. 2015; Berrang-Ford et al. 2011).  
Another challenge (directly linked to cost and availability of staff) is lack 
of access to populations under risk, given that HAT is most prevalent in 
remote areas (Simarro et al. 2014). It is expensive and time-consuming 
for mobile teams to reach remote areas carrying equipment. 
Furthermore, it is also a challenge to treat patients, as this requires 
hospitalisation (Mpnaya et al. 2015).  
In summary, current control and screening methods are only effective if 
they are implemented without interruptions. Sustained implementation 
is expensive and relies on funding from partners (such as the initiative 
Programme National de Lutte contre la Trypanosomiase Humaine 
Africaine, [PNLTHA], funded by the Belgian government) and 
donations (from pharmaceutical companies Sanofi and Aventis). 
Therefore, WHO’s aim to eliminate HAT requires expansion of the 
control and screening, as well as research developing new tools to 
overcome the inadequacies of current methods:   
The most immediate challenge is to expand and sustain control 
and surveillance activities using the best tools available. 
Research into new tools should be accelerated. Awareness 
about the disease should be raised, control of the disease 
should be prioritized and fundraising should be advocated. 
WHO should continue to support countries and to coordinate the 
work of all parties concerned with the control of, and research 
into, human African trypanosomiasis. (WHO 2010: 89) 
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In section 3.3 I will focus on research efforts to develop new drugs that 
will help with the cost of treatment, the need to carry out lumber 
punctures (by treating both stage one and two) and so forth. However, 
first, I will focus on another important challenge: making sure that 
patients participate in the control and screening campaigns. In the 
following section I focus on factors that determine patients’ 
participation in the current control and screening programmes, focusing 
on social barriers and taboos that stop patients from taking part in both 
active and passive case detection campaigns. In the following section, 
I aim to demonstrate patients’ perception of current control and 
screening methods, underlining the importance of patients’ needs in 
the research and development efforts discussed in section 3.3.  
3.2.2 Social Barriers and Taboos  
Determining patients’ perception of current control measures is a 
difficult task given that gambiense HAT is currently considered 
endemic in 24 countries, affecting a diverse group of communities. In 
order to keep my argument focused I will concentrate on patients’ 
perception of HAT and the current control measures in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), given that 83% of all reported HAT cases in 
2013 were in the DRC (DNDi 2014). In this section I will focus on 
community participation in current HAT control. In chapter 6 (section 
6.1) I provide a detailed discussion of the socio-economic and political 
context of current HAT control, extending my analysis to communities 
in Uganda and Angola.    
As discussed above, in both active and passive control methods, the 
stage of disease influences the healthcare-seeking behaviour of 
patients. That is to say, patients with specific symptoms are more likely 
to seek and participate in control measures, in comparison to patients 
with non-specific symptoms (often seen in the first stage of HAT).  
Hasker et al. (2011) study the healthcare-seeking behaviour in DRC, 
reporting that 50% of all HAT cases were detected through passive 
screening. Moreover, Hasker et al. (2011) report that participation in 
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active screening campaigns is very low, even when communities were 
visited by mobile teams. Hasker et al. interviewed a group of patients 
(diagnosed by passive screening) from two endemic areas in DRC, 
revealing that the 80% of patients lived in villages visited by mobile 
teams. However, only 4% of the patients interviewed by Hasker, et al. 
participated in the active screening campaigns when their village was 
visited by a mobile team. The negative trend in participation in active 
screening campaigns, reported by Hasker et al. (2011) is not an 
exception (see Robays et al. 2004, Robays et al. 2007). 
Robays et al. (2007) present findings drawn from 33 focus group 
discussion in the province of Bandundu in DRC, covering twelve 
villages, eight in a savannah setting and four in the fluvial setting. In 
this province, thirteen mobile teams are active, visiting each village 
with two days’ notice. Robays et al. (2007) argue that HAT is well 
known by the local communities and recognised as a major problem, 
but that there are major barriers to participation in screening. Robays 
et al. assert that toxicity and cost of treatment are two major barriers to 
participation in active case detection programmes. In addition, Robays, 
et al. argue that lack of confidentiality is an issue during screening due 
to the stigma attached to this disease.  
Robays et al.’s interviews show that the cost of treatment hinders 
people from participating in screenings:23 given that they cannot afford 
the treatment, why should they participate in screening? People 
refusing to participate in screening is thought to create a group of ‘core 
transmitters’ who remain infectious and act as a reservoir. In addition 
to the cost, people refuse to participate due to the stigma attached to 
mental health problems linked to HAT infection. Robays et al. argue 
that after the course of treatment patients are not taken seriously in the 
                                               
23 Patients are required to pay for a screening card during mobile teams’ 
visits. The costs of screening (which can be as high as 1.5 US$ per family) 
and treatment were both identified as major barriers to participation within 
communities interviewed by Robays et al.  
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community. In particular, the lack of confidentiality during screening 
was quoted as problematic, since infection leads to exclusion from 
society but patients are vulnerable to social pressure or state sanctions 
if they fail to comply with the procedure.  
Robays et al. argue that the toxicity of treatment (in particular, death 
and encephalopathy caused by Melarsoprol) constitute a major 
setback to patient participation. The death of seemingly healthy 
patients causes non-participation in screening programmes. The 
unpredictability of the outcome causes a lot of concern among patients 
and leads to conspiracy theories about the intentions of the mobile 
teams and medical staff. Another setback is the rest period after 
treatment. Participants claimed that a six month rest period where they 
are asked to refrain from labour and sexual activity creates social 
problems for the community, as the main income for participants is 
subsistence farming (and fishing in fluvial areas) and female 
participants also described marital problems caused by abstaining from 
sexual activity for six months. 
Robays et al. (2007) argue that lack of participation in the current 
control and screening programmes is caused by the inadequacies of 
the current control measures (cost, lack of confidentiality) and 
treatment (toxicity, cost, recovery period), and not a lack of knowledge 
on the part of local communities affected by HAT. Thus, to improve 
patient participation in HAT control, changes must be made to the 
healthcare system. These can be short-term measures such as 
lowering the cost, using less toxic treatments (NECT), improving 
confidentiality, and long-term, such as developing new drugs and 
diagnostics that cater to patients’ needs and are suitable for use in the 
field. In section 3.3 I will discuss the short-term and long-term in detail. 
However, first I will fist discuss the details of the socio-economic and 
political context HAT, where the current tools to eliminate HAT are 
inadequate.  I argue that the current tools to diagnose and treat HAT 
are inadequate given the broader context oh HAT. 
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As argued above, the active screening campaigns play a significant 
role in the control of HAT in terms of reaching out to the majority of 
population that has no access to healthcare. However, to progress it is 
necessary to increase community participation in active screening 
programmes. It is important to stress again that these barriers are not 
due to lack of knowledge about the disease and treatments: as Robays 
et al. (2007) argue, the barriers are due to inadequacies of the current 
control and screening methods, particularly the cost and toxicity 
(among others mentioned above). For the WHO’s aim to eliminate HAT 
by 2030 to be fulfilled, continued research to overcome the 
aforementioned inadequacies is crucial: 
The control tools currently available are not the most 
appropriate to design fine-tuned strategies for each 
epidemiological setting identified. Continuous research is 
needed to improve these weaknesses, mainly to allow the 
involvement of health services in eliminating Gambiense 
trypanosomiasis. (WHO 2012b: 25) 
As discussed above the currently available drugs have unacceptable 
levels of toxicity and atrocious side effects. New tools must be 
designed to match the patients’ needs: for instance, new drugs need to 
be orally bioavailable, have low toxicity, be effective against both stage 
one and two, and require a shorter treatment period. In the following 
section I shift my focus to research efforts to develop new treatments. 
In particular, I will focus on the public-private partnership Drugs for 
Neglected Disease Initiative (DNDi) that focuses on developing drugs 
that match patients’ need. DNDi’s patient needs-driven approach is a 
prime example of values arising from the socio-economic and political 
context influencing scientific practices.  
3.3 Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative - DNDi 
The Drugs for Neglected Disease Initiative (DNDi) is a public private 
partnership established in 2003 by Médecins Sans Frontières and the 
WHO to address specific research development needs of patients 
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suffering from Neglected Tropical Diseases. DNDi’s work is patient-
centred using target product profiles (TPPs, first discussed in 2.2.2) to 
guide and influence scientific practices. In this section I will focus on 
DNDi’s approach to research and development for NTDs, underlining 
how a set of values is constructed based on the broad context of HAT 
that guides scientific practice. In the previous section I argued that the 
current tools are inadequate, underlining the need for new diagnostic 
and therapeutic tools. Herein, I focus on anti-parasitic drug discovery 
and development programme directed by DNDi to argue that broad 
range of values from the socio-economic and political context of HAT 
shapes the scientific inquiry conducted by DNDi. Here I focus on TPP 
as overarching set of values that describe the succinct properties of 
drug that matches patients’ needs. The anti-parasitic drug discovery 
and development is a case where multiple approaches and accounts 
are employed to explore and explain different aspects of the 
phenomena (discussed in chapter 4 and 5). Moreover, it is a case 
where the influence of values on scientific inquiry is very clear 
(discussed in chapter 6) in the way that the broader socio-economic 
and political context of HAT determines particular aims of scientific 
practices and provides set of values to guide scientist along the way. 
DNDi was established to address an existing imbalance in the impact 
NTDs have on the global disease burden and the lack of research that 
went into developing new drugs to treat these diseases. Trouiller et al. 
(2001) assert that only 1.1% of all new drugs approved between 1974 
and 1999 were for NTDs, despite NTD’s contributing to 12% of the 
global disease burden. DNDi’s main aim is to develop new chemical 
entities (NCE) for the treatment of NTDs using an alternative approach 
to profit-driven pharmaceutical industry.  
DNDi operates as a ‘virtual pharmaceutical’ company in which all the 
R&D activities are outsourced to different partners, while the 
organisation and management of each project is undertaken by DNDi. 
Within its first ten years DNDi formed over 350 collaborations globally 
in 43 countries, with partners including pharmaceutical and biotech 
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companies, universities, research institutes, governmental and non-
governmental organisations (DNDi 2011) and delivered six new 
treatments and twelve NCE in preclinical and clinical development 
since 2003 (DNDi 2014).24 
DNDi’s alternative R&D model has four principles: keeping patients' 
needs at the centre of the R&D process; open access to knowledge 
and access to treatments; maintaining financial and scientific 
independence; building and sustaining solid alliances (DNDi 2014). 
The first principle, keeping patients' needs at the centre of the R&D 
process, is argued to be the most fundamental and distinct of all 
practices that take place in the organisation (DNDi 2014). Patients’ 
needs are taken into consideration during the selection of target 
diseases, definition of aims, particularly during key decision and policy-
making platforms: 
Beginning with the end in mind, and keeping it in mind until patient 
needs are addressed appropriately, is ingrained in the way the 
organizational model is designed. (DNDi 2014: 3) 
Target product profiles (TPP) play an important role in making sure that 
the patients’ needs are considered at every stage of research. DNDi’s 
definition of a TPP is a ‘succinct description of the ideal specifications 
needed for a treatment, considering the needs of the patients and the 
main characteristics of [the] related health system’. (DNDi 2014: 3).  
TPPs are disease-specific, and are determined by multiple actors 
including researchers, clinicians, patient representatives and disease 
                                               
24 Pharmaceutical companies (including AstraZeneca, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, Eli Lilly, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer, Roche and 
Sanofi-Aventis) had the average overall output around ~7 NCE per 
year between 2005 and 2010 (Bunnage, 2011). During this period, total 
R&D spending increased, reaching $60 billion per annum 2010. Taking 
these numbers into account, the DNDi model can be seen as a success, 
however further work is required for a healthier comparison. 
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control programme managers. The purpose of a TPP is to outline the 
properties of a desired product via the following questions:25 
- Indications: Which disease(s)?  
- Population: What type of patients and where?  
- Clinical Efficacy: Does it treat the infection effectively?  
- Safety and Tolerability: What level of acceptability for adverse 
events?  
- Stability: How long is the shelf-life of the drug(s) and what are the 
storage conditions?  
- Route of Administration: What is an acceptable way to administer 
the treatment to the patient population?  
- Frequency and Treatment Duration: How often and for how long 
must it be given?  
- Cost: Will it be affordable to the target population or health 
system?  
TPPs links the scientific practices and broader context of HAT. Here I 
argue that TPPs are overarching values guiding scientific practices, 
most notably allowing scientist to assess the likelihood of a given 
project to yielding a drug candidate that matches patients’ needs (see 
section 6.1). For instance, in early stages of the drug discovery 
pipeline, scientists must make judgements when validating drug targets 
(see Frearson et al. 2007; Torrie et al 2009).  
                                               
25 In chapter 4, I describe how Wyatt et al. (2011) demonstrate different 
criteria that link the molecular properties of drug targets with the requirements 
listed in TPP. 
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In summary, DNDi can be understood as a virtual drug company that 
brings together partners with different capabilities to contribute to the 
R&D process and manages the whole process. DNDi’s initial step can 
be seen as developing the TPP followed by forming a partnership that 
can deliver the target drug. In the following section I want to shift my 
focus to DNDi’s ‘two-pronged approach to R&D’ in order to 
demonstrate different strategies in developing treatments that best suit 
patients’ needs. Here I argue that the TPP consists of overarching 
values that direct and guide scientific practices involved in the R&D 
process. 
3.3.1 ’Two-pronged’ approach to R&D  
DNDi adopts two different strategies to address both urgent needs in 
the field in a short space of time and long-term goals to develop new 
chemical entities capable of changing how diseases are managed 
clinically, supporting sustainable control and elimination according to 
the WHO’s definitions. The short-term approaches focus on re-
appropriation of existing drugs and chemical entities for NTD treatment 
or optimisation of NTD treatments already in use. DNDi’s short-term 
approach addresses very urgent needs, for instance in the case of the 
approval of Nifurtimox–Eflornithine Combination Therapy (NECT), 
which addressed the urgent need to replace Melarsoprol and its severe 
side effects. The long-term approach entails developing new medicines 
according to the TPP. 
Short-Term Approach: NECT 
Nifurtimox–Eflornithine combination therapy consists of co-
administration of two registered drugs. NECT is the first new treatment 
to be registered for HAT in 25 years. Nifurtimox is a medication used 
widely for the treatment of Chagas disease, also known as American 
Trypanosomiasis. Chagas disease is caused by the parasite 
Trypanosoma cruzi (in the same genus as T. brucei), which is 
completely curable with nifurtimox if the treatment is administered 
swiftly. Eflornithine was initially developed as a cancer drug, which 
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later received attention for its effect on T. brucei. As discussed in 
section 3.1.4, eflornithine was proven effective against T.b. gambiense 
in the 1980s and approved by the FDA in 1990, but was only available 
for patients in 2001 through the efforts of MSF (Priotto et al. 2006). The 
combination of these treatments was facilitated by DNDi, starting in 
2003 with a phase III clinical trial in Brazzaville in the Republic of 
Congo. This trial was continued and extended to various areas in the 
DRC. This study was a multi-centre clinical study with 287 patients 
enrolled and completed in 2008. NECT combination therapy was 
approved and added to WHO’s essential medicines list. (Opigo and 
Woodrow 2009) The benefits of combination therapy in comparison to 
the Eflornitine mono therapy are significant: the total number of 
intravenous infusion of eflornithine is reduced from 56 to 14 and the 
number of days of hospitalisation is reduced from 14 to 10. The 
combination therapy requires two doses during day time instead of four 
times day and night, making NECT more suitable for the resource-poor 
local healthcare system and patients.  
The short-term approach is to deliver rapid solutions to urgent 
situations. However, as discussed above, this requires new drugs to be 
available, to achieve the WHO’s aim of elimination by 2030. Therefore 
DNDi’s second approach is to focus on developing new chemical 
entities that can be used for HAT treatment.  
Long-term approach: New Chemical Entities 
The long-term approach entails development of ‘break-through’ 
therapies that can transform the way patients are treated: 
Such ‘breakthrough therapies’ – ideally implemented at the primary 
healthcare and/or community level in combination with a simple 
diagnostic tool – have the potential to fundamentally transform how 
patients are treated for their disease, supporting optimal individual 
case management and, potentially, large-scale disease elimination 
strategies. In addition, such treatments would relieve the burden 
placed on healthcare workers and lower the cost to health systems. 
(DNDi 2014: 13)  
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Unlike the short-term approach where the focus is on the clinical 
research (modifying the registered treatment), a long-term approach 
starts with pre-clinical drug discovery and development research. The 
long-term approach is crucial for HAT, given that current tools (both 
diagnostic and therapeutic) have major limitations (discussed in section 
3.2) in achieving elimination. That is, in order to achieve elimination by 
2030 there is a need for new drugs that are better suited for use by 
active case detection campaigns i.e. orally bioavailable, with has short 
treatment and recovery times, tolerable toxicity and manufactured and 
supplied to patients at low cost.  
DNDi’s virtual R&D model faces several challenges. The most 
prominent is access to knowledge, compound libraries and data from 
second parties. The specific contracts with partners use financial and 
economic incentives to build partnerships with second parties such as 
private pharmaceutical companies and academic research institutions 
with in-house expertise on drug discovery and development. 
Two distinct methods are employed in the long-term approach. The 
first is intensive compound library screening, where the first step is the 
validation of a drug target and screening compound libraries in order to 
find small molecules that can interact and modulate the target activity. 
In the following chapter, I am going to focus in the initial stage target 
validation, paying close attention to Wyatt et al.’s paper that provides 
an account of how TPPs are used in scientific practices. In my 
argument I underline how TPP is used to justify plurality of practices 
employed to fulfil the aims of research.  
An example of a compound developed by DNDi is Oxaborole SCYX-
7158, a NCEs developed by DNDi, managed to advance from early 
drug discovery and development phase to, pre-clinical research phase 
where it was tested in vivo models was approved for phase I clinical 
trials in humans in 2012 (DNDi 2014).  
The second method is compound mining where past drug discovery 
and development efforts that never reached a conclusion (for 
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commercial or strategic reasons) are revisited. For HAT, assessment 
of anti-invectives called nitroimidazoles led to the re-discovery of the 
compound Fexinidazole. This compound is currently in phase III clinical 
studies, with the aim of registering it as a 10-day oral treatment for 
second phase of T.b. gambiense in adults and the first phase in 
children aged between 6 and 14 years old. 
In this chapter I argued that the scientific practices involved in 
developing new drugs for Human African trypanosomiasis must be 
understood within the broad socio-economic and political context of 
this disease. I demonstrated that the current scientific inquiry and 
research aims are guided by TPP’s, constructed by asking particular 
questions about the disease and its broader context. Elimination of 
gambiense HAT is possible, but current efforts to control and eliminate 
HAT have considerable limitations. This chapter follows from chapter 2, 
further developing the idea that scientific practices must be understood 
in their broader socio-economic and political contexts. In the following 
chapters I will refer back to the current research into developing new 
drugs to eliminate HAT. Here, I presented a preliminary argument that 
the scientific practices are guided by particular aims (elimination of 
HAT) and set of values (TPP’s). In this thesis, I argue that the scientific 
practices must be understood in their broader context. In this chapter I 
demonstrated the links between the broader context of HAT and the 
scientific practices aiming to develop new anti-parasitic drugs to 
address patients’ needs. In the following chapters I will refer back to 
the HAT case study to argue that plurality of accounts and approaches 
in scientific practices is an important characteristic of the scientific 
inquiry. Furthermore, I will argue that the extent of plurality and the 
benefits of having multiple approaches in any field of science must be 
understood with respect to the particular aims and values in that field.  
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Chapter 4 
4.1 Epistemic Pluralism 
In this chapter I aim to provide an argument for epistemic pluralism. In 
chapter 2, I argued that broadening the subject matter of philosophy of 
science to include scientific practices leads to the question of how to 
make sense of multiplicities in scientific practices and accounts. Here, I 
argue that these multiplicities are an important feature of scientific 
inquiry. In this chapter I provide detailed analysis of three pluralist 
theses: Kellert, Longino, and Waters (2006), Chang (2012) and 
Mitchell (2002). I use these three theses as a starting point for my 
pluralism, since all three are concerned with scientific practices and the 
use of scientific knowledge produced. Moreover, all three theses are 
empirically motivated, taking pluralities in scientific practices as 
justification for pursuing a pluralist line of argument.  
Pluralist debate has a rich and multifaceted history. In section 2.1.3, I 
presented Suppes (1978) assertion that close examination of scientific 
practices reveals a plurality in science, in methods, language and 
subject matter. Suppes further argues that neither languages nor the 
subject matter of different scientific disciplines can be reduced to a 
single language or subject matter. Suppes calls for acceptance and 
further philosophical study of pluralities in science. Although the roots 
of the pluralist argument can be traced before Suppes (1978), as I 
argued in chapter 2, the pluralist argument I put forward in this thesis is 
motivated by the shift in philosophy of science from the traditional view 
to philosophy of science in practice. Following Suppes, members of the 
Stanford School, Dupre (1993) and Cartwright (1999), provide 
metaphysical arguments supporting the pluralist account of the world. 
Many pluralist arguments that preceded the three pluralist arguments I 
will focus on here (Kellert, Longino, and Waters 2006, Chang 2012, 
Mitchell 2002) responded to the unity of science thesis, arguing against 
reductive accounts of science (see Galison and Stump 1996). Further, 
proponents of the disunity of science and pluralism also provided 
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alternative readings of the origins of the unity of science thesis set out 
by the logical positivists (see Cartwright et al. 1996, Uebel 1991). As 
stated, I focus on the pluralist argument, following the shift from the 
traditional view in philosophy of science to philosophy of science in 
practice (see section 2.1).  
The outline of the pluralist argument I wish to develop here is as 
follows: both historical and current scientific practices point out that the 
natural world is complex and cannot be captured with a single, 
complete and comprehensive account. Motivated by the state of affairs 
in scientific practices, I argue that there are multiple approaches in 
scientific practices, each focusing on different aspects of phenomena 
and producing partial accounts. An important characteristic of the 
pluralist argument I pursue here is the rejection of the notion that the 
aim of science is to come up with a single and complete account. 
Instead, I argue that plurality of approaches and accounts result from 
plurality of aims in science. While I acknowledge that the broad aim of 
science can be thought of as producing and proliferating knowledge 
about the world, in order to have a better sense of the state of affairs in 
scientific practices it is necessary to understand particular aims in 
science, which in turn allows me to investigate the role of values in 
science from a pluralist perspective (discussed in section 4.5 and 
further developed in chapters 5 and 6). 
This chapter is divided into five main sections. In the first, I develop the 
pluralist argument I aim to advance in this thesis. The pluralist thesis I 
develop here is built on the pluralist arguments put forward by Kellert, 
et al. (2006), Chang (2012) and Mitchel (2002) where all three 
arguments are motivated by the apparent pluralities in scientific 
practices, each aiming to provide a philosophical account of the 
multiplicities of accounts and approaches in scientific inquiry. In section 
4.1, I provide an overview of all three arguments, while developing the 
pluralist thesis I will defend. In section 4.2, I return to my case study, 
focusing on the pluralities in drug discovery and development for HAT, 
demonstrating the plurality of approaches in scientific practices and 
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further articulating my pluralist thesis. In section 4.3, I focus on the 
units of analysis, underlining the terms I use in understanding and 
analysing the pluralities in sciences. That is, I introduce the terms I 
wish to use in defining and describing pluralities in scientific practices 
in building my own argument for pluralism (which I will further develop 
in chapter 5). In section 4.4, I provide a defence against possible 
reductionist arguments against the pluralist thesis I develop here. I 
argue that reductionism can be recast in such a way that it seen as 
part of scientific practices and not a way to get rid of plurality. Herein I 
use Kaiser (2012) and Waters (1990) to support my pluralist argument 
against possible reductionist objections. In the final section (4.5), I 
provide a summary of the pluralist thesis developed in chapter 4, 
where I argue that pluralities in scientific practices are an important 
characteristic of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, I argue that scientific 
inquiry is ought to be pluralistic in order to explain and explore different 
aspects of phenomena (I will further develop the normative aspects of 
my argument in chapter 5). In this chapter I use several case studies 
(mainly from life sciences) to support my argument that multiple 
approaches produce partial accounts in order to explain and explore 
different aspects of phenomena. Moreover, I will use these case 
studies to argue for the plurality of aims in science.  
4.1.1 The Pluralist Stance 
The pluralist stance, as defined by Kellert, Longino, and Waters (2006), 
is the philosophical interpretation of multiplicities of approaches and 
accounts in scientific practices. Kellert et al. assert that the 
multiplicities in current and past scientific practices serve as empirical 
evidence for the pluralist stance. Instead of ignoring these pluralities or 
considering them to be a problem, Kellert et al. argue that such 
plurality must be accepted as a feature of scientific inquiry. Thus, given 
that the plurality of approaches is the character of scientific practice 
and scientific knowledge produced by different approaches, Kellert et 
al.’s pluralist stance is the philosophical interpretation of this state of 
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affairs. Kellert et al. argue that each approach in science provides 
different and partial accounts of phenomena. 
The pluralist stance can be framed as negative and a positive theses: 
the negative thesis is the denial of monism and the positive thesis is 
the argument for a pluralist approach to understand and explain 
scientific practices and their products. Kellert et al. mainly focus on 
approaches and accounts as their main subject of study in scientific 
practices: approaches can be thought of as distinct sets of scientific 
practices focusing on particular aspects of phenomena, while accounts 
are the products of approaches such as theories, representations, 
models, explanations, etc. (I will further discuss units of analysis in 
section in 4.3, comparing units of analysis used in pluralist arguments).  
Negative thesis: pluralism as rejection of monism 
Kellert et al. start by defining the pluralist stance as a rejection of 
monism, which is a thesis characterised in terms of the aims of 
science: 
the ultimate aim of science [is] to establish a single, complete, 
and comprehensive account of the natural world (or the part of 
the world investigated by the science) based on a single set of 
fundamental principles. (Kellert, Longino, and Waters 2006: x) 
Following Kellert et al.’s characterisation, I wish to further analyse 
monism on three different levels: metaphysical, epistemic and 
methodological. Here I argue that monism is a complex concept and 
can be understood in different ways (in sections 4.5 and 5.1 I will argue 
that the form of pluralism I develop in this thesis rejects epistemic 
monism). Kellert et al., (and other pluralists discussed here) react 
against monism, rejecting it as the traditional dominant view of science. 
Here I will argue that monism is complex and comes in different forms.  
The metaphysical argument for monism can be thought of as follows: 
the world is such that it can be explained with a universal, complete 
and coherent account. That is, metaphysical monism is the 
commitment to the notion that world is structured in a way that it can be 
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captured by one complete universal account (a theory, model, etc.). 
Epistemic monism is the philosophical commitment that one complete 
and universal account is knowable by us. That is to say epistemic 
monism is the notion that world can be described and explained by a 
single, complete, comprehensive and universal account based on 
fundamental principles. Thus the aim of science is to produce this 
universal  account. Thirdly, the methodological argument that there is 
one (best) method that can provide the monist account; moreover 
current methods can be judged based on whether they can yield such 
account (or closest to that account in that particular time). 26  As 
described by Kellert et al.,   
whether they provide (or come close to providing) a 
comprehensive and complete account based on fundamental 
principles.” (Kellert, Longino, and Waters 2006: x) 
Kellert et al. argue that in the monist interpretation, the multiplicities in 
science are regarded as a temporary state, caused by immature or 
incomplete science. They suggest that there is no definitive argument 
for monism; rather it is based on a priori assumptions about the natural 
world and the aims of science. Kellert et al.’s rejection of monism is 
therefore the rejection of such assumptions. Instead, Kellert et al. take 
the state of current scientific practices as the starting point for their 
argument for the pluralist stance, a position they summarise as follows: 
Scientific pluralism, in contrast, holds that there are no definitive 
arguments for monism and that the multiplicity of approaches 
                                               
26 A fourth category, axiological monism can be added to the list. Axiological 
monism can be thought as the view that scientific practices have a single aim: 
universal accounts of phenomenon. In other words axiological monism takes 
science to have a single set of values and aims that define what scientific 
practices ought to be and what scientific accounts ought to contain. 
Axiological monism is not further developed in this thesis as it is not 
discussed by Kellert et al., Chang and Mitchel, whose work forms the basis of 
my pluralist account.  
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that presently characterizes many areas of scientific 
investigation does not necessarily constitute a deficiency. As 
pluralists, we do not assume that the natural world cannot, in 
principle, be completely explained by a single tidy account; 
rather, we believe that whether it can be so explained is an 
open, empirical question. (Kellert, Longino, and Waters 2006: x) 
It is important to note here that Kellert et al.’s rejection of monism is not 
the rejection of the possibility of the natural world being such that it can 
be explained with a single account.  However, treating the 
metaphysical commitment that the world is such that it can be 
explained by a single complete and comprehensive account as an 
open question undermines the epistemic argument for monism: 
if we don't know whether the world can be fully accounted for by 
a single comprehensive account, then it seems unreasonable to 
assume that the ultimate aim of science is to achieve such [an] 
account. (Kellert, Longino, and Waters 2006: x-xi) 
Thus, Kellert et al. reject the notion that there is a single overarching 
aim in science that can be used to assess different accounts and 
approaches. Moreover, they argue that it is unreasonable to accept or 
reject approaches based on whether they can produce an account that 
can be used to understand and explain all phenomena. Kellert et al. 
summarise their position as follows: 
if the nature of the world is such that important phenomena 
cannot be completely and comprehensively explained on the 
basis of a single set of fundamental principles, then the aims, 
methods, and results of the sciences should not be understood 
or evaluated in reference to the monist quest for the 
fundamental grail. (Kellert, Longino, and Waters 2006: xi) 
Kellert et al.’s rejection of monism is supported by case studies 
presented in the collected volume, including the works of Fehr (2006) 
on the evolution of sex, Sent (2006)’s account of the plurality on 
economics and Dickson (2006)’s account of quantum dynamics. Kellert 
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et al. assert that the pluralist stance is empirical in the sense that it 
takes current state of affairs to support the pluralist argument. While 
Kellert et al. assert that they regard metaphysical monism as an open 
question, they argue against epistemic monism. For Kellert et al., 
metaphysical assumptions about the natural world remain an open 
question. However, epistemic and methodological assumptions about 
the aims of science are not supported by either the historical or current 
state of scientific practice. 
In summary, Kellert et al. take scientific practices as the starting point 
for their argument for scientific pluralism. Kellert et al.’s position 
regards the metaphysical assumptions of the state of the world as an 
open question. Moreover, Kellert et al. reject any a priori assumptions 
about the aims of science. Instead they provide a pluralist framework 
as a way to understand scientific practices and their products, 
replacing the monist commitments with: 
the commitment to avoid reliance on the monist assumptions in 
interpretation or evaluation coupled with an openness to the 
ineliminability of multiplicity in some scientific contexts. (Stephen 
Kellert, Helen Longino, and Waters 2006: xiii) 
In the following section I provide a detailed analysis of the empirical 
argument Kellert et al. provide as the basis of the pluralist stance.  
Positive thesis: Empirical Argument 
Kellert et al. argue that the pluralist stance is a philosophical approach 
to interpret the content and practices of scientific inquiry. The pluralist 
stance Kellert et al. take is empirical in the sense that the starting point 
of philosophical inquiry is scientific practices: 
According to the pluralist stance, the plurality in contemporary 
science provides evidence that there are kinds of situations 
produced by the interaction of factors each of which may be 
representable in a model or theory, but not all of which are 
representable in the same model or theory. Each factor is 
necessary for the phenomenon to have the various characters it 
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has, but a complete account is not possible in the same 
representational idiom and is not forthcoming from any single 
investigative approach (as far as we know). (Kellert, Longino, 
and Waters 2006: xiv) 
Kellert et al. point out that all factors relevant to a given phenomenon 
cannot be represented or explained in a single complete and coherent 
account. Instead, different approaches can produce representations of 
phenomena that focus on different aspects, producing partial 
representations of specific phenomena.  
all representations are partial in that any representation must 
select a limited number of aspects of a phenomenon (else it 
would not represent, but duplicate). This selective and partial 
character of representation means that alternative 
representations of a phenomenon can be equally correct. 
Hence, it should be obvious that different accounts, employing 
different representations, might be generated by answering 
different questions framed by those different representations. 
(Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino, and Waters 2006: xv) 
Kellert et al. argue that different accounts of phenomena focus on 
different aspects of phenomena. Thus, different accounts of a given 
phenomenon can be equally valid: 
[the] pluralist stance keeps in the forefront the fact that scientific 
inquiry typically represents some aspects of the world well at the 
cost of obscuring or perhaps even distorting other aspects. 
(Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino, and Waters 2006: xv) 
Kellert et al. suggest that in order to understand and explain different 
aspects of phenomena it is necessary to have multiple approaches. 
Instead of recognising such multiplicity as a problem, Kellert et al. 
argue that plurality is an ineliminable characteristic of scientific inquiry, 
and that our understanding of science should be free of the assumption 
that pluralities will be resolved through convergence and integration. 
However, they also take an empirical approach here, suggesting that 
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convergence of different approaches and accounts must be studied 
case by case, rather than judged on the basis of a blanket assumption, 
stating that: 
scientists sometimes must make decisions about whether to 
pursue or to defer the quest for comprehensive or convergent 
accounts. A pluralist approach advocates that such decisions be 
made on empirical case-by-case, pragmatic grounds rather than 
on the basis of blanket assumption. We expect that decisions 
made on those grounds will yield more fruitful and effective 
results. (Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino, and Waters 2006: xxi) 
Kellert et al.’s argument can be thought of in simpler terms, as follows: 
our gut instinct should not be how we can combine multiple accounts 
and different approaches working on the same phenomena. Equally, 
one must not impose pluralism in cases where convergence occurs as 
part of scientific practice; the pluralist stance does not rule out 
integration or convergence among accounts as part of scientific 
practice. Thus, the pluralist approach to questions of convergence or 
integration must be empirical and pragmatic in the sense that we must 
consider the particular aims of a given practice and assess the 
question of convergence or integration according to these aims. 
In summary, the pluralist stance is a meta-philosophical argument, 
outlining how to make sense of scientific practices and knowledge in 
light of the plurality of approaches and accounts in science. The 
pluralist stance, described by Kellert et al., rejects the notion that 
scientific practices aim to provide a complete and concrete account of 
the natural world. Kellert et al. argue that scientific inquiry must not be 
assessed on the monist assumptions about the world and the aim of 
science, but rather that the plurality in scientific practices and the 
practical success in achieving pragmatic aims serve as empirical 
evidence for the need for multiplicity in scientific inquiry. This pragmatic 
way of thinking is prominent in Kellert et al.’s pluralist stance, which I 
will further develop in chapter 5 (section 5.4) and in chapter 6 (section 
6.2). Before I further develop a pragmatic argument for pluralism, I will 
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shift my focus to Chang (2012), who argues for a normative form of 
pluralism, which I will use to advance a pragmatic form of pluralism in 
section 5.1.3. 
4.1.2 Active Normative Epistemic Pluralism   
Similar to Kellert et al. (2006), Chang (2012) calls for a re-examination 
of fundamental assumptions about scientific practices and their 
accounts of the world. Chang asserts that the main motivation for his 
account is plurality in scientific practices. Chang (2012) focuses on 
three different periods in the history of chemistry to argue for the 
benefits of multiple approaches operating simultaneously to produce 
accounts of phenomena, stating that: 
we are limited beings trying to understand and engage with an 
external reality that seems vastly complex, apparently 
inexhaustible, and ultimately unpredictable. If we are not likely to 
find the perfect system of science, it makes sense to foster 
multiple ones, each of which will have its own unique strengths. 
(Chang 2012: 255)  
There are two underlying assumptions in Chang’s argument: 
abundance and complexity. Chang argues that there is an unending 
abundance of inquiry, claiming that, 
nature holds an indefinitely large number and diverse types of 
facts there to revealed, and this makes it likely that each 
different system of practice could tap into a different part of that 
inexhaustible reservoir, and continue to tap into it. (Chang 2012: 
256-257)  
Chang argues that losing sight of this abundant potential restricts what 
we can learn about the world. Thus, it is necessary to preserve and 
promote the plurality of systems in order to maximise how we acquire 
knowledge. Furthermore, Chang argues that given the complexity of 
nature there is a need to produce simple schemes that pick out specific 
aspects. 
  105 
It seems that any domain of nature we choose to study reveals 
an indefinite degree of complexity, while human minds can only 
handle relatively simple schemes, no matter how much help we 
have from increasing computing power. (Chang, 2012: 257)  
Chang’s argument for pluralism is similar to that of Kellert, Longino, 
and Waters (2006) in the sense that they both oppose monism. Chang 
argues that monism is the notion that the aim of science is the search 
for the truth about the natural world. In other words, Chang argues that 
monism relies on the assumption that there is one natural word, and 
therefore there must be one truth about it. Chang offers pluralism as 
way of understanding scientific inquiry, defining it as ‘the doctrine 
advocating the cultivation of multiple systems of practice’ (2012: 260), 
in which a system of practice is a ‘coherent and interacting set of 
epistemic activities performed with a view to achieving certain aims’ 
(2012: 260).  
Chang presents two objections to monism. Similar to Kellert et al., the 
first objection is to do with the aims of science. For Chang, monism 
should not be regarded as the ultimate aim. Building on his empirical 
work on the history of chemistry, Chang argues that the aims of 
science vary, just as the questions scientists have about phenomena 
vary. Thus, Chang argues that it is more likely that these aims are 
better served by multiple interacting accounts of phenomena. In order 
to understand this, we need to look at Chang’s historical work on 
developments in chemistry from the mid-eighteenth century to the late 
nineteenth century. In particular, Chang focuses on the common 
narratives of the chemical revolution, in which the phlogiston theory 
was replaced by Lavoisier’s theory of oxygen. The traditional narrative 
is that the phlogiston theory was wrong about the nature of elements 
and was replaced by the theory of oxygen put forward by Lavoisier 
(see, Thagard 1990; Pyle 2000; McEvoy 2010). This kind of narrative 
assumes that the two theories were aiming to do the same thing and 
that they were compared against the same evidence and assessed 
accordingly. However, Chang argues that phlogistonists and 
oxygenists were focusing on different sets of questions and had 
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different aims. Therefore, the success of the two systems cannot be 
compared with one another, as each system was producing a valid 
account of phenomena peculiar to their particular aim. In other words, 
phlogistonists and oxygenists were interested in different questions 
about phenomena, therefore producing different but valid accounts of 
phenomena. Chang demonstrates how both theories were telling us 
something useful and insightful about phenomena that was particular 
to the given approach. Each theory has merits according to either 
system’s aims. Thus, each theory must be assessed according to the 
questions it attempts to answer, not according to a universal aim as 
monism suggests.  
The usual narrative of winners and losers is addressed in Chang’s 
work on triumphalism. Triumphalism can be understood as an 
approach in history and philosophy written from the perspective of the 
‘winners and losers’. According to Chang, triumphalism is entrenched 
in both the history and philosophy of science and is perpetuated by 
monist assumptions. That is to say, if we consider the aim of science 
as to provide a single, complete and coherent account, it is expected 
that only one of these accounts (phlogiston or oxygen) will provide the 
right answer. However, the pluralist interpretation of the chemical 
revolution reveals a different picture, in which Lavoisier’s oxygen 
theory is as incorrect as phlogiston, if we are looking for winners or 
losers. However, Chang encourages us to move away from thinking 
about winners and losers and focus on different systems of practice 
that provide partial knowledge of phenomena that others cannot. 
Going beyond monist assumptions about science, Chang argues that 
the plurality of systems of practices is beneficial for science.27 Chang 
discusses the benefits of plurality under two different categories: 
                                               
27 Chang brands his pluralism as active normative epistemic pluralism, which 
I will discuss in detail in chapter 5. However in order to draw parallels 
between Chang work and other pluralist arguments presented in this chapter, 
it is necessary to discuss his positive thesis. 
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toleration and interaction. The benefits of toleration can be summed up 
as allowing different systems of practices to pursue different aims in 
their own way. The benefits of interaction on the other hand can be 
further divided depending on the type of interaction between systems. 
Chang identifies the first form of interaction as integration, which 
occurs when   
none of the available systems by itself, not even all of them 
additively, can achieve a certain aim. In such cases, we may 
attempt to reach a better result by definition ad hoc integration 
of different systems. (Chang, 2012: 279). 
Chang’s definition of integration is very similar to integration as 
described by Kellert et al. The question of integration will be discussed 
in detail using Mitchell’s account (section 4.1.3) 
The second form of interaction is co-optation. This subcategory refers 
to cases in which a given system of practice co-opts an element from 
another system of practice. In order to better understand this, we must 
look into how Chang conceptualises system of practice. As mentioned 
above, a system of practice is a ‘coherent and interacting set of 
epistemic activities performed with a view to achieving certain aims’ 
(Chang 2012: 260). A system of practice is composed of different 
epistemic activities which Chang defines as ‘a more-or-less coherent 
set of mental or physical operations that are intended to contribute to 
the production or improvement of knowledge in a particular way, in 
accordance with some discernible rules (though the rules may be 
unarticulated)’ (Chang, 2012:15). Thus, the co-optation here refers to 
co-optation of different epistemic activities and different elements (such 
as theories, models, questions, methods etc.) from one system of 
practice to another.  
The final form of interaction defined by Chang is competition. The 
competition should not be understood to have an end goal; instead, it 
is the interaction among systems in which different accounts are 
provided to explain phenomena. The competition is not to be the 
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‘winner’ of the debate, but to get more funding, resources etc. I will 
discuss this in detail in the following section with respect to case 
studies. Chang sums up his position as follows:  
An important part of my proposal is to keep in mind the aims 
that scientists are trying to achieve in each situation. The 
presence of an identifiable aim (even if not articulated explicitly 
by the actors themselves) is what distinguishes activities from 
mere physical happenings involving human bodies, and the 
coherence of an activity is defined by how well the activity 
succeeds in achieving its aim. (Chang, 2012: 16) 
Chang’s pluralism is ‘an ideology of science aimed at promoting 
plurality in order to reap its benefits’ (Chang, 2012: 268). Chang aims 
to make normative claims about scientific practice and engage with 
scientific practice and cultivating plurality directly. In contrast, Kellert et 
al.’s pluralist stance sets out a research programme for philosophers, 
where the main aim is to have a new direction for the philosophical 
study of scientific practice.  
In chapter 5 I will further discuss the main differences between the 
pluralist stance and Chang’s pluralism, to develop the pluralist thesis I 
present in this dissertation. The rest of this chapter is reserved to 
illustrate pluralist points I presented so far using case studies.  
4.1.3 Integrative Pluralism 
Following Kellert et al. (2006) and Chang (2012), in this section I will 
focus on integrative pluralism as argued by Mitchell (2002). Integrative 
pluralism is similar to pluralist arguments put forward by Kellert et al. 
and Chang in the sense that Mitchell takes scientific practices as the 
starting point for her argument. In particular, Mitchell focuses on the 
plurality of models in current scientific practices.  
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Mitchell and Gronenborn (forthcoming) start with a quotation from John 
Kendrew’s Nobel lecture in 1963 28  in which Kendrew predicts that 
experimental methods to determine the functional protein structure, 
namely X-ray crystallography, will be redundant with the further 
development of ab initio methods. Kendrew suggests that a protein’s 
three-dimensional structure can be determined from knowledge of their 
amino acid sequence alone i.e. a protein’s structure can be elucidated 
by analysis of its building units. Mitchell and Gronenborn argue that, 
contrary to the expectation of Kendrew, current practices in protein 
structure determination mainly rely on experimental methods such as 
X-ray crystallography and Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR), while 
ab initio methods are only confined to small proteins with relatively 
simple structures. Mitchell and Gronenborn argue that understanding 
protein structure and function relies on the plurality of models that are 
derived from different approaches (including experimental and ab 
initio): 
the complexity of phenomena investigated [functional protein 
structure] conspires with the inherent partiality of scientific 
representation to generate pluralities of explanatory and 
predictive models. (Mitchell and Gronenborn forthcoming: 4) 
Similar to pluralist theses put forward by Kellert et al. and Chang, 
Mitchell and Gronenborn argue that plurality is ineliminable, where 
each approach produces partial accounts of the phenomena. They 
suggest that the determination of a protein structure, as an aim, is best 
achieved by multiple accounts. Here, I explore Mitchell and 
Gronenborn’s argument for the ineliminability of plurality under two 
titles: partiality of representations and complexity of phenomena. 
Moreover, I wish to emphasise the pragmatic aspects of the argument 
put forward by Mitchell and Gronenborn, in which the benefits of 
                                               
28 John Cowdery Kendrew won (jointly with Max Ferdinand Perutz) the Noble 
Prize for chemistry for their studies of the structures of globular proteins. 
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pluralism are realised through the interaction of multiple models in 
order to explore and explain phenomena with regards to particular 
aims. Mitchell and Gronenborn explore a particular form of interaction, 
which is integration. Here I will argue that this form of integration is ad 
hoc integration in order to achieve pragmatic aims, as opposed to 
integration as a way of eliminating plurality. 
In order to understand the Mitchell and Gronenborn’s argument it is 
necessary to attend to their case study, the modelling of protein 
structure and function. Proteins are a diverse group of molecules, 
functioning in various ways in different biological systems. Mitchell and 
Gronenborn argue that such variety and complexity cannot be captured 
in a single representational system. Instead, different features of 
phenomena require different models to capture them. Mitchell and 
Gronenborn argue that current research in protein structure and 
function does not support Kendrew’s idea that the function and 
structure of a protein can be determined by its amino acid sequence. 
That is, Mitchel and Gronenborn argue that the hope that functional 
protein structure can be determined by the amino acid sequence is not 
possible in light of current scientific practices, nor have we any 
empirical reason to expect to be able to predict functional protein 
structure from amino acid sequences in the future.  
Determining functional protein structure requires knowledge of different 
aspects of phenomena that can only be attained through various 
methods. Different approaches provide knowledge on distinct aspects 
of proteins, such as cellular interactions with other molecules (such as 
co-enzymes), or looking at thermodynamic properties of the protein in 
different structural formations, or the atomic configuration of side 
chains in a different chemical environment that stabilises the functional 
structure. The point I make here is that each question about protein 
structure requires a different approach to answering it, and there is no 
reason to think that one approach is the most important, as different 
aspects have different importance in different contexts. 
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Mitchell and Gronenborn describe scientific models as abstractions or 
idealisations of phenomena.29 They argue that models are scientific 
representations, produced by agents to fulfil particular aims, 
highlighting certain features while leaving others out. That is to say, 
scientific representations do not map one-to-one onto the natural 
world: they are partial with regards to the aim of different scientific 
practices.  Thus, Mitchell and Gronenborn argue that scientific models 
should not be judged merely on how complete they are or how well 
they map onto the world, but rather on their ability to serve agents’ 
goals: 
Scientific models are judged for their ability to help us explain 
and predict what goes on in nature. To be successful they need 
to capture (by similarity, isomorphism, structural or causal 
mirroring etc.) features that are relevant to the process and 
events we want to understand and on which we might be able to 
intervene in order to produce or prevent effects of interest. 
(Mitchell and Gronenborn, forthcoming: 6)  
Mitchell and Gronenborn further develop their position on scientific 
representations: 
What is true for all these accounts is that not every describable 
feature of a system in every possible degree of precision is 
required for identifying that which permits prediction, 
explanation, and intervention on that system. We do not need to 
have a complete representation, in that sense, for successful 
science […] What is represented and what is left out are usually 
tailored to meet some explanatory or pragmatic goal. (Mitchell 
and Gronenborn, forthcoming: 6)  
                                               
29 Founded on existing accounts of scientific representation by Ronald Giere 
(2004, 2006, 2010) and Bas Van Fraassen (2010). 
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The important point in Mitchell and Gronenborn’s argument on 
scientific representation is similar to Kellert et al.’s and Chang’s 
arguments in the sense that the aim of scientific representations is not 
to be a single and complete model of the world. All three pluralist 
theses recognise the plurality of aims and goals in scientific practice. 
Moreover, the three pluralist theses accept the existing plurality of 
accounts (including representations, theories, models etc.) as an 
important characteristic of scientific inquiry. In particular, Mitchell 
focuses on the interaction of different accounts, in particular the 
integration of different accounts to explain a particular phenomenon. In 
her previous work, Mitchell (2002) focuses on social insect colonies as 
a case study, identifying different explanatory models for social 
behaviour, including the genetic diversity model, the foraging for work 
model and the learning model. Mitchell argues that each model has 
merit in explaining an aspect of insect behaviour, but none of these 
models alone are sufficient in explaining the behaviour of particular 
insect colonies (i.e. bees, ants etc.). Therefore, Mitchell argues that in 
order to explain the social behaviour of each colony we integrate 
different models, asserting: 
At the concrete explanatory level, on the other hand, integration 
is required. However complex, and however many contributing 
causes participated, there is only one causal history that, in fact, 
has generated a phenomenon to be explained. (Mitchell 2002: 
66) 
In order to explain social behaviour in bees for instance, Mitchel argues 
that there is one explanatory model that is the product of integrating 
three different models (genetic diversity, foraging for work and 
learning) derived from idealised situations, and hence Mitchell argues 
that they do not directly apply to complex phenomena. Thus, Mitchell 
concludes: 
The complexity of nature and the idealized character of our 
causal models to explain that complexity conspire to entail an 
integrated pluralistic picture of scientific practice. Complexity in 
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the sense of the diversity of the contingent, evolved properties 
of biological phenomena has important implications for how we 
understand the relationships among the plurality of theories and 
explanations found in contemporary biology. (Mitchell 2002: 67) 
For Mitchell, the complexity of phenomena requires multiple accounts 
that focus on different aspects. Furthermore, Mitchel argues that in 
order to explain particular phenomena we need to integrate different 
explanatory accounts.  
Mitchell’s integrative pluralism was criticised by Kellert et al., describing 
it as modest. Kellert et al. characterise Mitchell’s argument as follows: 
nature varies in its strategies, using different strategies to 
achieve the same end, but for each situation in the natural world 
there is a single complete and comprehensive account that can 
be given. (Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino, and Waters 2006: xii) 
Kellert et al. argue that integrative pluralism is modest because it does 
not recognise the possibility that for some phenomena there may not 
be a single, best account. As discussed in section 4.1.1, Kellert et al. 
are open to the ineliminability of plurality, accepting the possibility that 
for some phenomena there can be equally valid but irreconcilable (or 
non-mutually consistent) accounts. In her later work, Longino (Longino 
2013) expands her criticism, arguing that Mitchell’s pluralism is guided 
by the idea that multiplicity can be overcome though integration to 
produce a complete model. Longino argues that: 
Epistemologically, we may learn more about a system by 
utilizing multiple partial representations, each of which enables 
us to go further in our study than would the attempt to obtain a 
complete representation of all causal interactions. Our 
understanding of the system may require not the integration of 
the different models but acknowledgement that each represents 
one aspect of the system (Longino 2013: 147) 
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Here, I provide a different reading of Mitchell’s integrative pluralism to 
that of Kellert et al. (2006) and Longino (2013). I argue that integration 
as described by Mitchell is ad hoc, to fulfil a particular aim (e.g. explain 
a particular behaviour in bee colonies), in which the result of integration 
is a new partial account that allows scientists to learn about 
phenomena. That is to say, Mitchel does not argue for integration for 
sake of a universal, complete and coherent account, but a local 
account that is complete and coherent with regards to the specific aims 
of a particular inquiry. As discussed above in 4.1.1, here I argue that 
aiming at single universal and complete account is necessary for 
epistemic monism. In Mitchel’s account discussed so far, she only 
focuses on local integration of different causal accounts to answer a 
particular question regarding the behaviour of different insect colonies. 
However, Mitchell does not assert that there is a knowable, single, 
universal account or a single best method to yield such account.30 In 
order to further my argument I will return to protein structure and 
function research. 
Mitchell and Gronenborn argue that all models are partial to different 
goals of inquiry. Moreover, functional protein structure requires plurality 
of models; different methods target different features of protein 
structure. Mitchell and Gronenborn study a few approaches, including 
X-ray crystallography, nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR), and ab 
initio methods. X-ray crystallography and NMR provide information on 
the location of atoms in three-dimensional space. X-ray crystallography 
entails exposing crystallised protein samples to an X-ray beam and 
looking at the diffraction pattern of X-rays after hitting the protein 
crystals. The diffraction caused by each atom allows crystallographers 
to locate each atom (depending on the quality of data) and build a 
                                               
30 Although it must be noted that Mitchell suggest that there is only one 
causal structure which alludes to metaphysical monism, however Mitchell 
does not argue that a single causal structure can be represented or 
understood by inquirer through one, universal complete account. 
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static model of the protein. NMR, on the other hand, does not require 
crystallised protein, but uses purified protein samples in solution. NMR 
experiments require exposing protein in solution to electromagnetic 
radiation, which is absorbed by distinct atoms (either hydrogen or 
carbon, depending on the type of experiment), emitted at different 
times and intensity based on their chemical environment. Structural 
chemists exploit this to map the reaction between atoms in three-
dimensional space. Because proteins are in solution, it is possible to 
make time-based experiments to study protein movement (not possible 
using crystallography). However, X-ray crystallography models provide 
high-resolution models if high-quality crystals are obtained. 
Both X-ray crystallography and NMR provide structural information. 
These structures, however, are not sufficient to understand the 
functional structure of these proteins. Proteins undergo a series of 
modifications and are structurally mobile in vivo. Protein models at the 
cellular level (studying the cellular location of proteins and their 
interactions with other molecules) provide further information that 
cannot be captured by models at the atomic level. Enzyme kinetics, for 
instance, looks at the reaction rates catalysed by proteins, which 
entails the study of interactions between a protein, its substrates and 
any other molecule involved in the reaction.  
These examples demonstrate how different approaches focus on 
distinct features of a given phenomenon (protein structure and function 
in this case), thereby producing different models. Furthermore, each 
approach has a distinct aim: produce a kinetic model of protein 
substrate interaction, or a three-dimensional model of atomic 
interaction between protein and substrate, etc. In order to fulfil these 
aims each approach is constituted by different cognitive elements 
(methods, theories, assumptions, models etc.). Integration is not the 
unification of aims, but rather the use of different cognitive elements or 
existing approaches to create a new approach that seeks to fulfil 
different aims. Thus, integration here must be understood as part of 
scientific practice, referring to a process in which a new approach is 
synthesised by using elements of different approaches. It is important 
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to note that integration does not lead to the elimination of existing 
approaches, but the generation of a new approach that addresses 
particular questions that existing approaches cannot address.  
An example of integration is homology modelling. Homology modelling 
entails deducing the structure of a molecule using the experimental 
model of its homologous protein. Two proteins are thought to be 
homologous if their amino acid sequences, (i.e. their primary 
structures) are similar. Homology modelling relies on the assumption 
that proteins with similar amino acid sequence will fold in the same 
way, i.e. have very similar tertiary structure. Based on these 
assumptions, the structure of a protein can be deduced by using the 
known structure of its homologous protein. Homology modelling is an 
approach in which ab initio and experimental models are used in 
combination in order to deduce protein structure using computational 
methods. For instance,  
- the amino acid sequence of both protein X and Protein Y is known; 
- protein X is homologous to protein Y;  
- the three-dimensional structure of protein X is available; thus 
- by aligning the sequences of protein X and Y, the three-dimensional 
structure of Y can be deduced based on the three-dimensional 
structure of X. 
Homology modelling as an approach is the product of integrating ab 
initio and experimental approaches. It employs elements from both in 
order to answer a particular question. Homology modelling is often 
used in cases where it is difficult to get protein to crystallise, or if a 
protein is not stable alone in a solution (for example, surface proteins). 
In these cases, the homology modelling is used in order to construct a 
three-dimensional model. Homology modelling does not replace other 
experimental methods, nor is it an ab initio approach as described 
above: it is the result of integrating different elements of different 
approaches. The new approach, homology modelling, produces 
representation of phenomena that is also limited and relies on the 
assumption that homologous proteins have similar three-dimensional 
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structures, producing limited accounts of phenomena that serve a 
practical aim of producing a computer model of a particular protein.  
Mitchell’s integrative pluralism thus must be seen as a way to 
understand the interaction among different approaches in scientific 
practices. In the case, for instance, homology modelling is a new 
approach that is the result of integrating cognitive elements from 
different approaches (experimental, ab initio, etc.), without replacing 
them. It is important to note that integration is not the only mode of 
interaction between different approaches. Here I provide a different 
interpretation of Mitchell’s integrative pluralism where the aim of 
integration is not motivated by epistemic (or methodological) monism 
given that the aim of integration is not to produce a universal, complete 
and coherent account of the world. This alternative reading of Mitchell 
is important for my argument given Mitchell provides a way to think 
about how different accounts and approaches can be brought together 
without epistemic and methodological monism. In the following section 
I will discuss the different ways in which approaches interact with one 
another in order to answer different questions and fulfil particular aims. 
In particular, I will focus on interaction among different approaches in 
early drug discovery research for HAT.  
4.2 Plurality in Pharmaceutical Research 
 
Section 2.2.4 described the early stages of drug discovery and 
development in anti-parasitic drugs. Here I will focus on scientific 
practices involved in identifying metabolic pathways specific to the 
parasite and essential for its survival and growth. The aim is to pick out 
a macromolecule (e.g. a protein) in the metabolic pathway, whose 
action can be manipulated and disrupted with a synthetic compound 
(which can be developed into a drug). This stage is referred to as 
target identification and validation.  
Wyatt et al. (2011) give an overview of different approaches used in 
target identification and validation. Although the main concern is to 
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identify a target essential for parasite growth and survival, there are 
other properties such as assay feasibility, toxicity etc. Here, I will 
mainly focus on essentiality for parasite growth and survival (I will 
discuss anti-parasitic discoveries further in chapter 5 in order to 
underline the importance of socio-economic and political context in 
defining other properties such as toxicity and delivery method) 
Wyatt et al. argue that multiple approaches are used in order to 
establish if a given target is necessary for parasite growth. The two 
main approaches the authors present are chemical and genetic, 
complementary approaches that use small molecule inhibitors or 
genetic methods respectively to modulate the functional activity of the 
potential target. Wyatt et al. argue that:  
neither method on its own is sufficiently robust to provide 
absolute proof of essentiality and, whenever feasible, 
complementary and confirmatory evidence should be sought 
using both approaches. (Wyatt et al. 2011: 1277) 
Chemical validation entails the use of experimental compounds or 
existing drugs to address questions around ‘druggability’ of the target 
molecule. Druggability can be best described as the likelihood of the 
target molecule responding to small molecules in vivo. Druggability is 
discussed in detail in Frearson et al. (2007), Hunter (2009), and 
Chatelain and Ioset (2011),- each describing the importance of 
assessing druggability in the early stages to ensure success in the 
clinical phases of drug development.  
Chemical approaches as described by Wyatt et al. (2011) determine 
whether specific inhibition of any given target molecule with a small 
molecule will result in impaired growth or death of the parasite. 
Moreover, chemical approaches can address several key issues 
including cell permeability, selective toxicity, drug metabolism and 
pharmacokinetic properties both in vitro and in vivo. In addition, 
chemical approaches allow identification of both protein and non-
protein targets. 
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The genetic approach, on the other hand, uses several techniques 
such as gene knockout or RNA interference (RNAi) to inhibit the 
expression of the gene coding for the target molecule. The genetic 
approach is regarded as the most definitive method for target validation 
since it provides knowledge of the cell metabolism in the absence of a 
target. It shows if there are alternative metabolic pathways that can 
compensate for the absence of a given target, but cannot identify non-
protein targets. Moreover, genetic approaches cannot show if a given 
target can be modulated by a drug to achieve the desired effect. 
Since both approaches have limitations, both are employed to increase 
confidence that a putative target is both essential and druggable. 
Herein, I want to clarify my point by looking at the case of chemical and 
genetic validation of trypanothione synthetase.  
Trypanothione synthetase is an enzyme involved in thiol metabolism in 
T. brucei. Uniquely, trypanosomes depend on trypanothione as their 
primary thiol, while other organisms use glutathione. Trypanothione is 
responsible for trypanosome thiol-redox homeostasis mechanism 
including cellular processes involved in defence against oxidative 
stress and xenobiotics (Wyllie et al. 2009). Trypanothione synthesis is 
a two-step reaction in which both stages of the reaction are catalysed 
by the enzyme trypanothione synthetase.   
Genetic approaches have shown that trypanothione synthetase is 
essential for parasite survival both in vitro and in vivo. Comini et al. 
(2004) report that the genetic inhibition of trypanothione synthetase 
(TryS) expression in T. brucei established that TryS is essential for the 
entire synthesis of trypanothione (T(SH)2), demonstrating that a 15% 
drop in T(SH)2 levels led to proliferation arrest31, and if sustained for 
days impaired the viability of parasite due to increased sensitivity to 
hydrogen peroxide and other hyper-oxides. Inhibition of TryS 
                                               
31 Proliferation arrest here refers to an arrest in parasite reproduction. 
Proliferation arrest is an indicator of druggability, indicating that the target is 
necessary for the parasite’s life cycle.  
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expression shows the metabolic importance of this target molecule, 
and that there are no alternative pathways to overcome oxidative 
stress. In general, genetic approaches allow investigation at the 
cellular level, providing knowledge on the metabolic pathways both in 
vitro and in vivo. It is important to note that similar experiments were 
done in animals in order to see if oxidative stress in the mammal 
bloodstream had the same results. Studying the same phenomena in 
animal models allow medical scientist to assess potential side effects 
of TryS inhibition in mammalian systems.  The plurality of methods 
allows for strengthening the claim that a given metabolic pathway is 
druggable but also allows to assess potential side effects of inhibiting a 
given pathway in humans. Given the complexity of the biological 
system both epistemic and methodological plurality is beneficial for 
achieving the aims of drug discovery and development.   
Although genetic approaches showed that trypanothione synthetase is 
essential for parasite survival, genetic approaches failed to provide 
knowledge on the druggability of this target. Torrie et al. (2009) 
managed to develop the enzyme assay suitable for high throughput 
screening, which is an automated process that detects a specific 
interaction between the target protein and a large number of small 
compounds. Torrie et al.’s in vitro study allowed identification of small 
molecules that interact specifically with the target, where these 
interactions demonstrated desirable potency and selectivity. Moreover, 
it was shown that the interactions are allosteric, meaning that the small 
compounds interact with trypanothione synthetase at an alternative site 
to the site at which it catalyses trypanothione synthesis. The 
significance of this study is that it provides further evidence that 
trypanothione synthetase is essential for parasite survival and is 
druggable. The case of trypanothione synthetase shows how single 
phenomena (role of trypanothione synthetase in parasite metabolism) 
can be studies using two different approaches, genetic and chemical. 
Where two different approaches focus on different aspects of 
phenomena. 
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This section demonstrated the epistemic and methodological plurality 
in pharmaceutical practices, using examples drawn directly from 
scientific practice and emphasising how different approaches are 
supported by different cognitive elements that allow the study of 
different aspects of phenomena. In the following section, I will shift my 
focus to philosophical literature in order to discuss how we can start 
analysing the pluralities in scientific practice from a pluralist point of 
view. So far I have discussed the pluralist theses put forward by Keller, 
et al. (2006), Chang (2012) and Mitchell (2002). I highlighted important 
aspects of the three pluralist theses I wish to use in developing 
contextual pluralism. In the following section I will focus on units of 
analysis.  
4.3 Units of analysis  
Hasok Chang initially defines systems of practice and epistemic 
activities in his book Is water H2O? (2012). He develops these 
concepts in Chang (2014) as follows: 
An epistemic activity is a more-or-less coherent set of mental or 
physical operations that are intended to contribute to the 
production or improvement of knowledge in a particular way […] 
The presence of an identifiable aim (even if not articulated 
explicitly by the actors themselves) is what distinguishes 
activities from mere physical happenings involving human 
bodies, and the coherence of an activity is defined by how well 
the activity succeeds in achieving its aim. (Chang 2014: 72) 
Gene knockout or high throughput screening (discussed above) are 
two different epistemic activities, each consisting of physical and 
mental operations with an identifiable aim, to inhibit gene expression 
and screen large compound libraries respectively. These epistemic 
activities exist in accord with each other, forming systems of practice to 
achieve certain aims. Chang differentiates the aims of an epistemic 
activity from the aims of systems of practice: the former has an 
inherent purpose and the latter has an external function. The inherent 
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purpose of epistemic activities exists independently of external factors. 
The inherent purpose of genetic knockout is independent of the genetic 
validation of a drug target; the purpose there is to inhibit the expression 
of a certain gene. This inherent purpose, however, serves an external 
purpose in a given system of practice. In Chang’s words,  
The inherent purpose of an activity exists regardless of any 
external functions that the activity may or may not serve. Both 
inherent purpose and external function fall under the rubric of 
aims, so the talk of aims needs to be disambiguated 
accordingly. (Chang 2014: 73) 
Although they fall under the rubric of aims, as stated by Chang, it is 
possible to differentiate the inherent purpose of epistemic activities that 
may be used in different systems of practice. This is best demonstrated 
in the homology modelling example: epistemic activities from different 
systems of practices are brought together to form the new system of 
practice. Chang argues that one must look at the external factors to 
understand why different epistemic activities come together. I will 
further this in the following chapters (sections 5.1, and 6.2), but for 
now, we can accept that external factors determine the broad aims, 
and thus determine the composition of each system of practice. That is 
to say, what makes the system of practice different is the combination 
of epistemic activities brought together to serve larger or more complex 
aims. In Chang’s words, ‘systems of practice are crafted in order to 
achieve certain aims which go beyond the inherent purposes of the 
activities that are pulled together to constitute the system.’ (Chang 
2014: 74) 
However, it must be noted that both systems of practice and epistemic 
activities are analysts categories; therefore these categories can 
change based on analysts’ aims. For instance, Chang recognizes that, 
‘a system of practice, if it has a clear inherent purpose, can be taken as 
a single activity that may form part of a larger system.’ (Chang 2014: 
74) 
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The purpose of including Chang’s units of analysis is to further the 
pluralist discourse. Each system of practice provides a partial account 
of phenomena. Accounts are products of different epistemic activities, 
working together to achieve a particular aim. Thus, each system of 
practice is limited since they only contain a certain amount of epistemic 
activity. This analysis serves as the epistemic justification for the 
plurality of approaches in scientific practice. That is, we need plurality 
of systems to learn as much as we can about the world. I will further 
discuss the normative aspects of Chang’s pluralism in chapter 5. 
However, first it is important to underline that analysts’ categories are 
not stable and change from analyst to analyst.   
Helen Longino uses approaches as her unit of analysis. An approach is 
defined as,  
[a] set of questions, experimental and observational strategies 
for answering these questions, patterns of argument and a 
specification of phenomena about which the questions are 
asked and the strategies are applied. (Longino 2013: 390) 
Longino makes a clear distinction between theories and approaches. 
Theories are thought to be set of laws or principles that explain a given 
phenomenon expressed in a formal way. Longino states that an 
approach is not a theory in the sense that it does not require an explicit 
set of principles. However, an approach entails an implicit theory or a 
model of the phenomena in question. Longino argues that approaches 
are not empirical competitors, meaning they ask different questions to 
phenomena. Each approach employs a method that discriminates 
alternative hypotheses from each other. Moreover, Longino argues that 
integration of approaches is not without loss of content. Finally she 
argues that each approach provides partial knowledge of phenomena. 
Longino (2013) argues that different approaches to studying human 
behaviour can only provide partial accounts. Each account looks at a 
specific area of causal space while obscuring the others. Longino’s 
argument is based on the claim that human behaviour is a multi-causal 
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phenomenon. For instance, genetic approaches will be able to provide 
an account of the genetic causes (genes, inheritance patterns etc.) for 
homosexual behaviour. While genetic factors are causally relevant and 
important in determining human sexual behaviour, they are not the only 
causally relevant factors. Looking at human behaviour, Longino argues 
that causal space can be divided into seven areas. She states that, 
The specificity of assumptions informing and shaping the 
individual research approaches and the methods of observation 
and measurement they employ means that this range or space 
of potential causes, all members of which are implicitly agreed 
to play some role, is only partially activated in any given 
research approach. (Longino 2011: 29) 
Longino demonstrates this using a horizontal grid, where different 
approaches can only explore a few sections of the causal space. 
Figure 1 is taken from Longino (2011), where the first grid (A) shows 
the undifferentiated causal space and the second grid (B) shows the 
causal space (gray boxes) studied by genetic approaches to explain 
certain behaviour patterns (aggression in this case). Longino uses her 
case studies to argue that genetic approaches can only investigate 
genetic aspects with regards to the socio-economic status of the 
subjects.  
Each approach or system of practice is partial due to its composition, 
which is determined by each approach aim. Here I propose the use of 
the term ‘approach’ to describe plurality in scientific practice, where 
different approaches are constituted by cognitive elements (i.e. 
different methods, theories, models or anything that contributes to 
production of knowledge). Herein, I keep the definitions of each unit of 
analysis broad since it is very difficult to give a precise definition due to 
the diversity of approaches in different disciplines in science. Here, I 
take an approach to be a way of answering a question (or set of 
questions) within science that serves an aim. Within each approach, 
different cognitive elements are used in order to achieve the aim and 
answer distinct questions. The aims and the ways in which an aim can 
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be fulfilled determine the cognitive elements that are involved in 
making the approach. I will further discuss this matter in the following 
chapter when I discuss how the broader socio-economic and political 
context plays a role in determining the aims of scientific research.  
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Figure 4. Representation of causal space parsed by different approaches in behavioral studies (adapted from, Longino 2011: 29). 
Row A represent the undifferentiated causal space, where row B represents active causal spaces (in grey) and inactive casual 
spaces in black in case of genetic approaches in studying role of genetic variation in aggression among different socio-
economic groups in society 
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4.4 A Question of Reduction? 
So far I have provided three main philosophical positions arguing for 
pluralism that is empirically motivated by the multiplicity of accounts, 
producing partial accounts of phenomena. I also argue that the plurality 
in scientific practices is an important characteristic of scientific inquiry. 
The three pluralist theses by Kellert et al., Chang and Mitchell each 
provide a philosophical account of multiplicities, arguing for the benefits 
of multiple approaches to explain and understand phenomena. In the 
following chapters I will further explore the normative aspects of 
pluralism, while I develop contextual pluralism. However, first I wish to 
address a possible challenge to pluralism: reduction. In this section I 
provide a brief overview of the reduction/anti-reduction debate, 
followed by an alternative account provided by Kaiser (2012) to argue 
that reductive explanations are common in scientific practices (just like 
integration, discussed in 4.1.3), where reduction is a way of explaining 
phenomena, rather than eliminating the plurality of approaches and 
accounts.   
The reductive explanation I will defend here is different to monist notion 
of reduction, which relies on the tenet that everything we know can be 
derived from our understanding of the fundamental components of the 
universe. Therefore, the aforementioned pluralities in scientific 
practices can be eliminated through reduction (where a given account 
of phenomena can be derived from the account of its constituent 
parts). It is necessary to approach this issue with caution since the 
reduction debate is multi-faceted, including issues in epistemology and 
metaphysics.32 Sarkar argues that: 
There has often been a failure to keep epistemological and 
ontological questions separate. For instance, the questions, 
whether reduction is being attempted in order to explain some 
                                               
32 Reduction: explanation of theories through theories van Riel (2011); 
Practice based epistemic issues focusing on education Brigandt (2013) 
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theories, laws or facts by others, or whether reduction is 
intended to show what entities are composed of other, perhaps 
more 'fundamental', entities, have often been routinely 
confused. The former is an epistemological question, the latter 
is an ontological one – they are obviously not the same. (Sarkar 
1992: 169) 
Therefore, in addressing the reduction debate there is an important 
distinction to make: while metaphysical reduction is concerned with the 
relation between things in the world, epistemic reduction focuses on 
the interaction between knowledge about things in the world. While I 
remain agnostic about the metaphysical side of the discussion about 
the structure of the world (see Dupré 1993; Cartwright 1999 for a 
metaphysical argument for pluralism), I hold that there is no reason to 
think that any of our scientific practices has a privileged status in 
exploring and explaining the phenomena. In line with the pluralist 
thesis I aim to develop, I argue that plurality of approaches cannot be 
eliminated (nor that it should be eliminated) through the reduction of 
different accounts of phenomena to a single account without loss of 
knowledge or ways of attaining more knowledge about different 
aspects of phenomena. However, following Kaiser (2012), I argue that 
reductive explanations are used in scientific practices and my aim is to 
provide a pluralist explanation for these. 
In this section, I will use Marie Kaiser’s account to argue that epistemic 
reduction can be seen as part of scientific practice as opposed to a 
remedy for the plurality of approaches. The type of reduction I will 
describe here is in line with pluralism as described above in the sense 
that reduction is part of scientific practices as a opposed to a way of 
eliminating plurality. First, it is important to address the reductionism 
debate to dispel any doubts or confusion in the readers’ mind, given 
the rich literature on reductionism. Starting from Nagel, 'reduction' is 
taken to be the deductive relation between different theories. Herein, I 
start with a brief description of Nagelian model of reduction, followed 
by an exegesis of the reduction debate following the Nagelian model. I 
conclude this section with Marie Kaiser’s account (2011 & 2012) to 
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argue that one must go beyond the Nagelian model of reduction in 
order to make sense of reduction that is prevalent in current scientific 
practices. 
4.4.1 The Nagelian model of reduction  
In his paper ‘Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations’, Ernst 
Nagel takes reductions to be the deductive relation between different 
theories, where theories are taken to be sets of law statements. Nagel 
states that:  
every reduction can be construed as a series of statements, one 
of which is the conclusion (or the statements which are being 
reduced), while the others are the premises or reducing 
statements. (Nagel 1998: 907) 
Nagelian reduction must be understood as a certain kind of 
explanation, in which the laws of a given science are the logical 
consequence of the theoretical assumptions of another. Nagel’s 
account is based on cases from physics, in particular the reduction of 
classical thermodynamics that deal with macro-scale objects to 
statistical mechanics that deals with micro-level objects. On this point, 
Nagel states that: 
The claim that a theory T (e.g., the corpus of rules known as 
thermodynamics) is reduced to another theory T’ (e.g., the 
kinetic theory of gases) would therefore be interpreted as saying 
that all the observation statements which can be derived from 
given data with the help of T can also be derived with the help of 
T’, but not conversely. (Nagel 1998: 911) 
In simpler terms Nagel argues that the behaviour of macro-scale 
objects are explained in terms of micro-scale processes. Nagelian 
reduction relies on two principles. The first principle is the condition of 
derivability under which a reduced theory needs to be derived from 
reducing theory. The second principle is the condition of connectability, 
under whic reduced and reducing theories either contain the same 
terms (in the case of homogenous reductions) or can be connected 
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with bridge laws (in the case of heterogeneous reductions). Bridge 
laws are used in cases where concepts and terms of reduced laws are 
not present in the reducing laws: bridge laws in most general terms link 
the vocabulary of two theories.  
Although in his paper Nagel is focused on examples from physics, his 
model of reduction is meant to apply to scientific explanations in 
general. However, this claim is much contested, especially by 
philosophy of biology. In order to assess the Nagelian model of 
reduction, I will briefly look at this model's proponents and opponents 
before I move on to Kaiser’s post-Nagelian reduction. 
4.4.2 Proponents of Nagelian reduction  
Dizadji-Bahmani et al. (2010) examine Nagelian reduction, defending it 
as a regulative ideal. Nagelian reduction received considerable  
attention in philosophy, including the work of Schafner (1993 & 2012), 
Butterfield (2011), van Riel (2011). Although, most of these papers 
cited may be regarded as departures from Nagel’s model of reduction, 
their starting point is the model discussed in 4.4.2. Thus, I take them to 
be Nagelian in the sense that they do not reject the Nagelian model (or 
at least not completely) but depart from it in a sense that they take 
Nagelian model as an approximate model for reduction in 
thermodynamics, but they do not make any claims that Nagelian model 
can must be regarded as the universal model of reduction in science.33 
Here I focus on Dizadji-Bahmani et al.’s account using Nagel’s initial 
example (the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics), 
allowing me to highlight how current accounts can defend Nagel’s 
argument clearly without needing to go into detail. The reason for 
choosing Dizadji-Bahmani et al. is that their approach is close to the 
Philosophy of Science in Practice approach, given that they regard the 
                                               
33 This distinction will become clear in the following sub-section where I move 
on to discuss the Anti-Reductionist debate, where the main premise is the 
complete rejection of the Nagelian model.  
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question of whether a theory can be reduced to another as a practical 
(rather than philosophical) question, asserting: 
Whether any given theory can actually be reduced to another 
theory, or even whether theoretical reduction can be achieved 
across the board, is, in our view, a factual and not a 
philosophical question. (Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg, and Hartmann 
2010: 410) 
The important point in Dizadji-Bahmani et al.’s account for Nagelian 
reduction is concerned with how reduction takes place in statistical 
mechanics in practical terms. Following their engagement with the 
practices, Dizadji-Bahmani et al.’s version of reductionism recognises 
that reduction is approximate in the case of reducing thermodynamics 
(TD) to statistical mechanics (SM). The modified model of reduction is 
described in the following way: 
a theory TP (here TD) reduces to another theory TF (here SM) 
iff the laws of TP can be deduced from the laws of TF and some 
auxiliary assumptions. The auxiliary assumptions are typically 
idealisations and boundary conditions […] reduction is the 
deductive subsumption of a corrected version of TP under TF, 
where the deduction involves first deriving a restricted version, 
T*F, of the reducing theory by introducing boundary conditions 
and auxiliary assumptions and then using bridge laws to obtain 
T*P from T*F. (Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg, and Hartmann 2010: 
398)  
Dizadji-Bahmani et al.’s argument is notable, given that they are not 
supporting reductionism as way for all sciences to converge into one 
fundamental account. Instead, they argue that Nagelian reduction can 
be modified in the way described above in order to explain part of 
scientific practice in statistical mechanics. That is, while Dizadji-
Bahmani et al. further the Nagelian model by looking at the question of 
reduction ion thermodynamics, they do not make generalizable claims 
about reduction in all science based on the Nagelian model. Hence, 
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their main claim is for reduction as a factual and not a philosophical 
question.  
However, it must be noted that using the same example as Nagel to 
defend Nagelian reduction does not address the anti-reductionist 
arguments. The main anti-reductionist arguments come from 
philosophy of biology, mostly on the topic of the reduction of Mendelian 
genetics to molecular biology (Ruse 1971, Hull 1972, Maull 1977) and 
more recently arguments on the limits of reductionism in medicine and 
life sciences (Ahn et al. 2006, Mazzocchi 2008).    
4.4.3 Anti-reductionism  
Kenneth Waters (1990) summarises the anti-reductionist position, 
which I will use here to exemplify the rich literature on this topic. 
Waters’s account of anti-reductionism focuses on the literature that 
objects to the possibility of reducing classical mendelian genetics to 
molecular biology. 34  Although there are differences among anti-
reductionist thesis, Waters presents general tenets of anti-reductionist 
arguments as follows: 
according to the general anti-reductionist thrust, the relations 
between the levels of the organisation represented by the 
classical and molecular theories are too complex to be 
connected in the systematic way essential for a successful 
theoretical reduction. Antireductionists support this view by 
arguing that the gene concepts of the respective theories cannot 
be linked in an appropriate way. If the concepts cannot be 
linked, the reasoning goes, neither can the theoretical claims 
couched in terms of them. Hence, reduction will never be 
achieved. (Waters 1990: 125-126)  
                                               
34 See Ruse (1971) Hull (1972) Maull (1977) Rosenberg (1985) Kitcher 
(1984)  
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Anti-reductionist objections are summed up by Waters under two 
heading: (1) the unconnectability objection; and (2) the explanatory 
incompleteness objection. 
(1)The main premise of the unconnectability objection is the conceptual 
gap between Mendelian genetics and molecular genetics. The 
concepts of the gene in both theories are far too complicated to be 
connected using Nagelian reduction. The main proponent of 
unconnectability, Rosenberg (1985), argues that connectability cannot 
be achieved in a Nagelian sense since the relationship between 
Mendelian phenotypes and molecular genes is very complex. Thus, 
forming bridge laws that can connect two sets of laws and theories are 
exceedingly complex.  Rosenberg sums up his position as follows: 
In the end, the thesis that we can in fact deductively reduce 
Mendelian genetics to molecular genetics founders on the 
impossibility of meeting the criterion of connection between the 
terms of the two theories. Such vast, unwieldy, general 
statements as we might construct – In which a Mendelian gene 
is equated with the molecular one – will be full of disjunctions, 
conjunctions, denials, exceptions, qualifications. It will make so 
many appeals to stages in the pathway between the DNA and 
the phenotypic end-point of the pathway that it will be without 
any independent scientific standing. (Rosenberg 1985: 107) 
(2) The second objection is explanatory incompleteness, which is 
based on the claim that molecular biology will never explain or 
enhance knowledge of Mendelian genetics. In other words, anti-
reductionists argue that the ‘gory details’ of molecular biology do not 
enhance understanding of key processes underlying classical 
Mendelian genetics. For instance, Philip Kitcher argues that molecular 
genetics is more successful in explaining the process of DNA 
replication and characterisation of genetic mutations than classical 
Mendelian genetics (Kitcher 1984: 359). However, Kitcher further 
argues that, 
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in the current practice of biology, nature is divided into levels 
which form the proper provinces of areas of biological study: 
molecular biology, cytology, histology, physiology, and so forth. 
Each of these sciences can be thought of as using certain 
language to formulate the questions it deems important and as 
supplying patterns of reasoning for resolving those questions. 
(Kitcher 1984: 370) 
Kitcher later adds that meiosis should not be explained through the 
‘gory details’ of reshuffling genes at a molecular level, but through 
observation of chromosome movements in cells at a cytological level. 
Thus, Kitcher argues that, 
anti-reductionism emerges as the thesis that there are 
autonomous levels of biological explanation. Anti-reductionism 
construes the current division of biology not simply as a 
temporary feature of our science stemming from our cognitive 
imperfections but as the reflection of levels of organization in 
nature. Explanatory patterns that deploy the concepts of 
cytology will endure in our science because we would foreswear 
significant unification (or fail to employ the relevant laws, or fail 
to identify the causally relevant properties) by attempting to 
derive the conclusions to which they are applied using the 
vocabulary and reasoning patterns of molecular biology. (Kitcher 
1984: 371) 
However, this criticism is not supported well, nor is it explained exactly 
why we cannot expect molecular biology to explain classical Mendelian 
genetics. That is, Waters argues that trying to apply the ‘gory details’ 
argument to Mendelian genetics makes it less plausible. Waters 
demonstrates this using the Holiday Model for genetic recombination 
(Waters 1990: 132-133). Moreover, Waters asserts that that the anti-
reductionist argument is unreasonably pessimistic: 
The claim that the gory details of molecular biology do not 
enhance our under- standing of key processes underlying CMG 
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is quickly becoming outdated. There is no question that 
molecular theory has greatly improved our understanding of 
gene replication, expression, mutation, and recombination. 
Furthermore, it is just a matter of time before it accounts for the 
pair-wise coupling and separation of chromosomes during 
meiosis. Anti-reductionists need to justify their pessimism and 
explain why we should not expect molecular biology to continue 
on its path towards explaining CMG in accordance with the spirit 
of post positivist reduction. (Waters 1990: 134) 
Waters argues that two major objections to the reduction of Mendelian 
genetics to molecular genetics cannot stand ‘rigorous’ scrutiny. Waters 
show that neither reductionist nor anti-reductionist accounts can 
explain the connection between classical Mendelian genetics and 
molecular genetics. Waters states that: 
the anti-reductionist arguments were based on admittedly 
brilliant philosophical analyses that appeared plausible in the 
abstract. But, when scrutinised with respect to the details of the 
actual science, the arguments were found to rest on undue 
pessimism, on implausible judgments of comparative 
explanatory value, and on highly questionable assumptions 
about the structure of CMG and molecular biology. Practicing 
geneticists believe that the classical theory can be 
systematically explained at the molecular level, I suggest, 
because they have a firm grasp of the explanatory power and 
structure of molecular biology. (Waters 1990: 135)  
For Waters, the response should not be that Nagelian reduction does 
not apply in biology and therefore reductive explanations have no place 
in the philosophy of biology. Instead, the main task for the philosophy 
of biology is to find a way to reformulate a conception of reduction that 
goes beyond the Nagelian model and theories. The key point to take 
away from Waters’s account is that he takes a critical stance towards 
the reduction/anti-reduction debate in light of what is happening in 
scientific practice, stating that, 
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The question of whether CMG is being reduced deserves to be 
reconsidered, not just because we have good reason to suspect 
that the anti-reductionist consensus is wrong, but also because 
it provides the opportunity to advance philosophical debates 
about the structure of theories and the nature of scientific 
explanation and theoretical reduction.  (Waters 1990: 136) 
The point here is that reductive explanations are present in life 
sciences and neither the Nagelian model nor the anti-reductionist 
critiques can explain. Kaiser argues that the opponents of Nagelian 
reduction do not offer a new version of reduction, but rather abandon 
the concept of a reductive explanation altogether. Kaiser argues that 
we must go past the Nagelian reduction as the main model for 
reductive explanations in science and elaborate on a new form of 
reductionism in order to account for reductive explanation in life 
sciences. For a pluralist taking a PSP approach it is necessary to 
provide a philosophical account of reductive explanations, given that 
the common objection to pluralism comes in some form of reductive 
explanation. In the following section I focus on Kaiser’s account of 
reduction motivated by scientific practices in the field of biology as an 
alternative philosophical account of reductive explanations that is 
compatible with the pluralist argument I wish to develop in this thesis. 
4.4.4 Kaiserian Reduction 
Kaiser formulates a reductive account that moves away from Nagelian 
reduction in the sense that it ceases to look only at theories and the 
logical connections between them. The new account of epistemic 
reductionism Kaiser proposes ‘captures the diversity of reductive 
reasoning strategies present in current biological research practice’ 
(Kaiser, 2012: 251). Kaiser’s criticism of Nagelian reduction centres on 
the general way of thinking about reduction, which can be summed up 
as a relation of logical derivation of theories from one another. Kaiser 
argues that Nagelian reduction is abstract, only focusing on theories. 
Kaiser further argues that Nagelian reduction is still flawed when it 
comes to thinking about reduction in biology: 
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[a] formal model of theory reduction does neither capture the 
most important cases of epistemic reduction in biology nor does 
it account for the diversity of reductive reasoning strategies 
present in current biological research practice. (Kaiser, 2012: 
252)  
Kaiser argues that a philosophical account of epistemic reduction in the 
philosophy of biology should satisfy two criteria (criteria which Nagelian 
reduction fails to meet):  
[it should] capture and help understand the case of epistemic 
reduction that actually occur in current biology research 
practice, rather than focusing on epistemic reduction that can 
only be achieved in principle. In addition, it should account for 
diversity for the complexity of the cases of epistemic reduction 
that are present in contemporary biology. (Kaiser, 2012: 254) 
Kaiser concludes that Nagelian reduction is deeply flawed when 
applied to life sciences, arguing that the formal model of reduction 
does not capture how reductive explanations are used in this field, nor 
does it reflect the diversity of such explanations. Kaiser moves on to 
provide an account of reductive explanations in life sciences. Similar 
points are made by Steel (2004) and Brigandt (2013), for whom the 
common premise is  the need to provide a positive thesis for reductive 
explanations in science.  
Kaiser (2011) demonstrates three different forms of reductive 
explanations used in life sciences: (i) decomposition and part-whole 
explanations; (ii) parts in isolation; and (iii) focusing on internal factors. 
Here I will focus on the two that are used in chemical and genetic 
approaches discussed above (see section 4.2)  
Decomposition and part-whole explanations refer to entities located 
at a lower level being used to explain phenomena under investigation. 
Kaiser argues that decomposition and part-whole explanations must 
not be linked with fundamental level explanations, a metaphysical 
thesis which assumes that lower level explanations are more 
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fundamental. As mentioned above, epistemic reductions are concerned 
with the relations among different knowledge claims. Therefore part-
whole explanations must be understood in terms of scale, as opposed 
to one being fundamental to another: 
What is crucial for the reductive character of an explanation is 
that it includes only lower-level factors, not that it refers only to 
fundamental-level factors. (Kaiser, 2011: 464) 
Decomposition and part-whole explanation are used across life 
science. One example is sickle-cell anaemia, a condition that manifests 
itself physiologically where it is explained through mutation in a 
particular gene coding for haemoglobin. The mutation in this gene 
leads to mis-folding of haemoglobin, altering the shape of red blood 
cells. The change in the shape of red blood cells leads to the 
physiological traits of sickle-cell anaemia: low red blood cell count, 
increased risk of infection and recurring pain. The physiological traits of 
this disease are explained through haemoglobin mis-folding at 
molecular level due to a specific mutation on the HBB gene (coding for 
the beta globulin, one of four polypeptide chains that forms the 
haemoglobin molecule).    
Population ecology is another case in which part-whole explanations 
are used. Population ecology is a case where a lower level does not 
have to be the molecular level. Individual-based models in population 
ecology explain the behaviour of a given population in terms of 
individual organisms and interactions among them. Here, the whole is 
the population and parts are individuals. It is important to underline this 
point, since part-whole reduction here is local and does not make any 
metaphysical claims about objects at lower levels being more 
fundamental. Kaiser’s part-whole explanation focuses on two 
explanations at two different levels, say atomic and cellular, while a 
lower-level explanation is used to account for the higher-level 
phenomena.  
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The decomposition and part-whole explanations as described by 
Kaiser can be found in early drug discovery processes. In the case of 
trypanothione synthetase, kinetic assays have shown that higher 
concentrations of the natural substrate has no effect on the rate of 
inhibition. This phenomenon was explained by structural information at 
the atomic level: the atomic interaction between the trypanothione 
synthetase and an inhibitor molecule happens on a different site than 
the natural substrate, thus making the inhibition allosteric.  
In summary, part-whole explanations are used in scientific practice 
where phenomena can be explained referring to phenomena that take 
place at a lower level, without holding any assumption that one level is 
more fundamental than the other.  
Explanation of parts in isolation involves the explanation of a part of 
a system isolated from their native state in the organism. Explanation 
of parts in isolation (in a practical sense) requires purification of a 
compound of interest and studying its behaviour under controlled 
conditions. For instance, in vitro assays used for target validation entail 
isolation of trypanothione synthetase to its interaction with potential 
inhibitors.  In vitro study plays a significant role in life sciences, 
particularly in biochemistry, to determine the tasks of each molecule in 
metabolic pathways. 
Explanation of parts in isolation can also be seen in experimental 
methods used to determine functional protein structure. As described 
above, the three-dimensional structure of proteins is determined by x-
ray crystallography or nuclear magnetic resonance, where both 
methods study proteins, not in their natural environment but rather 
isolated in a solution or in crystallised form. Although they are studied 
in isolation, I previously argued that such methods are necessary to 
generate three-dimensional models of proteins in order to explain 
atomic interactions involved in their functional activities. 
These three types of reductive explanations can be discussed in depth, 
and each can be backed up by different case studies from current 
practices. It is important to note that each one of these three different 
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types of reductive explanations are also analytical categories and can 
be challenged in different terms.  
In this section I argued that reductive explanations are used in 
scientific practices, particularly in life sciences. Following Kaiser’s 
account, I argued that the Nagelian model of reduction (or the anti-
reductionist arguments) does not give a successful account of the 
reductive explanations used in life sciences. Moreover, I argued that 
Kaiser’s account of reductive explanations is compatible with the 
pluralist argument I present in this thesis. Kaiser’s account allows 
understanding of reductive explanations as part of scientific practice. 
Reductive explanations must be understood as partial accounts of 
phenomena that explain certain aspects of phenomena. Both 
reductionist and holist approaches provide partial accounts, focusing 
on different aspects of phenomena.  
4.5 The aims of pluralism: who are we trying to 
convince? 
Section 4.1 provided an overview of three philosophical theses that aim 
to provide a philosophical interpretation of the pluralities in scientific 
practices. Following these accounts, I argued that multiplicities in 
scientific practices must be regarded as an important characteristic of 
scientific inquiry that allows scientist to explain and explore different 
aspects of phenomena. Moreover, I argued that each account provided 
by particular approaches aims to answer a different set of questions. 
That is to say, each approach has different aims, producing accounts 
to satisfy these aims. Section 4.2 demonstrated how the pluralities in 
HAT research, particularly in early drug discovery and development, 
can serve as a case study in which the plurality of approaches and 
accounts are beneficial to satisfy a particular aim (in this case, to 
validate a dug target). Following my discussion of pluralities in scientific 
practices and various pluralist arguments, I shifted my focus to ways in 
which pluralists analyse scientific practices focusing on units of 
analysis. I argued that the way in which pluralists parse scientific 
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practices to argue for the benefits of pluralism must be understood as 
analyst categories, which are contingent on analysts’ projects. 
Recognising the partiality of analysts’ categories will become important 
in chapters 5 and 6, in particular developing a normative argument for 
pluralism. 
Section 4.4 provided an argument against possible reductionist 
objections to the pluralist argument I develop in this thesis. Following 
Kaiser (2012), I argued that the reductionist/anti-reductionist debate 
does not help explain the reductionist explanations used in scientific 
practices. I argued that the reductive explanations are not used in 
scientific practices to eliminate plurality of accounts or approaches. 
Instead, they are ways of explaining certain aspects of phenomena, 
discussing three types of reductive explanations outlined in Kaiser 
(2011).  
In the following chapter, I will focus on active normative epistemic 
pluralism, first discussed in section 4.1.2, defined by Chang (2012). 
Chang asserts that pluralism as he means it is unapologetically 
normative. Moreover, Chang argues that pluralism must be active in 
the sense that pluralism must be promoted in all parts of scientific 
inquiry. In the following chapter, I address different questions that arise 
from Chang’s active normative epistemic pluralism. The motivating 
question of the chapter 5 is this: who are we trying to convince to be 
pluralist?   
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Chapter 5 
5.1 Active Normative Epistemic Pluralism 
In the previous chapter I discussed three distinct pluralist arguments 
put forward by Kellert et al (2006), Chang (2012) and Mitchell (2002). 
Following these three accounts, my argument for pluralism in the 
previous chapter focused on building a philosophical account for the 
pluralities in scientific practices. I argued that the pluralities in current 
and historical sciences serve as evidence that the aim of scientific 
inquiry is not to come up with a single complete and coherent account 
of the world. Moreover, I argued that the multiplicities of accounts and 
approaches must be understood as an important characteristic of 
scientific inquiry. I also argued that different approaches have distinct 
aims, asking different questions about phenomena. In section 4.2, I 
argued that different approaches (genetic and chemical) in target 
validation during drug discovery processes focus on different aspects 
of phenomena. Both approaches have related aims, each producing 
partial accounts used by scientist to determine whether a given 
macromolecule can be used as a drug target. I argue that the different 
accounts reveal interesting information about the phenomena, and are 
the result of asking different questions and employing different sets of 
tools (both physical and cognitive). In previous chapters I discussed 
several case studies to argue that the plurality of approaches must be 
regarded as an important characteristic of scientific practices, and that 
the accounts of the world produced by each approach are partial to the 
particular aims of the approaches that produced them, in the sense 
that each account answers a distinct set of questions according to the 
aims of the given approach. I also argued that approaches and 
accounts interact with each other in different ways, including 
competition and co-option (4.1.2), ad-hoc integration (4.1.3), and 
reductive explanations (4.4).  
The pluralist argument presented so far has focused on rejecting the 
monist interpretation of scientific inquiry. I argued for a pluralist 
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interpretation of the multiplicity of accounts in science and the way 
these accounts interact with each other in scientific practices. 
Moreover, I argued that the plurality of approaches and accounts in 
scientific practices are an important characteristic of scientific inquiry. I 
also argued that scientific inquiry is ought to be pluralistic to explain 
and explore different aspects of phenomena. In this chapter I wish to 
further this normative argument. Herein, I shift my focus to the benefits 
of plurality, building a normative pluralist argument. In this chapter, I 
will first argue that, in order to assess the benefits of pluralism, it is 
necessary to focus on particular aims in science. As I argued in the 
previous chapter, there are multiple aims in scientific practices and the 
benefits of multiple approaches must be understood in terms of a 
multiplicity of aims in science. In order to develop my argument for 
normative pluralism, I will focus on Chang's active normative epistemic 
pluralism, providing a critical reading of Chang’s normative argument. 
In particular I will focus on the normative and active aspects of Chang’s 
argument, in which he provides an argument for the benefits of multiple 
systems in science and argues that the pluralism he proposes aims at 
actively promoting a multiplicity of systems of practices by challenging 
monist assumptions in both science and the philosophy and history of 
science.  
In section 5.1.1, I will examine Chang’s normative and active claims, 
where he argues that plurality is more beneficial to science and goes 
on to define his form of pluralism as an ideology committed to promote 
plurality in scientific practices. In section 5.1.2, I will focus on the 
distinction between descriptive and normative forms of pluralism. 
Chang argues that Kellert et al. merely describe the states of affairs in 
scientific practices, where he argues to move beyond mere description 
and assert that scientific practices ought to be pluralistic. In section 
5.1.3, I move on to focus on Chang’s argument for active pluralism, 
where his form of pluralism is committed to challenging monism and 
proliferating multiple systems of practices. 
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In section 5.2, I argue that in order to understand the normative and 
active aspects of Chang’s pluralism, it is necessary to further articulate 
the position Chang is reacting against. Thus, I ask the question ‘what 
does it mean to be a monist?’. Here I identify three monist assumptions 
metaphysical, epistemic and methodological. 35  I argue that these 
assumptions lead to unnecessary limitations to the potential of 
scientific inquiry to explain and explore different aspects of 
phenomena. Herein, I argue that it is the role of pluralist to challenge 
and remove these assumptions. In section 5.2.1, I will further this 
argument using case studies from current debates in epidemiology, in 
which proponents of the potential outcomes approach (POA) argue 
that the only causally relevant factors are those that can be described 
as well-defined interventions, thus arguing that other approaches in 
epidemiology must be disregarded. I will argue that POA is a system 
based on an epistemic assumption of what can be counted as a causal 
factor, thus limiting the plurality of systems in epidemiology, which 
does not have the same concept of causality. In section 5.2.2, I will 
focus on gene-centric biology, in particular current systems of practices 
(such as the genetic validation approach discussed) using gene-centric 
methods (such as gene knockout or RNA interference) to investigate 
metabolic processes. I argue that the focus on gene-centric 
approaches is based on the assumption that the manipulation of genes 
is a useful way to investigate cellular processes, without any epistemic 
assumptions about genes being more important or causally 
fundamental in cellular processes.  
In section 5.4, I summarise the active normative aspects of the pluralist 
argument I put forward in this thesis. Herein, I argue that scientific 
practices ought to be pluralistic in order to explain and explore different 
aspects of phenomena. Following Chang’s call for action, I argue that it 
                                               
35 Herein I mainly focus on epistemic and methodological given that I remain 
agnostic to metaphysical argument. The main focus of my thesis is scientific 
practices and the accounts they produce to explain and represent the world.   
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is the role of pluralist to identify and challenge any assumptions that 
lead to unnecessary limitations to the potential of scientific inquiry. In 
the final section I presented a preliminary argument for pragmatic 
values. I argue that pragmatic values, different to the monist 
assumptions identified here, limit the extent of plurality in any given 
field of science with regards to the particular aims of scientific 
practices. I will further develop this argument in chapter 6.  
5.1.1 Active Normative Epistemic Pluralism 
Section 4.1.2 presented Chang’s argument for pluralism, who argues 
that the aim of science is not to come up with a monist account of 
phenomena, but to fulfil different scientific aims: 
What we want science to do is to give us an account of the 
natural that serves whatever ultimate aim we may have (…) The 
monistic character of the account is itself not our ultimate aim. 
Aims of science can be served better in general by cultivating 
multiple interacting accounts. (Chang 2012: 260)  
Chang argues that there are multiple systems of practices in science, 
which are sets of epistemic activities working together to achieve 
different aims. Moreover, Chang lists three main benefits of having 
multiple systems of practice (toleration, co-option, and competition, all 
discussed in 4.1.2), arguing that, 
pluralism is more beneficial to science than monism, given any 
reasonable position regarding the aims of science and the 
fundamental values operating in science. (Chang 2012: 269) 
Chang describes his pluralism as an ideology of science, promoting the 
plurality of systems of practice to reap the benefits of having multiple 
systems of practice. Chang’s argument is focused on improving 
knowledge acquisition by promoting the presence of multiple systems. 
Thus, Chang argues that that any field of science that is monistic must 
be reformed:   
  146 
proper ‘ism’ should be an ideology, which implies a commitment 
to action. So, pluralism about science is a commitment to 
promote the presence of multiple systems of scientific 
knowledge. (Chang 2012: 260) 
if we should find a field of science that is quite monistic, then 
that is quite likely not healthy, and we should consider reforming 
it. (Chang 2012: 269) 
As discussed above, Chang’s argument is concerned with improving 
knowledge acquisition and opposing monist assumptions about the 
aims of science. Chang argues that accounts of phenomena produced 
by each system of practice are partial to the aims of a given system of 
practice. Chang asserts that each system of practice has a distinct aim, 
asking different sets of questions. In my example above (section 4.2), I 
demonstrated how chemists and geneticists ask different questions 
regarding target validation, each focusing on different aspects of 
phenomena: while chemists are interested in the question of whether 
manipulating a given macromolecule will lead to the death of parasite, 
geneticists are interested in understanding whether the presence or 
absence of a given macromolecule is essential for parasite survival. 
Both chemists and geneticists in this case are interested in establishing 
if a macromolecule can be a drug target, but the specific questions 
they ask are different, allowing them to learn about different aspects of 
the role of macromolecules in the cell (see section 4.2; more technical 
information can be found in Wyatt et al. 2011).   
It is important to note that Chang uses an example in which two 
systems of practices are significantly different from one in terms of the 
questions they ask and how they conceptualise the phenomena, such 
as oxygen and phlogiston. Chang argues that as long as we regard the 
aims of a given system as worthy of pursuit, we should keep them 
alive. In summary, Chang argues that there are multiple systems of 
practice aiming to answer different questions about phenomena. Each 
system of practice produces an account of phenomena that serves 
whatever aim that system has. For instance, Chang argues that while 
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both oxygenists and phlogistonists were interested in understanding 
chemical processes such as combustion and constitution of 
substances, oxygenists were interested in theories of heat and 
changes of state, while phlogistonists were interested in explaining the 
properties of compounds in terms of the properties of their ingredients 
(Chang 2012: 20). For Chang, both oxygenists and phlogistonists 
asked different questions about phenomena according to their aims. 
Chang rejects the assumption that the aim of science is to provide a 
monist account of phenomena and acknowledges that different 
systems have individual aims, allowing these systems to study different 
aspects of phenomena. However, what is implicit in Chang’s argument 
is the notion that the broad aim of science is to produce and proliferate 
knowledge about the world, and thus pluralism is more beneficial to 
science. Moreover, Chang argues that pluralists must be committed to 
promoting plurality of systems of practices: 
Pluralism as I intend is not a descriptive statement about what 
science is, or not even an armchair-normative statement about 
what science should be […] Pluralism about science is a 
commitment to promote the presence of multiple systems of 
scientific knowledge. (Chang 2012: 260) 
Chang’s strong emphasis on normativity (underlining the benefits of 
multiplicity of systems of knowledge) and his commitment to action 
underlines the main difference between Chang’s active normative 
epistemic pluralism, Kellert et al.’s pluralist stance and Mitchell’s 
integrative pluralism (see sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.3). Chang’s argument 
goes beyond describing pluralities as the state of affairs in scientific 
practices, asserting that multiple systems of practice are more 
beneficial for scientific inquiry and plurality must be promoted. Chang 
develops his normative argument in comparison to Kellert et al.’s 
pluralist stance. For Chang, the pluralist stance is merely descriptive of 
pluralities in science. In the following section, I will focus on the 
normative aspects of Chang’s pluralism. 
5.1.2 Normative vs Descriptive Pluralism  
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Chang asserts that his argument for pluralism is unapologetically 
normative, which he further articulates by comparing active normative 
epistemic pluralism to the pluralist stance defined by Kellert et al. 
(2006). Chang uses this comparison to underline the normative 
aspects of his argument. As discussed in 4.1.1, Kellert et al. define the 
pluralist stance as: 
A commitment to avoid reliance on the monist assumptions in 
interpretation and evaluation coupled with an openness to the 
ineliminability of multiplicity in some scientific contexts. (Kellert, 
Longino, and Waters 2006: xiii) 
Chang criticises Kellert et al. for being merely descriptive and passive, 
in the sense that the pluralist stance fails to promote a plurality of 
systems directly in scientific practices. Chang argues that the Pluralist 
Stance merely aims to interpret the content and practices of scientific 
inquiry. Chang asserts that interpreting science this way makes little 
difference. Instead, Chang argues that philosophers of science must 
demonstrate the benefits of plurality using current and historical case 
studies in order to challenge monist assumptions in our understanding 
of scientific practice. Moreover, Chang argues that, for every field in 
science, multiple systems of practices and account is more beneficial 
epistemically, as different systems will allow scientist to explore and 
explain different aspects of phenomena, thus producing more 
knowledge about the world.   
Both Kellert et al. and Chang challenge monist assumptions regarding 
the aims of science and the nature of knowledge that science 
produces. Moreover, both Kellert et al. and Chang underline the 
partiality of different systems and approaches. However, Kellert et al. 
argue that the benefits of multiple accounts of phenomena is an open 
question that must be addressed case by case: 
we do not hold that for every phenomenon there will inevitably 
be multiple irreducible models and explanations. We hold that 
the task of identifying which situation require multiple 
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approaches requires empirical investigation. (Kellert, Longino, 
and Waters 2006: xiv) 
Chang argues that the benefits of plurality of systems of practices is 
not an open question, but a commitment. For Chang, an empirical 
investigation to choose between monism and pluralism is futile and 
requires an experiment where both monist and pluralist approaches 
are tried. Chang argues that only people who are committed to the 
benefits of pluralism will subscribe to an experiment to answer whether 
pluralism or monism is beneficial, thus making the question futile. In 
Chang’s words:  
for that experiment, we have to make a genuine effort to create 
and cultivate a set of systems, and observe how they develop, 
each of them in itself and also through mutual interaction. We 
have to keep this going long enough to see whether any trends 
in successfulness that we detect are stable; if it turns out that 
the particular combination of systems that we try out really 
doesn't deliver goods, we have to try some other combinations 
of systems before we give up on pluralism in general. By that 
point we are up to our necks in pluralism with no clear end of 
experiment in sight, so we might as well be pluralists! The 
empirical question can only really be answered post-
commitment, and it is pointless to insist on treating question as 
empirical if we are not going to try to answer it through real 
experience. (Chang 2012: 291) 
Chang argues that individuals willing to try the experiment will commit 
to pluralist assumptions before the experiment concludes. That is, 
Chang’s argument for pluralism is based on the commitment that 
plurality of systems is more beneficial to the broad aims of science, 
which he takes to be the production and proliferation of knowledge. 
Therefore, the open question to determine which situation requires a 
multiplicity of accounts and approaches (in Kellert et al.’s terms) is 
futile for Chang, given that Chang is committed that in every situation, 
a multiplicity of systems will allow scientists to produce more 
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knowledge. Chang’s argument for pluralism is a doctrine about 
knowledge-building and not just knowledge evaluation (Chang, 2012: 
284). Thus, Chang argues that scientific practices ought to have 
multiple systems to improve their knowledge-building capacity. 
Chang’s active normative epistemic pluralism aims to improve the 
acquisition of scientific knowledge by actively promoting plurality in 
scientific practices. Chang argues that a passive version of his 
pluralism would only point out the benefits of multiple systems, where 
Chang wants to go further and engage actively in cultivating multiple 
systems. In the following section I will examine what it means to be an 
active pluralist, expanding on Chang’s argument that pluralists must 
actively promote multiplicities of systems in scientific practices.     
5.1.4 How to be an Active Pluralist?  
In the previous section I described the normative aspects of Chang’s 
pluralism. In this section I focus on how to actively promote the 
presence of multiple systems of scientific knowledge. Chang asserts 
that: 
The main action point is to proliferate: to foster valuable 
alternative scientific systems of practice alongside the orthodox 
and the fashionable. I intend pluralism as a doctrine about 
knowledge-building, not just knowledge-evaluation. In a way, it 
is obvious that people who can best put pluralism into practice in 
science are practicing scientists. However, it is also likely that 
scientists are already being as pluralistic as their professional 
constraints allow, and at any rate it is unlikely that many 
scientists will be inclined to change the way they do science 
following some philosophical doctrine articulated from outside 
their own field. So it may well fall to those who are not 
professional scientists to undertake active pluralist work, and 
there are some distinct lines of useful work that historians and 
philosophers of science can plausibly carry out. (Chang, 2012: 
284-285) 
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Thus, Chang argues that one way of actively proliferating multiple 
systems of practice is through pluralist historiography. Chang's pluralist 
historiography is a way to challenge triumphalism in history of science. 
As discussed in section 4.1.2, Chang argues that the history and 
philosophy of science must not focus on the ‘heroes’ of science, 
described in narratives in which one system of practice ‘triumphs’ over 
the other (as in the case of oxygenists triumphing over phlogistonists, 
where Lavoisier is named the father of chemistry). Although Chang’s 
historical account of the chemical revolution is challenged (see Kusch 
2015, Klein 2015), Chang’s pluralistic historiography has an important 
lesson. Chang argues that our understanding of scientific practices 
(both historical and current) must be rid of monist assumptions. 
Triumphalist historiography, as defined by Chang, holds the 
assumption that the ultimate aim of science is to provide the monist 
account. Therefore, a plurality of systems is expected to end when one 
system is agreed to be right, in the sense that it is closer to the ultimate 
aim. As discussed in section 5.1.1, Chang argues against the notion 
that the monist account is the aim, therefore different systems of 
knowledge must not be judged based on their likeness to such 
account.   
The task of pluralist historiography is to emphasise the plurality of 
systems of practices, underlining the plurality of aims of questions 
asked by different systems of practices. Moreover, Chang argues that 
the task of pluralists is to uncover the monist assumptions that underlie 
the received view of science and challenge them. Monist assumptions 
are recognised in multiple guises as I will discuss in section 5.2. Chang 
states that any unwarranted assumptions that lead to monism must be 
replaced by pluralist assumptions, and that the main task of pluralist 
history and philosophy of science is to encourage alternative systems 
to complement current practices. Chang summarises the active aspect 
of his pluralist argument as follows: 
To sum up: the ultimate aim of the active normative epistemic 
pluralism that I advocate is to improve science by cultivating 
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multiple systems of knowledge. The most active service that 
history-and-philosophy of science can perform in this 
connection, going beyond description and commentary, is to 
address scientific questions that are not being dealt with by 
scientists because they are restricted by monist traditions—
sometimes due to the necessities of normal science, sometimes 
for lack of imagination. History gives us an effective starting 
point, if we approach it with sufficient philosophical acumen to 
discern elements of the past that became discarded or hidden 
without good reason. (Chang, 2012: 290) 
Chang’s complementary science (Chang 2004) is an interesting 
approach that addresses questions no longer dealt with by scientists, 
unearthing forgotten methods and accounts to learn more about these 
systems of practices and phenomena itself. Here I wish to focus on 
Chang’s argument for actively challenging monist assumptions. In the 
following section I define monist assumptions and question how to 
challenge them, using case studies from current debates from current 
debates in epidemiology and gene-centric biology. 
5.2 What does it mean to be monistic?  
Here I aim to identify monist assumptions that must be eliminated from 
our understanding of scientific inquiry (this might include from 
philosophical, historical and scientific policy perspectives as well as 
how scientific inquiry is conceptualised by scientists themselves). 
Chang argues that scientific inquiry should not be limited by monist 
assumptions: that is, monism about scientific knowledge and practices 
restricts the capacity of scientific inquiry to produce knowledge about 
the world. Chang characterises monism in the following way: 
monism about science springs from the notion that science is 
the search for the truth about nature; since there is only one 
world, there is only one truth about it, and only one science 
should seek it […] there is one right answer to each well-formed 
question, and science tries to find out that right answer, 
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employing the one best scientific method known and employed 
by the relevant mainstream scientific community. (Chang 2012: 
259) 
Here I will identify three different monist assumptions in Chang’s 
characterisation. The first is metaphysical, holding that the structure of 
the word is such that it can be explained in a single account. Chang 
rejects the metaphysical assumption asserting that the external reality 
as we know it through scientific practices is complex and abundant 
(see 4.1.2). The second assumption is epistemic considering the 
nature of scientific knowledge, holding that there is only one truth about 
the world that can be captured by a single complete and 
comprehensive account. Finally, there is what I call the methodological 
assumption, holding that there is one method that can provide such 
account. Chang seeks to challenge monist assumptions, and cultivate 
multiple systems of practice in any given field of science (2012: 260). 
Here, I am going to focus on epistemic and methodological 
assumptions, as Chang remains agnostic about the metaphysical view. 
I agree with Chang that it is not necessary to commit to a metaphysical 
view to pursue epistemic and methodological pluralism. The starting 
position is scientific practices and their aims. Metaphysical monism is 
an ontological view on what constitutes phenomena and the way the 
world is. The argument for metaphysical monism can be constructed 
as follows: the nature or the structure of the external reality is such that 
it can be explained completely through the simplest and the most 
fundamental terms. I remain agnostic about metaphysical arguments 
for monism. I hold the assumption that nature or the structure of the 
external reality is an empirical question that cannot be answered a 
priori. Instead, the argument I pursue regards how we go about 
investigating and understanding the phenomena.   
Epistemological assumptions, broadly construed, are the notion that 
the aim of science is to provide a single complete and coherent 
account of phenomena. Thus, scientific accounts of phenomena must 
be judged in terms of their proximity to the monist account, where the 
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aim is to get rid of the multiplicity of accounts leaving with the best (or 
as best as it can be). Although Chang makes it clear that his position is 
epistemic as opposed to metaphysical, he does not comment on his 
stance on methodology assumptions. I define methodological 
assumptions as that there is one way to achieve an aim. 
Methodological monism coupled with epistemic monism will argue that 
there is one way to achieve a single, complete and coherent account of 
phenomena. However, it is possible to separate methodological 
monism from epistemic assumptions. Herein I argue that a distinction 
between epistemic and methodological monism is important for active 
pluralism, especially if one defines active normative pluralism as the 
rejection of monist assumptions that restrict the potential of scientific 
inquiry to explain and explore different aspects of phenomena. Thus it 
is necessary to make the distinction between methodological and 
epistemic assumptions in monsim. It is possible for practitioners of a 
system to accept the plurality of aims in scientific practices, but adhere 
to a single methodology that can only explain and examine limited 
aspects of phenomena. Adherence to a given system based on 
epistemic assumptions leads to a disregard of other systems, 
compromising the plurality of systems of practices. Therefore, the 
normative pluralism I defend in this thesis is the rejection of epistemic 
assumptions (and to an extent methodological assumptions that 
compromise proliferation of other systems). This has direct 
consequences for promoting active pluralism. In section 5.2.1, I will 
focus on current debates in epidemiology, particularly Broadbent 
(2015), who summarises the POA, which is based on the epistemic 
assumption that the only causally relevant factors in epidemiology are 
those that can be intervened in, via well-specified interventions. I will 
argue that the epistemic assumption must be challenged from a 
normative pluralist point of view, and argue for plurality of causally 
relevant factors in epidemiology, promoting approaches that focus on 
different causal factors. In section 5.2.2, I shift to gene-centric biology, 
using Waters (2006) to argue that focus on gene-centred methods in 
molecular biology, in particular biological development, is based on the 
assumption that genes are difference-makers in cells. Therefore, 
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methods for manipulating genes such as gene knockout or RNAi are 
used in cellular biology research, based on the assumption that gene 
centred methods are the best way of studying biological development. 
Herein, I want to underline that monist assumptions are nuanced, and 
require close scrutiny. Moreover, I argue that only assumptions that 
lead to unnecessary limitations of scientific inquiry must be challenged 
and replaced. 
5.2.1 Concepts of Causation in Epidemiology 
Broadbent (2015) provides a critical overview of the potential outcomes 
approach (POA) developed recently in epidemiology. Although the 
POA has a long history, Broadbent focuses on contemporary 
developments in this field where the use of mathematical methods 
(such as marginal structural models) has led to reconsideration of the 
concept of causality. Broadbent identifies two papers important in the 
development of the POA, by Hernán and Taubman (2008) and Vander-
Weele and Robinson (2014). Hernán and Taubman (2008) argue for a 
conceptual change in how epidemiologists think about causal 
inference. Vander-Weele and Robinson further the argument, arguing 
for a shift in conceptual frameworks beyond what is generally 
considered reasonable or plausible by epidemiologists, creating a 
division between established concepts and the POA. According to the 
POA (as put forward by Hernán and Taubman [2008] and Vander-
Weele and Robinson [2014]), the only relevant causal factors are those 
that can be intervened in experimentally and in a well-specified way. 
Hernán and Taubman (2008) argue that obesity does not respond to a 
well-specified intervention, and therefore it is not a cause of death. 
Broadbent summarises Hernán et al.’s position as follows: 
obesity ought not to be treated as a cause of death. The reason 
– which is the real point of the paper – is that obesity does not 
correspond to a well-specified intervention. There is more than 
one way to reduce obesity, and these different methods all lead 
to different effects on mortality. From this striking and 
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uncontestable point, they draw the conclusion that obesity itself 
is not a cause of death. (Broadbent 2015: 74) 
Hernán and Taubman (2008) reach this conclusion using a 
comparative case study looking at the possible outcomes of 
experimental studies (different diet, exercise and combinations of diet 
and exercise) and retrospective data analysis. Hernán and Taubman 
suggest that although data analysis can provide the exact number of 
deaths attributable to obesity, only experimenters can give specific 
recommendations to reduce mortality. Broadbent summarises Hernán 
and Taubman’s conclusions as follows: 
something is a cause only if it corresponds to a well-specified 
intervention, and that experimental studies are better than 
observational ones because they enforce the proper 
specification of an intervention; that much of the causal 
knowledge delivered by observational studies is either useless 
or illusory, or perhaps both; and, of course, that obesity is not a 
cause of death. (Broadbent 2015: 74) 
Proponents of the POA argue that observational approaches are 
inadequate because they cannot enforce a proper intervention, 
moreover arguing that knowledge delivered by observation is useless. 
The POA relies on the epistemic assumption that something is a cause 
only if it corresponds to a well-specified intervention, therefore other 
approaches and systems of practice in epidemiology that focuses on 
causal factors that do not correspond to a well specified intervention 
must be discarded. Broadbent argues that the observational 
approaches in epidemiology have been crucial to understanding 
disease, causes and patterns, offering methods of intervention before 
the conception of the POA. Thus, it is normative pluralists’ role to 
actively challenge this assumption and argue that observational 
approaches in epidemiology also produce useful knowledge about 
phenomena. For instance, racial differences are taken to be an 
important causal factor for some diseases (such as heart diseases). 
However, Vander-Weele and Robinson (following the assumption that 
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only causes that correspond to well-specified interventions are 
relevant) assert that that since race cannot be manipulated, there is no 
well-defined intervention; therefore, effects of race should not be 
considered as a cause by the epidemiologist.  
On the one hand, the POA can be treated as a new tool for an 
epidemiologist that focuses on different aspects of disease causes. 
However, the epistemic assumption that these causes are the only 
relevant ones leads to a monist argument that the POA is the only 
approach worth pursuing in epidemiology. Broadbent argues that in 
these two papers (by Hernán & Taubman and Vander-Weele & 
Robinson), the POA is presented as a conceptual framework to 
understand causal concepts in epidemiology. Moreover, Broadbent 
makes a distinction between the narrow sense of the POA, that is the 
application of mathematical tools in epidemiology to analyse different 
aspects of phenomena, and the broad sense of POA, which he calls a 
methodological revolution. The narrow sense can be regarded as a 
new method in epidemiology that asks different questions about 
phenomena using mathematical tools, producing distinct accounts of 
alternative approaches in epidemiology. The narrow sense does not 
have any commitment to the epistemic assumption that the only 
relevant causes for epidemiologist are those that correspond to well-
specified interventions. The broad sense of POA is the commitment to 
a new concept of causality based on the epistemic assumption that 
limits what can be considered as a cause in epidemiology (namely the 
causes that correspond to well-specified interventions). Moreover, 
Broadbent argues that broad POA can be thought of as a 
methodological revolution, aiming to replace the existing approaches in 
epidemiology that are based on observational studies with 
experimental studies. Broadbent states that:  
Epidemiology in its modern form is a discipline characterized by 
observational studies, carried out on exposures that are highly 
prevalent in the population, and which may not themselves be 
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manipulable. It is also characterized by stories of detective-like 
informal reasoning. (Broadbent 2015: 75) 
In contrast to observational practices, Broadbent states that:  
the potential outcomes approach strongly favours experimental 
studies–that is, studies where an intervention is performed. This 
is not only because of the advantages of randomization, widely 
discussed among philosophers and others elsewhere. It is also 
because there is a conviction that if you actually do an 
intervention, it is necessarily well- specified. (Broadbent 2015: 
75) 
Thus, the broad sense of the POA leads to epistemic monism, based 
on the epistemic assumption that ‘causal questions are well-defined as 
long as interventions are well-specified’. The POA motto is not that the 
mathematical methods that constitute POA are better than others 
because of their own merits — rather, the POA allows the elucidation 
of causal questions that epidemiologists aim to answer. The POA, as 
defined in Hernán and Taubman (2008) and Vander-Weele and 
Robinson (2014), aims for a certain type of knowledge that is 
exclusionary of different systems of practices, namely observational 
studies in epidemiology. The POA takes the aim of epidemiology to be 
identifying well-specified interventions for diseases; therefore only the 
POA can produce knowledge that will fulfil this aim. However, 
observational studies, as argued by Broadbent, produce accounts of 
phenomena, revealing causal relations and helping the epidemiologist 
understand disease patterns. Thus, the role of active pluralism in this 
debate between the proponents of the POA and the traditional 
observational studies is to promote pluralism by challenging the 
epistemic assumption that the only relevant causal account of disease 
aetiology is the one that corresponds to well-specified intervention. 
Moreover, the role of pluralists is to argue that each approach 
produces a partiality of accounts and argue for the benefits of having 
multiple accounts to improve our understanding of disease aetiology.  
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5.2.2 Gene-Centric Biology  
Gene-centric biology is another field in which we can draw a distinction 
between methodological and epistemic monism. Although I used case 
studies from gene-centric approaches in chapter 4 (sections 4.2 and 
4.4), in this section I want to focus on Waters’s (2006) account of gene-
centric biology in order to argue that the decision to focus on genes is 
not due to an epistemic assumption that genes are causally 
fundamental in biological development. Instead, Waters argues that 
genes are at the centre of this field because of their utility. That is to 
say, genes are useful tools in manipulation developmental processes 
in order to reveal causal relations in development. 
Waters’s argument involves defending gene-centrism against its 
critiques, namely the developmental systems theory (DST). I will not go 
into the details of this debate in order to keep my line of argument 
clear. The proponents of the DST claim that biological development is 
multi-factorial and that genes are no more significant as causal factors 
than others, such as epigenetic factors and environmental factors (see 
Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 2001). The DST approach argues for a 
more holist understanding of biological development in which genes 
are part of a larger causal picture including epigenetics and 
environmental input. Thus, critiques of gene-centred biology argue that 
focusing on genes obscures aspects of biological development that 
cannot be revealed by gene-centric practices. Although these worries 
are warranted, Waters argues that closer studies of gene-centric 
practices reveal that genes are at the centre of some scientific 
practices not because they are regarded as causally fundamental but 
due to their pragmatic value. Waters argues that: 
Gene-centrism can be understood as a general scientific 
approach for investigating and modelling a broad range of 
biological processes. As such, it includes practical knowledge 
about various procedures, descriptive knowledge about the 
makeup and causal regularities of model organisms, and 
evaluative knowledge assessing the utility of procedures, 
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materials, and ideas for further research. The functioning of this 
knowledge is structured not just by patterns of explanatory 
reasoning, but also by strategies for investigation. (Waters 2006: 
199) 
Here Waters underlines that focusing on genes is not justified by an 
epistemic assumption that genes are more fundamental in 
understanding biological development in comparison to epigenetic and 
environmental factors. That is to say, gene-centrism does not rely on 
the assumption that focusing on genes will lead to a fundamental 
account that can be used to explain all biological phenomena. Instead, 
Waters argues that gene-centrism is justified through its pragmatic 
value in that the set of methods allow further investigation of 
phenomena. Waters sums up this position in the following statement: 
Understanding gene-centrism as an approach centered on a set 
of open-ended strategies for investigating a broad range of 
biological phenomena, rather than as an explanatory enterprise 
centered on filling out the details of a central theory, makes it 
possible to entertain the idea that genes are at the center of 
attention because of their investigative utility, not because of 
their alleged explanatory power.” (Waters 2006: 200 
Waters argues that the focus on genes in molecular biology is because 
genes are regarded as difference-makers in the development 
processes (a term that will become clear in the following example), and 
thereby useful tools to investigate phenomena. For instance, gene-
centric approaches focus on gene expression and protein synthesis, 
which involves the translation of genetic information into amino acid 
sequences. This is a complex process and takes place in multiple 
stages. First, genes (which are short DNA segments) are transcribed 
into RNA molecules, which get modified into messenger RNAs 
(mRNAs) and transported to special sites in cells called ribosomes, 
where they get translated into other amino acid chains. The whole 
process relies on multiple molecules and processes including transfer 
RNA, ribosomal RNA and many other enzymes, all causally relevant. 
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Moreover, gene expression is often a response to external stimuli from 
the environment (such as the presence of xenobiotics or absence of 
nutrients). Waters acknowledges that gene expression is a complex 
process that includes multiple factors that have different causal roles at 
different stages. Waters also acknowledges that it is wrong to say that 
genes direct the whole process. Nonetheless, Waters notes that most 
causal factors involved in DNA expression, except genes, are uniform 
in a given cell or cell structure at a given time. In simple terms this 
means that the translators remain the same, but the translated script 
(the genes) changes, therefore they are regarded as difference-makers 
in the whole process. Even if there are differences in these causal 
factors, the changes will be ubiquitous in the cell, i.e., every gene 
expressed will be affected by the difference in the gene expression 
mechanism. On the other hand, the difference in a gene will lead to a 
particular change in the end product i.e. the amino-acid chain.  
Waters also argues that genes’ capacity to bring about difference in the 
cellular processes is utilised by molecular biologist in order to 
manipulate biological processes. For instance, Waters uses the case of 
systems biologists investigating metabolic pathways by interfering with 
the related genes. Although the immediate causal agents under study 
are metabolites, Waters argues that the strategy to learn about 
metabolic patterns is to manipulate the related genes. In the case of 
HAT research discussed in the previous chapter (4.2), the genetic 
approach uses various methods (gene knockout or RNAi for instance) 
to manipulate genes to investigate whether a given metabolic pathway 
is essential for parasite survival. The aim is to understand the role of a 
given macromolecule (coded by a particular gene that is manipulated) 
in a parasite’s metabolic pathways. Therefore, genes are mere tools in 
order to validate a causal factor, protein or RNA, as a drug target. I 
argue that gene-centric methods do not rely on the epistemic 
assumption that genes are the only relevant causal factor in biological 
development and the genetic approaches described above do not lead 
to monism (in this case epistemic and metaphysical). Waters sums this 
up as follows: 
  162 
Interpreting gene-centrism as one of a plurality of possible 
approaches leaves open the possibility that genes are the 
centre of attention not so much because of their explanatory 
value, but because of their investigative utility. I will argue that 
this is indeed the case, that genes provide a unique entry point 
for investigating and model a broad range of biological 
processes. (Waters 2006: 201) 
Thus, gene-centric approaches in biology should not be thought of as 
epistemic monism, as long as they are not based on an epistemic 
assumption that genes are the only causally relevant factors in 
biological development, and therefore a gene-centred account of 
development is the only type of account scientists should seek to 
produce. Waters argues that gene-centric approaches focus on genes 
for pragmatic reasons, as genes can be manipulated in a way that can 
produce useful knowledge about developmental processes (and other 
metabolic activities) in living cells. ‘Useful knowledge’ is a loaded term 
that I will discuss in the following section, particularly focusing on 
pragmatic values.  
In this section, I argued that normative pluralists must actively 
challenge epistemic assumptions that lead to monism (as in the case 
of the POA). Moreover, I argued that methodological assumptions in 
which one approach is favoured over another due to its utility lead to 
methodological monism. However, the argument for methodological 
monism does not hold that other approaches do not produce accounts 
of phenomena that are useful for different aims. Methodological 
monism can be understood as adherence to an approach that is 
thought to be the best way to accomplish a given aim. For instance, the 
aim of the WHO is to eliminate HAT by 2030, which can be done by 
developing new drugs. Therefore, anti-parasitic drug discovery is 
prioritised over other approaches that can also help eliminate HAT. 
Chapter 6 discusses the broader context of HAT, and argues that the 
socio-economic and political context leads to prioritisation of drug 
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discovery over other methods (such as environmental control or more 
holist epidemiological control) based on pragmatic values.  
In summary, in this section I argued that the role of normative pluralists 
to identify monist assumptions. Moreover, I argued that monist 
assumptions are more nuanced and can be divided into different 
categories. It is necessary for active normative pluralists to challenge 
and replace assumptions that favour one set of approaches and 
accounts, thus limiting the potential of scientific inquiry to explain and 
explore different aspects of phenomena.  
5.4 Monism v. Pluralism 
The pluralism pursued in this thesis is a rejection of a monist ideal that 
can be realised in three different arguments: metaphysical, epistemic 
and methodological. In this chapter I mainly focus on epistemic and 
methodological assumptions, given the pluralist thesis I develop here 
mainly focuses on scientific practices and the accounts they produce to 
explain and explore the natural world. 
Herein, I argued that the epistemic assumptions of monism are that the 
ultimate aim of scientific practices is to provide a single, complete and 
coherent account of the world in the sense that we can derive all 
knowledge from this account. Although this might be an exaggerated 
view, epistemic monism still influences historical accounts of science 
(triumphalism) and the way philosophers make sense of the multiplicity 
of accounts and practices in science (naïve reductionism discussed in 
chapter 4). Epistemic monism is a ‘conceptual hangover’ from the 
received view of science I discussed in chapter 2.  
Rejecting epistemic monism strengthens the philosophy of science in 
practice approach, given that the first step in PSP is to understand the 
different aims of scientific practices. An important assumption that 
epistemic pluralism makes is that the multiplicity of aims and practices 
are ineliminable. This assumption is driven by direct engagement with 
scientific practices and not from a rational reconstruction of science.  
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In addition to epistemic assumptions, I identified methodological 
assumptions. The methodological monism can be thought of as 
adhering to a particular approach or system of practice based on the 
assumption that a given method or set of methods (genetic approaches 
in developmental biology for instance) is the best way to explain and 
explore phenomena. Herein, I asserted that an argument for 
methodological monism requires further justification.  
Providing this analysis of the monist argument is to further the 
discourse on active pluralism. Understanding different arguments in 
detail allows me to make the point that active pluralists must challenge 
the epistemic assumptions and values that lead to monism in the 
sense that one system of practice that dominates a field of inquiry is to 
the detriment of other systems. Moreover, pluralists must emphasise 
the partiality of scientific knowledge. This is particularly important in 
debates in which different systems are compared and contested on the 
assumption that one is right. Pluralists’ role in such cases is to highlight 
the merits of each system with regard to their distinct aim. The pluralist 
must act if a given approach is dominating the field based on 
aforementioned monist assumptions, especially if this is resulting in the 
termination of alternative systems. 
Chang’s work on the history of phlogiston shows how oxygen theory 
was favoured over phlogiston based on the assumption that it captured 
reality better The monist assumption leads to the killing of a system 
that was successful in its own terms. Moreover, Chang argues that 
phlogistonists were successful in engaging with certain aspects of the 
phenomena, demonstrated in his book Is Water H2O? (discussed in 
section 4.1.2, pages 107 and 108). The task of the active pluralist is to 
challenge the most dominant assumptions and values. However, the 
only boundary to pluralism is not the assumptions I associated with the 
monist ideal. Herein, I argue that there are pragmatic values that arise 
from the context of inquiry that provides justification in prioritising 
certain systems over others. I presented the case of HAT where anti-
parasitic drug discovery research as a system of practice is prioritised 
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over systems of practices such as environmental research or 
epidemiological research in achieving the goals set by the WHO. 
I will further discuss pragmatic values in the following chapter, however 
it is necessary to make the distinction between the methodological 
assumptions I defined here and pragmatic values I will discuss in the 
following section. Although both methodological assumptions and 
pragmatic values lead to limitation of plurality of approaches in a given 
field. Methodological assumptions stipulate best way to explain and 
explore an aspect of phenomena (such as the use of gene-centred 
methods to study biological development). Pragmatic values define the 
best way a particular aim can be achieved taking the broader context. 
In the following chapter I will argue how the pragmatic aims limit the 
extent of plurality of approaches to eliminate HAT, where eliminating 
HAT by 2030 requires new drugs that match patients’ needs.  
The difference between Chang’s argument and mine stems from the 
differences in our case studies. The HAT case study I am looking at is 
contemporaneous with an aim that has a strict timeframe. Chang, on 
the other hand, looks at history of chemistry over several centuries. 
Differences in the timeframes and the type of benefits we expect from 
plurality leads to two different conclusions. While Chang argues that 
pluralism must be promoted at all costs with regards epistemic values, 
I argue that there are cases in which the context of inquiry prompts 
plausible pragmatic boundaries. 36  These pragmatic boundaries and 
values are up for debate and philosophical scrutiny and the 
                                               
36 Chang’s discussion does not directly consider the role of ethical values; 
however, he acknowledges that different values jostle with each other. 
Chang’s project is mainly focused on epistemic values (and to an extent 
methodological values). Chang only acknowledges ethical values when he 
remarks that it is impossible to step away from ethical considerations in his 
own work (Chang 2012: 27). Chang does not give ethical values place in his 
overall argument. My analysis goes beyond Chang’s, to include ethical values 
under pragmatic values, which I will get to discuss in detail in the following 
chapter.  
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responsibility to do this lies with pluralists. In the following chapter I 
focus on the broader context of the HAT case, demonstrating how 
these pragmatic values are constructed. Moreover, I argue that values 
have a fundamental role in science, particularly in shaping the aims of 
inquiry and setting the priorities and the direction of research. I borrow 
from the contemporary pragmatism debate to further develop the 
concept of pragmatic values identified in this chapter.  
In this chapter, following Chang’s active normative pluralism, I argued 
that the role of normative pluralists is to challenge assumptions that 
lead to monism. I separated monist assumptions into metaphysical, 
epistemic and metaphysical, focusing on the epistemic and 
methodological. I argued that normative pluralism promotes a 
multiplicity of accounts and approaches in scientific practices, allowing 
scientists to explain and explore different aspects of phenomena. 
Following Chang’s call for active, normative pluralism, I argued that it is 
the role of normative pluralism to challenge any assumption that limits 
such plurality. In section 5.2.1 I suggested that an approach like the 
POA is based on an epistemic assumption that the only causally 
relevant factors in epidemiology are those that correspond to well-
defined interventions. I argued that the proponents of the POA assert 
that observational studies in epidemiology produce inadequate 
accounts, given that the aim of epidemiology is to come up such 
interventions. That is, the proponents of the POA approach explored 
here are committed to the assumption that the aim of epidemiology is 
to come up with well specified interventions which only the POA can 
produce. Thus, it is the normative pluralists’ role to challenge these 
assumptions to show that there are multiple aims in epidemiology and 
each approach in epidemiology produces partial accounts of 
phenomena (experimental or observational). In section 5.2.2, I shifted 
my focus to gene-centric approaches to understand biological 
development. I argued that gene-centric approaches are based on the 
assumption that genes can be utilised to manipulate developmental 
processes in cells. That is to say, in understanding biological 
development at a cellular level, genes are useful, given that they can 
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be manipulated in ways (gene knockout, RNAi etc.) that allow 
scientists to find out more about phenomena. It is important to note that 
the gene-centred approach in my discussion only relies on 
methodological assumptions and not epistemic assumptions; therefore, 
I argue that gene-centric approaches in biology are not problematic 
from a normative pluralist point of view, as long as they do not limit 
other approaches seeking to explain different aspects of biological 
development.  
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Chapter 6 
6.1 Aims and Values in Scientific Practices 
In the previous chapter, I argued that scientific practices ought to be 
pluralistic in order to explore and explain different aspects of 
phenomena. Moreover, I asserted that the role of normative pluralists 
is to challenge any monist assumption that lead to unnecessary 
limitation of plurality of approaches and accounts in scientific practices 
(following Chang’s call to action). While I argue that the role of 
normative pluralist is to challenge monist assumptions, I also identify 
pragmatic values in scientific practices which pose boundaries to the 
extent of plurality. In this chapter I will return to Human African 
Trypanosomiasis. Here, I wish to argue that while current efforts to 
eliminate HAT involve a plurality of approaches working together, there 
is a limit to the extent of plurality. I will argue that the limits to plurality 
in this case are not due to epistemic assumptions, but pragmatic 
values. In the first half of this chapter I will provide a detailed 
discussion of current HAT research, focusing on the aims set out by 
the World Health Organisation. I will argue that the WHO’s aims are 
shaped by the biomedical knowledge of HAT and the socio-economic 
and political context of the disease. Moreover, I will argue that while 
the aim (in this case elimination of HAT) promotes a plurality of 
approaches employed (particularly in anti-parasitic drug discovery 
process, as discussed in section 4.2), it also sets a boundary to which 
approaches will be employed in a given timeframe. In section 6.1.1 I 
will argue that scientific and medical practices working towards 
eliminating HAT involve multiple approaches (genetic engineering and 
organic chemistry to validate drugs, medicinal chemistry to develop 
drug candidates, structural biology to determine drug-target interaction 
etc.) with particular aims (target validation, synthesis and development 
of drug candidates, determining pharmacodynamics properties etc.). 
However, these multiple approaches are governed by the overarching 
aim of eliminating HAT by 2030. I will further argue that the aim limits 
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the extent of plurality by favouring certain approaches over others. In 
particular approaches involved in anti-parasitic drug discovery and 
development process are prioritised over approaches involving 
environmental control and vector control (two approaches proven 
effective by colonial administrations, discussed in 3.1). I will argue that 
limits to plurality are posed by pragmatic values, which define the best 
way to achieve elimination. In 6.1.2, and 6.1.3, I will further discuss the 
origins of the pragmatic values that determine how elimination can be 
achieved in the way specified by WHO. My aim in the first part of this 
chapter is to flesh out the justificatory narrative put forward by WHO to 
prioritise active screening campaigns over other methods (such as 
vector control and environmental approaches), thus prioritising 
approaches linked to anti-parasitic drug discovery.  
In section 6.2, I will shift my focus to the philosophical debate on  
values in science, aiming to further articulate the role of pragmatic 
values in scientific practices. I will provide an overview of arguments 
that a broad range of values (not just so-called epistemic values) play 
an important role in scientific practices. In section 6.2.1 I will provide an 
overview of Longino (1990 & 1996) and Douglas (2000 & 2009), who 
both argue that epistemic and non-epistemic values are used by 
scientists. This is in line with my argument that the values from the 
socio-economic and political context of HAT guide the scientific 
practices involved in its elimination. Longino argues that scientists 
require values to bridge the gap between theory and evidence, where 
Douglas argues scientists require values to assess the inductive risk 
linked to decisions they make. Both Longino and Douglas argues 
(broadly) that scientists use values to make sense of evidence in hand. 
In section 6.2.2 I wish to argue further that values play an integral role 
in scientific practices, following Brown’s (2013) argument against the 
lexical priority of evidence, arguing that values in science only play an 
indirect role in scientific practices (assessing evidence for example). 
Instead, I will argue that, instead of regarding values as an 
afterthought, we must understand the relationship between values and 
evidence in a pragmatic framework. My main aim in the second part of 
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this chapter is to define and further articulate the pragmatic values. 
Here I will argue that pragmatic values are specific to the broader 
context of scientific practices, moreover I will argue that they allow 
determine the aims of inquiry and they shape and guide scientific 
practices. I will develop the concept of pragmatic aims following 
Brown’s (2012) account of Dewey’s logic of science, who provides an 
account of scientific inquiry focusing on the links between scientific 
practices and their broader context.  
6.1.1 Elimination of HAT  
In section 3.2, I built an account of current efforts to control and 
eliminate HAT. These efforts are organised by the WHO and supported 
by organisational bodies such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank 
(WB). The current efforts led by WHO are a partnership with a diverse 
group of stake holders with their own set of aims and values guiding 
their operations. However, in the efforts lead by the WHO, partners 
share overarching values and the broad aim. These values are the 
result of the difficulties in implementing the existing control methods in 
the disease endemic regions. There are existing control methods that 
have proven effective in some disease-endemic regions, but ineffective 
in others. One key problem for implementing these control measures is 
the inadequacy of the diagnostic tools and drugs. As described above, 
diagnostic tools for the second stage of this disease are invasive and 
painful, and the drugs available for treatment have high toxicity and a 
long treatment period (section 3.1). 
To address the need for new drugs in HAT treatment, the Drugs for 
Neglected Disease working group was established in 1999 by MSF to 
build strategies for developing new medicines that match the needs of 
the target populations (section 3.3). This working group led to the 
establishment of the Drugs for Neglected Disease Initiative (DNDi) in 
2003. DNDi was established through the contributions of five public 
institutions (Oswaldo Cruz Foundation from Brazil, the Indian Council 
for Medical Research, the Kenya Medical Research Institute, the 
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Ministry of Health of Malaysia and the Pasteur Institute), with MSF and 
WHO, UNDP and the World Bank acting as permanent observers.  
WHO’s aim is to eliminate HAT in two stages. The first stage is: 
detection of less than 1 new case per 10 000 inhabitants in at 
least 90% of endemic foci reporting less than 2000 new cases 
annually at continental level by 2020. (WHO 2012b: 11) 
Followed by the second and final stage of elimination: 
reduction to zero of the incidence of infection caused by a 
specific pathogen in a defined geographical area, as a result of 
deliberate efforts; continued actions to prevent re-establishment 
of transmission may be required. (WHO 2012b: 12) 
The main strategy to achieve elimination is active screening 
campaigns. These campaigns involve screening populations in 
disease-endemic areas, and providing treatment to those who test 
positive. However, there are major barriers to patient participation to 
these campaigns.  Anthropological studies (discussed in 6.1.2) have 
shown that drug toxicity and cost are the two main barriers to 
implementing current control methods in disease-endemic areas, 
highlighting the need for new medicines. Therefore, the focus of the 
scientific practices involved in the efforts to eliminate HAT has been 
anti-parasitic drug discovery. Herein I argue that the context of this 
disease and the aims set out by the WHO and DNDi provide a way of 
understanding why some scientific practices are prioritised over others. 
Moreover, efforts to develop new drugs are guided by target product 
profiles, defining the desired properties of new medicines. I argue that 
the TPP determines the constitution of scientific practices involved in 
the drug discovery and development process, where multiple 
approaches (such as genetic and chemical approaches) are used to 
study different aspects of parasite metabolism in answering questions 
determined by the TPP (e.g. whether a drug candidate can treat both 
forms of T. brucei, or can be formulated to an orally bioavailable drug).  
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In section 4.2, I demonstrated the multiplicity of approaches in anti-
parasitic drug discovery, arguing for the benefits of plurality in this field. 
While a plurality of approaches is favoured in anti-parasitic drug 
discovery and development, anti-parasitic drug discovery is prioritised 
in research and development in current efforts to eliminate HAT, to 
overcome the limitations of the screening programmes. In summary, 
the timeframe, specific needs and restricted resources make it 
necessary to promote a set of approaches (anti-parasitic drug 
discovery) over others (such as environmental control or vector 
control).37 This R&D landscape with a limited plurality of approaches is 
a result of pragmatic values (as opposed to epistemic assumptions). 
The focus on the set of approaches under anti-parasitic drug discovery 
is not due to the assumption that they will provide an account of 
phenomena that fulfils the monist criteria (as discussed above). 
Instead, the pragmatic values lead to prioritisation of the anti-parasitic 
drug discovery to fulfil the aims of WHO within the given timeframe and 
the socio-economic context of HAT. In the absence of these pragmatic 
values, there is no justification of prioritising anti parasitic drug 
discovery over other approaches, given that approaches such as 
environmental control and vector control were effective in the past 
(section 3.1). 
For instance, there is a body of historical evidence to argue that 
elimination can be achieved using environmental control. Historical 
data (number of new cases of HAT versus population screened) 
presented in WHO (2000) (see figure 3) shows that partial elimination 
was achieved through control measures, using current diagnostics, 
drugs and environmental methods (discussed in 3.1). Although control 
and elimination are hypothetically possible using current methods, they 
                                               
37 It is important to underline that I am focusing on the R&D priorities that 
shape scientific practices. These practices are different from day-to-day 
medical practices in disease-endemic areas, where the aim and priority is to 
screen people and provide treatment. The focus here is the R&D priorities 
leading to the promotion of certain approaches over others.  
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are not sustainable for various reasons in practice in the given time 
frame. The first reason is the aforementioned barriers for patient 
participation caused by current diagnostics and drugs. The second 
reason is the cost of current measures, since the current support to 
fight HAT (and other NTDs) is not long term and bound to stop at some 
point . The third reason is the difficulty of building infrastructure and 
sustaining active control methods due to political instability in disease-
endemic regions. Moreover, a lack of infrastructure makes it difficult to 
preserve and administer current drugs. Therefore, the reason for 
prioritising anti parasitic drug discovery and development is primarily 
pragmatic values as opposed to primarily epistemic values, i.e. the 
boundaries of plurality are set by pragmatic values (although it is 
necessary to underline that the two sets of values are related, see 
section 6.2).  
In chapter 5, I put forward a normative argument for pluralism, 
asserting that scientific practices are ought to be pluralistic in order to 
explain and explore different aspects of phenomena. Moreover, I 
argued that the role of pluralists is to challenge any assumptions that 
lead to monism. However, in this case, I argue that the limits to 
pluralism are rooted in pragmatic values that derive from the socio-
economic and political context of HAT. It must be noted that pragmatic 
values here lead to a focus on the biomedical causes of HAT. Yet note 
too that it is possible to conceptualise the causes of HAT epidemic as 
environmental (changes in the physical environment or increased 
overlap between tsetse and human habitats) or socio-political (as a 
result of colonisation and consequent changes in social, economic and 
political structures). Here I argue that in addition to challenging 
assumptions that lead to monism, it is also the normative pluralists’ 
task to scrutinise pragmatic values that limit plurality. In the rest of this 
section I will argue the need for prioritising one approach over others 
by looking at the broader context of scientific practices.  
As discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3, there is a need to develop new 
tools to achieve sustainable elimination by 2030. Here, I argue that 
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there is a need to develop new tools in order to achieve elimination in 
the given time period with limited resources, and that plurality in 
scientific practices is limited by pragmatic values. In the rest of this 
chapter I will focus on arguments for the need to develop new drugs. 
Simarro et al. (2015) argue that there are two main challenges in 
protecting the population in disease-endemic areas.  
Concerning the population at risk, the challenge for the future is 
twofold. First, to prevent the 43.4 million people presently living 
in low and very low risk areas from sliding back into a situation 
of higher risk through effective surveillance and response. 
Second, to set up appropriate and sustainable control strategies 
to reduce transmission in the areas where 13 millions of people 
are still living at moderate to very high risk of infection. If met, 
these targets will enable to reach the 2020 goal of eliminating g-
HAT as a public health problem. (Simarro et al. 2015: 11) 
Moreover, Simarro et al. (2015) list several obstacles: (1) possible 
donor fatigue; (2) competing health priorities in disease-endemic areas; 
and (3) social unrest and gaps in the coverage of the population at risk. 
In addition, Simarro et al. assert that that current control methods have 
difficulties in integrating the control programmes with national 
healthcare systems and mustering resources to fund necessary 
research.  
Rock et al. (2017) make a similar argument using a mathematical 
model to predict the success of current control methods in achieving 
WHO goals. Rock et al. report an estimate of new infections using 
reported case data and active screening levels in order to predict 
transmission rates. Rock et al. assert that it is necessary to focus on 
the transmission rate instead as the number of cases reported is not 
reliable due to underreporting (see 3.1.5). As discussed in chapter 3, it 
is difficult to estimate the real disease burden based on the new cases 
reported due to underreporting. Therefore, there is a need for other 
indicators such as the transmission rate in order to assess the 
progress towards elimination. Based on the rate of transmission 
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extrapolated from the mathematical model, Rock et al. conclude that it 
is not possible to achieve this within the timeframe set by the WHO: 
It is very unlikely that the 2030 full elimination target will be met 
by continuing with strategies which screen only low-risk 
members of the population and with no vector control. The 
predicted elimination year is 2236 for mean screening, and 2121 
for maximum screening. This demonstrates how the current 
strategy is unlikely to impact HAT transmission sufficiently to 
reach full elimination by 2030. (Rock et al. 2017: 8) 
Hasker et al. focused on the shortcomings of the current control 
methods in DRC (see section 3.2). The current control programme 
Programme National de Lutte contre la Trypanosomiase Humaine 
Africaine (PNLTHA) in Democratic Republic of Congo relies on active 
screening funded through bilateral funding from Belgium. Hasker et al. 
(2011) argue that with the prospect of this funding being phased out 
and no other prospective funding, the screening and monitoring 
activities will be gradually reduced. Given that 89% of the new cases 
reported in 2013 were in the DRC, it is important to maintain active 
screening campaigns in this region to achieve elimination. Active 
screening is particularly important in this context given that average 
annual attendance to the healthcare services is less than 0.15 visits 
per inhabitant. However, whether active screening campaigns are 
running or not, the population in disease endemic areas must be 
persuaded to participate in these campaigns. 
Hasker et al., Rock et al. and Simarro et al. here all focus on the 
shortcomings of the tools currently available for use in the active 
screening campaigns. The three papers discussed here all argue that 
the current methods are not sustainable in long term to achieve 
elimination (in the way defined by WHO). The main point here is that 
there is a need for new tools, particularly new therapeutic tools that can 
be deployed by the active screening teams to treat patients effectively 
in the disease endemic area. Due to the lack of infrastructure and the 
lack of long term funding for these campaigns, and more importantly 
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due to high toxicity of current drugs, makes the development of new 
drugs a priority in the effort to eliminate HAT.  
So far, I only discussed the shortcomings of the diagnostic and 
therapeutic tools from a medical and an economic perspective. In the 
following section I wish to shirt my focus to social factors, particularly 
patient’s perspectives, that render current tools deficient to use. In 
chapter 3 I considered health-seeking behaviour of patients living in 
disease-endemic regions, toxicity, the cost of HAT treatment and 
intrusive diagnostic tools as factors that negatively influence patient 
participation in the screening campaigns. In the following section I aim 
to discuss social taboos and barriers to patient participation, 
underlining how contextual values are taken into consideration in 
determining the properties of the new drugs. I aim to show how the 
social and economic values in particular play a part in shaping the 
Target Product Profile, therefore playing an important role in scientific 
practices. 
6.1.2 Social Taboos and Barriers 
Understanding the patients’ perspective and the patients’ perception of 
the screening campaigns is necessary to encourage effective 
participation of communities living in the disease endemic regions. In 
this section I focus on social taboos and barriers to community 
participation in HAT control. Robays et al. (2007) and Mpanya et al. 
(2015) argue that social taboos and barriers negatively affect patient 
participation in active screening campaigns and following treatment. In 
section 6.1.1 (and in chapter 3) I argued that lack of participation is due 
to inadequate diagnostic tools and costly and toxic treatments, thus 
creating a need for the development of new diagnostic and therapeutic 
tools to eliminate HAT. Given lack of patient participation (and 
problems due to lack infrastructure and political will), the current control 
methods are not sufficient to eliminate HAT by 2030. In this section I 
focus on anthropological works, suggesting how the current tools used 
by the mobile screening teams to diagnose and treat HAT patients 
generate social barriers, preventing patient participation directly or 
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indirectly in the form of social taboos linked to the disease and how it is 
treated. My broader argument here is that the WHO’s aim to eliminate 
HAT by 2030 requires new tools, and therefore leads to the 
prioritization of some sets of practices over others. Moreover, I argue 
that, in order to have a better understanding of scientific practices and 
their aims it is necessary to look at the social context in which these 
aims are constructed. The social barriers and taboos described 
contributed to how the WHO and other scientists understand and 
address HAT.  
Mpanya et al. (2015) identify ‘taboos’ as a mixture of local beliefs and 
medical advice, referring to a set of rules to follow during HAT 
treatment.  In other words, taboos are amixture of medical 
recommendations and local customs. The taboos identified by Mpanya 
et al. are specific to two provinces of DRC; however, similar issues are 
observed in related social contexts (Kovacic et al. 2016, Simarro et al. 
1999). Some of the taboos identified by Mpanya et al. have a long and 
complex history:  
most were originally intended to reduce the incidence of adverse 
drug effects caused by melarsoprol, without any firm evidence 
base. The prohibitions originating from the health care providers 
were amplified at community level and merged with traditional 
nosological interpretations of a symbolic nature. (Mpanya et al. 
2015: 9-10) 
It is important to note that community perceptions and taboos vary 
geographically due to cultural heterogeneity in the disease-endemic 
regions and the epidemiological history (see Chappuis et al. 2004, 
Kovacic et al. 2016) These taboos and restrictions to lifestyle deter 
people from participating in the screening campaigns. Mpanya et al. 
describe a list of taboos identified in the two regions of DRC, which 
include avoiding sun during the treatment period, avoiding spicy food, 
abstaining from sexual intercourse and an additional rest six-month 
rest period after treatment ends. These taboos have considerable 
social effects, abstinence from sex being the most reported problem 
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with serious consequences for families. Moreover, the six-month rest 
period has severe economic consequences for the individual and the 
family as the resting patient (who may be the main breadwinner) is 
reliant on their family for resources and care.  
A similar study conducted in Western Uganda by Kovacic et al. (2016) 
questions how memories of HAT control and treatment measures are 
preserved in communities in disease-endemic areas. Kovacic et al.’s 
objective was to understand how memories of past experiences and 
potential trauma influence current generations’ participation in the 
current control measures. They state their aims as follows: 
By examining elders’ memories in this study we aimed to 
explore what memories have been preserved in relation to 
colonial HAT control measures and more recent interventions 
implemented by MSF. (Kovacic et al. 2016: 3) 
Kovacic et al. argue that the memories of elders are well-preserved in 
these communities, and inform current attitudes towards screening 
campaigns and treatment. They argue that: 
The study is especially relevant in the context of new diagnostic 
tools and treatment of HAT, which are expected to be 
introduced in the next couple of years. Understanding of the 
community experiences of previous programs may greatly 
impact on how these new tools are accepted and utilized. 
(Kovacic et al. 2016: 3) 
Kovacic et al. argue that elders recall diagnostic procedures, treatment 
duration and side effects from the early 1990s. Kovacic et al. argue 
that preservation of these memories has a negative effect on 
participation, particularly in communities that currently live in the low-
risk areas. Kovacic et al. also report that recent advancements in 
treatment, like the use of NECT, received a very positive response. 
Kovacic et al.’s work highlight the importance of taking participants’ 
perceptions of treatment into consideration when developing new 
treatments and measures. In other words it is necessary to consider 
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the broader context of a given disease while determining the aims of 
scientific practices. Kovacic et al. summarise this as follows: 
The beneficiary community should be the first stakeholder to be 
informed about the changes occurring in global HAT control 
strategies, hence transparent communication and frequent 
dialogue is necessary not only for keeping all the information 
updated, but also to prevent future negative experience with 
disease control programs. As shown in our study, negative 
experiences will remain a part of the collective memory for a 
long time. (Kovacic et a. 2016: 14) 
In order to assure the success of the active control campaigns it is 
necessary to address the barriers to patient participation. Robays et al. 
Mpanya et al. and Kovacic et al. all argue that patients experience with 
the diagnostic and therapeutic tools can have negative consequences 
in community participation for a long time. Moreover, the social and 
economic strains on communities as a result of resting period (and 
period in which sexual activity is forbidden) required during and after 
the treatment negatively effect the rate of community participation in 
the control programmes. In order to achieve the elimination aim set by 
WHO (see section 6.1.1) it is necessary to make sure the factors 
leading to the barriers to the community participation in control 
programmes are eliminated by developing new tools such as drugs 
with tolerable toxicity and shorter treatment periods. Studies such as 
Robays et al. Mpanya et al. and Kovacic et al. allow highlight the 
patients’ needs from new drugs developed to be used in the control 
programmes in  order to eliminate HAT. 
In the following section I will argue that patients’ needs should be 
translated into Target Product Profile (TPPs) by DNDi in order to 
develop drugs that will help eliminate HAT by 2030. In the following 
section I wish to revisit TPPs, to show that the social taboos and 
barriers identified in the disease-endemic region are taken into 
consideration in determining the TPP. The purpose is to show how the 
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broad socioeconomic and political context (including idiosyncratic 
community responses) are formulated into scientific guidelines. 
6.1.3 Target Product Profile 
The TPP is a tool which considers the broader socio-economic and 
political context of a disease and what is already known biologically 
and medically about the disease in order to specify the properties of 
the desired drug. In this section I will focus on the role of TPP’s linking 
the broader context of HAT (discussed above in 6.1.1 and 6.1.2) and 
the scientific practices aiming to develop anti-parasitic drugs. 
As stated above the anti-parasitic discover and development projects 
for HAT are facilitated by DNDi (see section 2.2.4). DNDi claim to have 
patients’ needs as a fundamental part of their daily practice and overall 
organisation. That is, research and development process is guided by 
TPP, developed by experts from disease-endemic countries, 
researchers, clinicians, disease control programme managers, and 
patient representatives (DNDi, 2014). An example of a generic patient-
orientated TPP is given in table 2: answers to the questions listed 
constitute the TPP. 
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Table 2. adapted from DNDi (2014). TPPs are updated in the light 
of new evidence and findings to keep up-to-date with the needs of 
patients. 
  
- Indications: Which disease(s)?  
- Population: Which type of patients and where?  
- Clinical Efficacy: Does it treat the infection effectively?  
- Safety and Tolerability: What is the level of acceptability for 
adverse events?  
- Stability: How long is the shelf-life of the drug(s) and what are 
the storage conditions?  
- Route of Administration: What is an acceptable way to 
administer the treatment?  
- Dosing Frequency and Treatment Duration: How often and how 
long must it be given?  
- Cost: Will it be affordable to the target population or health 
system?  
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In order to assess whether patients’ needs are addressed by the 
scientific inquiry it is necessary to look at the role of TPP in scientific 
practices. The role of TPP can be best understood as a tool for guiding 
and informing scientific practices. Wyatt et al. (2011) assert that TPPs 
are used for linking the chemical properties to the patients’ needs, 
describing a TPP as a strategic planning tool. For example, the clinical 
efficacy, stability and route of administration of a drug is linked to the 
atomic composition and the size of the molecule; therefore smaller 
molecules with chemical composition that allows them to be absorbed 
into the blood stream through ingestion, pass the blood brain barrier 
and have a stable formulation (as a pill or suspension that can be 
administered orally without specialised equipment) are selected as 
drug candidates when possible.38 TPP’s define the desired efficacy, 
route of administration, provisions available to store drugs and so forth, 
thus  prescribing which chemical entities that can be developed into 
drug candidates (that have the desired properties listed in the TPP). 
Wyatt et al. use the following TPP for HAT in table 3. Wyatt et al. 
assert that TPP’s are used to assess project feasibility, monitor 
progress and guide drug discovery and development. Moreover, TPP’s 
are used as a communication tool between different actors, among 
scientist themselves and among scientists and medical professionals, 
policy makers etc. TPP can be considered as the set of values that 
guide the anti-parasitic drug discovery and development process, 
serving as a decision-making tool in the drug discovery pipeline 
(discussed in section 2.2.2.1) (This includes selecting drug targets 
[section 4.2], and informing the drug optimisation processes, designing 
in vitro studies in animals and clinical trials [both cases discussed 
sections 2.2.2 and 3.3.1]).   
                                               
38 See Lipinski et al. (2001) for more details how the pharmacological 
properties of a  
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Table 3. adapted from Wyatt et.al. (2011) listing TPP used for HAT 
  
- Active against T.b. gambiense and T.b. rhodesiense 
- Active against Melarsoprol refractory strains 
- Efficacy against early and late-stage disease desirable 
- Formulation (oral against early stage desirable; parenteral against 
late stage acceptable) 
- Curative in 14 days (late stage) or less (early stage) 
- Cost less than current treatment for early stage disease ($100- 
140) 
- Safe in pregnancy 
- Stable under tropical conditions  
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In short, TPPs describe a drug with the right attributes that matches 
patients’ needs. It is a set of values that allow scientists to make 
decisions in the drug discovery process.39 Wyatt et al. state that:  
Clearly defining a TPP and using it to define criteria for 
progression from one phase of the drug discovery process to 
another helps to deliver benefits from better decision making, 
faster development times and higher approval success rates to 
bring a drug to market. Most importantly this approach helps to 
define targets and compound series which will never achieve 
the TPP and therefore never benefit patients, facilitating the 
rapid closure of such projects and allowing the realignment of 
valuable resource into potentially more productive areas. (Wyatt 
et al. 2011: 1276) 
The importance of TPPs becomes even clearer when we consider the 
broader context of NTD research. As described in section 2.2.2, HAT 
has received limited interest from profit-driven pharmaceutical 
research, and current resources put into public-private partnerships are 
limited and lack longevity. Approximately 0.1% of global research 
budgets are spent on NTD drug research (Wyatt et al. 2011: 1275). 
The failure rate of drug discovery and projects is significant: 1 in 50 
projects successfully yield an approved drug that can be used in 
humans. The reasons for such a high rate of failure are many, but one 
reason is due to selecting poorly-validated targets and sets of 
compounds (HITS) that interact with the target. Using TPP from the 
beginning of the process, scientists determine specific criteria to 
examine the prospect of success at different stages of the drug 
discovery and development processes to deliver the desired product. 
Wyatt et al. focus on six criteria they use to link the chemical properties 
                                               
39 The benefits of TPP described by Wyatt et al. is a heuristic tool used with 
the hope to lower the attrition rates in the drug discovery pipeline while 
delivering a drug that matches patients’ needs. Whether the use of TPP’s 
lower the attrition rate requires further assessment. 
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of a potential drug target to a TPP: (1) large validation; (2) druggability; 
(3) assay feasibility; (4) toxicity; (5) resistance potential; and (6) 
structural information. Scientists, as described by Wyatt et al., use 
these six criteria to identify strengths and weaknesses of different 
targets and assess the performance of project at different stages. A 
TPP is a heuristic tool for decision-making, aimed at keeping attrition 
rates low while making sure that the patients’ needs are met. 
Moreover, a TPP is a communication tool between different actors 
involved in the process: scientists involved in drug discovery and 
development, healthcare providers, policy-makers etc. Wyatt et al. 
emphasise the importance of TPPs as follows: 
in this still under resourced area of drug discovery, there needs 
to great clarity around the aims and goals of the mission and 
clear decision making associated with each project. To this end 
Therapeutic Product Profiles are coming to the fore, allowing the 
unmet medical need and the properties required of the clinical 
drug and its usage to be clearly defined. Using this information, 
the criteria for transition from each stage of the drug discovery 
process can be clearly defined, even back to making 
assessments on whether a target could eventually deliver 
candidates which could satisfy the TPP. (Wyatt et al. 2011: 
1282) 
In previous chapters I argued that in order to understand the aims of a 
particular field in scientific practice, it is necessary to understand the 
context of inquiry. Looking at the broader context of HAT, it is clear that 
the scientific practices involved in this field are informed and guided by 
patients’ needs. As argued above (section 4.2), a TPP promotes the 
plurality of approaches employed to study a given phenomenon within 
set boundaries. To understand these boundaries it is necessary to look 
at the broader context. Eliminating HAT by 2030 requires development 
of new therapeutic and diagnostic tools, which are in turn required to 
meet the specifications listed in TPP in order to meet patients’ needs.  
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At this point it is necessary to refer back to Chang’s active normative 
epistemic pluralism and Chang’s statement that the normative 
argument for pluralism must start with identifying aims and values in 
science. Chang continues to say that, given the aims of science, 
pluralism is always beneficial. Herein, I argued that any assessment of 
whether pluralities are beneficial must understand aims and values in 
their broader context. While the aim of eliminating HAT promotes 
plurality of approaches in anti-parasitic drug discovery, it also leads to 
the exclusion of some other approaches (environmental, 
epidemiological etc.). In summary, the boundaries of the plurality of 
approaches employed to eliminate HAT are determined by its context. 
In the next section I shift my focus to values in science literature. So 
far, I have argued that aims and values promote or limit plurality in 
scientific practices. In the following part I link my argument with the 
broader discussion of values in science by providing a critical appraisal 
of this literature, arguing there it is a need to go beyond the argument 
against the notion that the science is value-free to argue that values 
are essential in scientific practice. 
6.2 Values 
Section 2.1.1 presented Hacking’s analysis of the traditional view in 
philosophy of science, in which there is a sharp distinction between 
context of justification and context of discovery. The context of 
discovery is thought to include intuitive and irrational processes that 
help in the generation of new theories, methods etc. The context of 
justification, on the other hand, includes the verification and testing of 
new theories using logical reasoning. According to this distinction, 
values have no role to play in rational processes, and are therefore 
irrelevant for philosophy of science given that philosophers of science 
are only concerned with rational processes. Another way of putting this 
is philosophy of science is concerned with the internal processes of 
science, which are purely rational, free from any external influences.  
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In section 2.2.1 I challenged the distinction between context of 
discovery and context of justification, arguing that values are relevant 
to internal scientific processes therefore philosophers of science must 
take values into consideration. For instance, Kuhn (1977) identifies a 
set of epistemic values (including accuracy, simplicity etc.) arguing that 
these values are used by scientists in accepting new theories. 
However, while Kuhn recognised that epistemic values were used in 
internal scientific processes (such as evaluating theories in light of 
evidence), epistemic values were meant to be particular. That is, only 
epistemic values were thought to be important for scientific practices, 
while non-epistemic values were thought irrelevant to the internal 
processes of science; moreover, non-epistemic values are thought to 
be eliminated from internal scientific processes.  
Here I will look at two accounts that challenge the idea that non-
epistemic values ought to be eliminated from internal processes of 
science. Both Longino and Douglas argue that non-epistemic values 
play important roles in what are considered the internal processes of 
science. In the previous section I argued that values from the socio-
economic and political context of HAT play an important part in 
scientific practices involved in its elimination. Longino (1990) argues 
that values in science are used to address the underdetermination 
problem i.e. how we can bridge different evidence and theories (or 
hypothesis). Douglas (2000 & 2009) points to a different use of values 
in science, in which they are used to assess the inductive risk related 
to scientific practice and its products. The values literature is rich and 
has a long history, but for the purposes for my argument I will focus on 
these two main themes with reference to other topics in the field when 
relevant.  
Both Longino and Douglas provide strong arguments for the relevance 
of non-epistemic values in science. After I describe the arguments put 
forward by Longino and Douglas I will move on to discuss Matt J. 
Brown’s (2013) criticism of the values debate. Brown argues that the 
values debate has focused on rejecting the value free ideal. Both 
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Longino and Douglas argue that values play an important but an 
indirect role in assessing and evaluating different forms of evidence. 
While this should not be taken as an argument for values having lesser 
role in scientific practices, these accounts do not provide a framework 
to understand how value judgements are employed in scientific 
practices at all stages. In particular, understanding the integral role 
values play in scientific practices: in defining aims of inquiry and 
defining the ways in which these aims can be best achieved with 
respect to broader context.  Brown (2013) argues that it is necessary to 
move beyond to build a pragmatic framework in which we can treat 
values as an integral part of scientific practices and discourse 
(including policy and wider discussions). This is important, given that 
my argument emphasises the role of context in shaping and guiding 
scientific practices. Brown proposes a pragmatic framework to study 
the role of values in scientific practices, using John Dewey’s logic of 
science to show how values interact with evidence and theories. 
Dewey’s logic of science provides a detailed inquiry that is situated in a 
particular context. Dewey also articulates the roles of values, facts and 
ideas in an inquiry.  According to Brown, Dewey’s account provides ‘a 
middle path between atomism and holism, and it replaces universalism 
with a form of contextualism’ (Brown 2012: 268).  
The pragmatic framework I present here supports my argument for the 
limits of pluralism. Here I wish to argue that pragmatic values play an 
important role in defining the aims of scientific practices; moreover, 
they help determine which accounts to employ. In the following section 
I will provide a detailed overview of arguments that both epistemic and 
non-epistemic values play an important role in scientific practices by 
Longino and Douglas. Using the two arguments put forward by Longino 
and Douglas, I will argue that the distinction between epistemic and 
non-epistemic values is futile; that epistemic values are not more 
important than other values; and that the terms ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-
epistemic’ are only analysts’ categories. That is to say, although I reject 
the epistemic and non-epistemic distinction posed by the value free 
ideal, I do not argue that we cannot differentiate between distinct types 
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of values in scientific inquiry and the different roles they play. Here I 
argue that a broad range of values (epistemic, pragmatic, ethical, 
aesthetic etc.) play part in science. I will later argue that all values that 
play part in scientific inquiry must be understood in a pragmatic 
framework; a framework I develop using Brown (2012 & 2013) 
6.2.1 Two arguments for non-epistemic values 
Underdetermination 
Longino’s contextual empiricism holds that empirical data gathered 
through observation and experimentation forms the ground from which 
to assess scientific theories. Moreover, Longino states that given that 
data underdetermines theory, the bridge between data and theory can 
never be merely formal. Thus, Longino argues that the evidential 
relevance of data to theories, models and hypotheses relies on values 
and background assumptions.  
Based on their role in forming these evidential bridges between data 
and theory, values cannot be eliminated from science. Part of 
Longino’s project is to look at how values and assumptions are used in 
science and what controls and prevents background assumptions from 
rendering scientific theories entirely subjective. Longino (1990, 1996) 
argues that what prevents theories from being entirely subjective is 
critical interaction among scientists. Longino coins the term 
intersubjective interaction, describing critical assessment of evidence, 
theories, values and assumptions at community level in recognised 
fora. For this to happen, there must be public standards. Longino 
describes this process: 
There must be publicly recognized standards by reference to 
which theories, hypotheses and observational practices are 
evaluated and by appeal to which criticism is made relevant to 
the goals of the inquiring community. Such standards serve as 
ideals regulating normative discourse in a community. That is, 
by explicitly or implicitly professing adherence to those 
standards individuals and communities adopt criteria of 
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adequacy by which their cognitive activity may be evaluated. 
The satisfaction of goals of inquiry is not ascertained privately, 
but by evaluation with respect to shared values and standards. 
This evaluation may be performed by anyone, not just by 
members of the community sharing all standards. Furthermore, 
standards are not a static set, but may themselves be criticized 
and transformed, in reference to other standards, goals, or 
values, held temporarily constant. Indeed, the presupposition of 
reliance on such standards is that they have survived similar 
critical scrutiny. (Longino 1996: 40) 
Longino argues that when theories, evidence, values assumptions etc. 
are subject to community scrutiny, it is difficult for idiosyncratic, 
subjective preferences of individuals to be incorporated into scientific 
practices and knowledge. The process described by Longino where 
idiosyncratic assumptions are scrutinised by a scientific community, is 
a process in which an overarching set of values are constructed in 
scientific inquiry. On a more normative point, Longino argues that 
intersubjective interaction is necessary for scientific cognition given 
that it eliminates idiosyncratic assumptions and makes it difficult for 
sets of values and assumptions to dominate a field because they are 
commonly held.  
The important point Longino makes in her work is to point out that 
cognitive practices have social dimensions. In other words, the 
evidential link between theory and data requires further extra-
theoretical interpretation that is subject to intersubjective discussion. 
This interaction among scientists is regulated by public standards. For 
Longino, public standards include cognitive and pragmatic values, as 
well as substantive assumptions grounded in metaphysical or social 
and political commitments. Longino’s argument is in line with the 
argument I present in this thesis; where I argue that the scientific 
practices are directly influenced by the broader socio-economic and 
political context of inquiry. Intersubjective interaction can be seen as 
the process in which overarching values are constructed and 
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scrutinised. This is similar to process in which TPP’s are constructed 
(using values from the broader context of HAT in order to determine 
the desired features of the potential product) and modified in light of 
further evidence or changes in the relevant circumstances in the 
broader context.  
While Longino distinguishes cognitive values as a category separate 
from the rest, she argues that non-cognitive values can serve as 
cognitive values too. This might sound contradictory; however Longino 
(1996) is responding to a literature in which cognitive values are 
thought be a definitive category only containing privileged values that is 
shared across the board by scientists. The point Longino is making 
against this form of thinking is that we might recognise a group of 
values that are used by scientists to regulate the discursive and 
material interactions in the scientific community, but these values differ 
in time and context and are not esoteric to science.  
While cognitive values can be interpreted in different ways, Longino 
focuses on the debate in which cognitive values are put forward as a 
solution to underdetermination. For instance, Kuhn identifies five 
values that scientists use to guide their judgement while choosing 
between alternative theories: accuracy, simplicity, consistency (internal 
and external), scope and fruitfulness. Kuhn presented these values as 
an objective ground for justification while choosing between competing 
theories. While there are many other renditions and interpretations of 
these values, Longino focuses on Kuhn for brevity. I will follow suit as 
my main aim here is to illustrate Longino’s argument against the 
dichotomy between cognitive and non-cognitive values in science. 
Longino (1996) contrasts Kuhn’s cognitive values (I will use cognitive 
and epistemic values to mean the same thing) with sets of feminist 
values. Longino defines feminist values as empirical adequacy, 
novelty, ontological heterogeneity, mutuality of interaction, applicability 
to current human needs and diffusion of power. The cognitive values in 
the traditional sense are taken to serve the aims of science, which can 
be thought of in the abstract as the construction of rational beliefs 
  192 
about nature. Longino, on the other hand, argues that the feminist set 
of values serve the cognitive aims of feminist inquiry. Moreover, 
Longino argues that the feminist cognitive aims are scientific as well as 
their broader political and social aims. As soon as we realise the aims 
of scientific practices in their broader context, the dichotomy between 
cognitive and non-cognitive values become questionable. Longino 
states that by identifying the values of a particular scientific community, 
it is possible to highlight the features of the values traditionally thought 
to be cognitive. While the socio-political aspect of feminist values are 
immediately obvious to many, the same cannot be said about the 
cognitive values described by Kuhn for example. While feminist values 
have clear social and political role, they also have cognitive roles 
influencing scientific practices and judgement. Kuhn’s epistemic value 
son the other hand, have clear cognitive roles but their social or 
political role are not as clear. This ambiguity arises from the lack of 
attention to the aims of science in a broader context. That is to say it is 
difficult to give a precise answer as to what aims the cognitive values 
identified by Kuhn serve. The best answer we can give is either a 
contraction of rational belief or some abstract realist argument about 
the truth of theories. However, once we move beyond to discuss 
scientific practices in context, we see that cognitive values are not 
divorced from the broader social and political context. Moreover, 
values that are not thought to be relevant to science become highly 
important for scientists in their decision-making about models, theories, 
hypotheses etc. 
To sum up Longino’s position, her contextual empiricism states that the 
main ground on which to assess a theory is using empirically-attained 
data. However, in order to make the evidential links between the theory 
and data, scientists use sets of values. The traditional group of values, 
termed cognitive (or epistemic) values, were identified as a privileged 
set that guided the decision-making process in science. Longino 
argues that the traditional cognitive values are not purely cognitive set 
of values shared by all scientist’s independent of the broader context of 
the scientific inquiry (Longino 1996: 54). Moreover, looking at the 
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values of particular scientific communities, we see that there are 
different sets of values used based on the specific aims of that 
community (Longino 1996: 55). Longino furthers the 
underdetermination argument to show that values have a place in 
science, taking the argument further to show that both cognitive and 
non-cognitive values play an important role in scientific inquiry.   
Inductive Risk 
The second argument underlining the importance of the values in 
scientific inquiry can be traced back to the concept of inductive risk, 
first introduced by Carl Hempel in order to explain the extent to which 
values can be part of scientific reasoning (Hempel 1965). According to 
Hempel, inductive risk is the chance that a scientific hypothesis can be 
wrongly accepted or rejected. Hempel states that, given that evidence 
cannot establish a hypothesis with certainty, scientists must have rules 
for accepting and rejecting hypotheses, and in determining these rules 
scientists must decide how different outcomes are valued. Hempel 
asserts that values played no logical role in scientific reasoning, but 
scientists make use of these rules in accepting and rejecting 
hypotheses. Inductive risk argument shows that values have a role in 
science, guiding scientists in accepting and rejecting hypotheses. Like 
the underdetermination problem, the inductive risk argument is based 
on the notion that scientists can never have certainty in accepting or 
rejecting hypotheses, theories, models etc. 
Heather Douglas uses the concept of inductive risk to argue for the 
importance of values in scientific reasoning. However, it is important to 
note that Douglas’s position in this debate is different in the sense that 
she argues for dismantling the value-free normative standard for 
science. Unlike Hempel, Douglas argues that values are necessary for 
rational processes in scientific reasoning (Douglas 2000: 578). 
Following, Douglas aims to understand how and why scientific disputes 
occur by focusing on the role of values in scientific decision-making 
processes (Douglas 2000: 564). Douglas’s position is different to 
Hempel in the sense that Hempel does not consider the practical 
  194 
outcomes of research, but only the epistemic aims of research, which 
he takes to be ‘the attainment of an increasingly reliable, extensive, 
and theoretically systematised body of knowledge’ (1965: 93). Douglas 
does not restrict her argument to epistemic aims but looks at scientific 
practices in their broader context. Douglas argues that it is necessary 
to look at the practical aims and non-epistemic values while 
considering inductive risk, given that the consequences of decision 
taken by scientist have non-epistemic consequences: 
Where science is ‘useful’ it will have effects beyond the 
development of a body of knowledge. In many contexts, if a 
scientist affirms something as true, or accepts a certain theory, 
that statement is taken as authoritative and will have effects, 
potentially damaging ones, if the scientist is wrong. (Douglas 
2000: 563) 
Similar to Longino, Douglas’s argument supports the overarching 
argument I present in this thesis where values from the broader context 
of scientific inquiry has a direct influence in shaping scientific practices. 
Douglas argues that judgment involved at different stages of scientific 
practices entails consideration of both evidence and values together. 
Before moving on to discuss how these two are used by scientists, it is 
necessary to clarify how Douglas defines values (statements of norms, 
goals and desires) and evidence (descriptive statements about the 
world). 40  While empirical evidence describes things in the world, 
Douglas argues that value judgements are required to determine the 
accuracy of descriptive statements and assess whether errors can 
arise from accepting these statements. Values do not directly influence 
the argument on which theory is ‘true’41, but they are used in assessing 
                                               
40 However, Douglas adds that descriptive statements are also value-laden in 
their origins (since they are produced by a value laden process). 
41 Here I am using Douglas’s term: I am not making a realist claim on what 
makes theories true.  
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the consequences of accepting or rejecting a theory as true. On this 
Douglas states the following:   
because error is always a possibility, we are required to 
consider the consequences of error alongside the arguments 
concerning evidence. And the consideration of the 
consequences of error require the consideration of values, both 
epistemic and non-epistemic. The role for values is there, even 
if it is not direct. (Douglas 2000: 564) 
Douglas also argues that values are involved at different stages of 
scientific practices when inductive risk is relevant. While Hempel 
focuses on inductive risk at the point of accepting and rejecting 
theories, Douglas argues that there are multiple stages in the course of 
scientific practices at which inductive risk is relevant. That is to say, 
Douglas argues that we must go beyond looking at theory choice and 
look at all instances where scientists must make a choice. For 
instance, Douglas identifies three stages, including choice of 
methodology, gathering and characterisation of data, and interpretation 
of data where inductive risk is relevant. In virtue of this, Douglas’s 
analysis of inductive risk moves beyond theories, but looks at decision-
making processes in scientific practices more broadly. Moreover, 
Douglas stresses that whenever inductive risk has non-epistemic 
consequences, scientists must consider non-epistemic values in their 
decision-making: 
The scientist will need to consider both the quantity of evidence 
or degree of confirmation to estimate the magnitude of inductive 
risk and the valuation of the consequences that would result 
from error to estimate the seriousness or desirability of the 
consequences. The weighing of these consequences, in 
combination with the perceived magnitude of the inductive risk 
(i.e., how likely one is to be wrong), determines which choice is 
more acceptable. Where non-epistemic consequences follow 
from error, non-epistemic values are essential for deciding 
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which inductive risks we should accept, or which choice we 
should make. (Douglas 2000: 565)  
To illustrate the importance of non-epistemic practices in scientific 
practice, Douglas uses the example of methodological choice 
regarding an appropriate level of statistical significance. Douglas 
argues that the deliberate choice of statistical significance requires 
deliberate choice of which risks to tolerate. Her example is the 
statistical significance levels in toxicology studies, demonstrating the 
role of values.  
Determining the level of statistical significance is a balancing act 
between two types of errors: false positives and false negatives. 
Douglas articulates this as follows:  
False positives occur when one accepts an experimental 
hypothesis as true and it is not. False negatives occur when one 
rejects an experimental hypothesis as false and it is not. 
Changing the level of statistical significance changes the 
balance between false positives and false negatives. If one 
wishes to avoid more false negatives and one is willing to 
accept more false positives, one should lower the standard for 
statistical significance. If one wishes, on the other hand, to avoid 
false positives more, one should raise the standard for statistical 
significance. For any given experimental test, one cannot lower 
both types of error; one can only make trade-offs from one to 
the other. (Douglas 2000: 566) 
Determining a suitable level of statistical significance determines 
whether we tolerate more false positives or false negatives. In 
toxicology studies, for instance questioning the carcinogenic effects of 
dioxin exposure, an excess of false positives will lead to the conclusion 
that dioxins are more toxic than they actually are, while an excess of 
false negatives will lead to the conclusion that dioxins are safer than 
they are. Douglas argues that an excess of false positives will lead to 
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over-regulation of chemicals; false negatives will lead to under-
regulation; and both outcomes have non-epistemic consequences: 
Overregulation presents excess costs to the industries that 
would bear the costs of regulations. Underregulation presents 
costs to public health and to other areas affected by damage to 
public health. Depending on how one values these effects, an 
evaluation that requires the consultation of non-epistemic 
values, different balances between false positives and false 
negatives will be preferable. (Douglas 2000: 567) 
Douglas has an extensive and sophisticated account demonstrating 
how both epistemic and non-epistemic values are used by scientists. 
Here, I used a small part of her account to illustrate how Douglas 
(similar to Longino) responds to values literature arguing for the 
importance of both epistemic and non-epistemic values in scientific 
practices. In summary, Douglas argues that values are necessary for 
scientists to assess the inductive risks linked to their decisions about 
methodology, data collection and interpretation. Douglas points out that 
these decisions have both epistemic and non-epistemic consequences, 
and therefore the scientist much consider both epistemic and non-
epistemic values.  
Both underdetermination and inductive risk arguments are strong, 
showing the importance of values in scientific practices, particularly in 
how scientists reason. Both arguments also question the dichotomy 
between epistemic and non-epistemic values: each show that sets of 
values used by scientists (or scientific communities) differ depending 
on their aims and the context in which their inquiry takes place.  
6.2.2 Lexical Priority of Evidence 
At the core of the values debate is the normative question on the role 
values ought to play in scientific practice. So far I have focused on two 
arguments that reject the value-free ideal and demonstrate how 
scientific communities use a range of values to assess scientific 
theories, evidence and the risks involved in decisions made by 
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scientists in accepting or rejecting hypotheses. The third argument I 
want to present here is that of Brown (2013), who argues that both 
Longino and Douglas share a flawed premise, wherein both arguments 
prioritise evidence over values. Brown argues that both Longino and 
Douglas build strong arguments against the value-free ideal of science; 
however both accounts maintain a lexical priority of evidence over 
values to an extent, where values play an indirect role in scientific 
practices. Brown argues that empirical evidence is given higher 
epistemic status in both traditional values literature and their critiques; 
and that values have a more integral role as opposed to being auxiliary 
to evidence. Brown goes on to show how this flawed premise does not 
do justice to the important role played by values in science. Brown’s 
argument promotes a new kind of thinking about the role of values, 
demonstrating their importance for scientific practices and supporting 
the argument I presented in section 6.1.1, where I argued that the 
socio-economic and political context of HAT plays an important role in 
determining the aims of scientific practices and which approaches are 
employed to achieve these aims. This goes a step beyond the 
traditional debate on the role of values in science, by shifting the focus 
to value judgements.   
The under-determination argument holds that values are relevant in the 
gap between evidence and theory. Brown states that if we follow the 
gap argument, we must accept that in cases where the gap is narrow, 
the role for values is reduced. In the inductive risk argument, values 
indirectly dictate the decision by determining the level of acceptable 
uncertainty. In both cases values are auxiliary, occupying the space left 
over once the evidence is settled. Brown articulates this as follows: 
The reason that values must play a role is that uncertainty 
remains once the evidence is in. In a relatively weak version of 
this argument, social values fill in the space between evidence 
and theory because something has to, so it might as well be 
(and often is) social values […] The arguments of these two 
general forms all assume the lexical priority of evidence over 
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values. The premise of lexical priority guarantees that even in 
value-laden science, values do not compete with evidence when 
the two conflict. […]This is often defended as an important 
guarantor of the objectivity or reliability of the science in 
question. (Brown 2013: 834) 
The hierarchy between values and evidence is thus seen as a leftover 
from the value-free ideal in which where the lexical priority is a 
rhetorical device. This hierarchy can be seen clearly in Douglas’s work 
when she argues that values only influence decision-making indirectly 
once the evidence is determined. Brown argues that these arguments 
are good for undermining the value-free ideal and establish that values 
play a major role in scientific practices. However, Brown argues that 
these are unfit grounds for further development of understanding the 
role of values in science. 
Brown identifies two main problems with the lexical priority of evidence. 
First, giving lexical priority to evidence over values requires taking an 
uncritical stance towards evidence: ‘in testing we ask, given the 
evidence, what should we make of our hypothesis? Framed this way, 
values only play a role at the margins.” (Brown 2013: 836, emphasis 
mine). That is to say, once evidence is in place, values play a role in 
determining what to make of that evidence. Brown argues that an 
uncritical view of evidence is not favourable, given that evidence can 
be unreliable, laden with unfit background assumptions that may be 
irrelevant in a given context.42 In addition, Brown argues that lexical 
priority reduces the role of value judgment to an expression of 
preference, as opposed to a nuanced judgement. Brown argues that 
value judgement must not be thought as mere expression of 
preference, stating:  
                                               
42 The history and philosophy of science and social studies of science 
provided us with many examples calling for the critical scrutiny of evidence, 
such as eugenics and its racist assumptions, or the design of clinical trials to 
favour different interest groups.  
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It is crucial to distinguish between preferences or valuing and 
value judgments or evaluations […] Valuing may be the 
expression of a preference, but value judgments are reflective 
decisions about what to value and are better and worse on the 
basis of reasons. Value judgments may even be open to 
empirical test because they hypothesize relationships between a 
state or course of action to prefer and pursue and the 
desirability or value of the consequences of pursuing and 
attaining them. (Brown 2013: 836) 
Brown further argues that if we consider value judgements to be 
adopted for good reason and subject to scrutiny, it is unreasonable to 
think of them as ‘having lower epistemic status’ in comparison to 
evidence. Thus, Brown argues that the lexical priority is an 
unreasonable presumption, and that philosophers of science should 
emphasise the joint necessity of evidence and values. The arguments 
presented by Longino and Douglas (as discussed above) focus on 
showing that values are necessary in scientific practices but do not 
allow us to further analyse the value judgements that take place in 
scientific inquiry. Brown argues that value judgements have a 
pragmatic function, stating that this allows us to recognise the different 
roles played by evidence, theory and values in inquiry. The pragmatic 
aspect of Brown’s account is described as follows, in which Brown links 
functionality to the resolution of a problem: 
According to such an account [pragmatic], not only must 
evidence, theory, and values fit together in their functional roles, 
but they must do so in a way that actually resolves the problem 
that spurred the inquiry. (Brown 2013: 837) 
Brown further argues that the relationship between evidence, theory 
and values is defined by the problem or question that led to the inquiry. 
That is to say, the aims of the inquiry define how evidence and values 
relate to one another. Brown’s conclusion can be better understood by 
looking at his earlier paper (Brown 2012), where he focuses on John 
Dewey’s theory of inquiry. Brown states that Dewey’s work is 
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particularly relevant to the contemporary debate in philosophy of 
scientific practice, given the shared interest in the processes that make 
up scientific inquiry and the social aspect of science (discussed in what 
follows).  
The argument against the lexical priority of evidence is significant for 
the pluralist argument I put forward in my thesis. So far, I have argued 
that the aims of scientific practices see the boundaries of the extent of 
plurality in approaches employed to achieve a given aim. Moreover, I 
argued that particular aims in science must be understood by taking 
the broader context into consideration, and understanding how values 
guide the scientific practices. For instance, in section 6.1 I argued that 
the anti-parasitic drug discovery research is prioritised to develop new 
therapies to eliminate HAT by 2030. I argued that the socio-economic 
and political context of the disease determine the Target Product 
Profile, and thus that values play an important role in determining the 
boundaries of inquiry, providing ways to assess the performance and 
the outcome of inquiry, as well as determining questions that scientist 
pursue within a system of practice. The important role values play in all 
parts of the inquiry must be analysed in a pragmatic framework. 
Following from Longino and Douglas, I argued that the traditional 
distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values does not hold, 
where I demonstrated that broad range of values play various roles 
scientific practices. Moreover, I argued against the rhetoric where 
evidence has a lexical priority over values, where values are given only 
an external role determining the aim of inquiry, or only having an 
indirect role in the internal processes of science.  That is to say the 
values in science debate must be reframed in order to understand the 
role of values in scientific practices at different stages of inquiry and 
the value judgements that take place in scientific inquiry. In the 
following section I focus on Brown’s account of Dewey’s logic of 
science to develop a pragmatic framework with which to understand 
the pluralities in scientific practices and, more importantly, the limits of 
pluralities in a given field of science.  
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6.3 A pragmatic framework for values 
Brown provides a detailed account of Dewey’s logic of science, which 
is mainly concerned with the epistemic and methodological issues in 
science. Brown presents Dewey’s logic of science as the study of 
inquiry, in which an inquiry is defined as a process of a perplexity or 
problematic situation being resolved through a series of organised and 
intentional processes. Dewey’s notion of inquiry is a complex and a 
dynamic process that is interlinked with its wider context. Brown 
underlines the key points in Dewey’s logic that are directly relevant to 
the contemporary debate on pluralism and values in science. Using 
Brown’s work on Dewey, I will further articulate my notion of pragmatic 
values in order to demonstrate how the pragmatic framework is useful 
for understanding the role of values in scientific practice, particularly 
the way they determine the extent of plurality in any field of science.  
Dewey acknowledges the link between scientific inquiry and its context. 
A key aspect of Dewey’s logic is situationism, in which a situation is 
defined as the contextual whole that forms the background of 
experiences and judgement. Brown states that Dewey’s situationism 
avoids following, 
‘atomistic particularism’ and the ‘analytic fallacy’ on the one 
hand and ‘unlimited extension or universalization’ on the other, 
by way of ‘contextual situations’ that preserve that ‘connection 
and continuity’ present in the experienced world while providing 
‘limiting conditions’ for any generalization. (Brown 2012: 268) 
A situation can be simply understood as an interaction or relation 
between agents and their environments, where that environment 
contains both animate and inanimate objects as well as social and 
cultural objects. Therefore, situations are particular to agents and 
practices, defined by the specific interactions between the agents and 
a specific environment. What counts as relevant in an inquiry depends 
on this interaction. Brown states that ‘anything that is causally 
connected to a situation is potentially relevant thus potentially part of 
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the situation – there is no way to rule out anything out a priori’ (Brown 
2012: 273). This is best understood as the context of inquiry where the 
relevance of causal factors depends on the question in hand.  
For Dewey, inquiry consists of ‘complex pattern[s] with multiple phases’ 
centred around a problematic situation. Brown describes Deweyan 
inquiry as an attempt to overcome an indeterminate situation or a 
perplexity (Brown 2012: 274). In Dewey’s words: 
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an 
indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its 
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements 
of the original situation into a unified whole. (Brown 2012: 274). 
Inquiry begins with an implicit or poorly-expressed perplexity redefined 
as a problem statement that is the explicit formulation of the perplexity 
at hand. Dewey uses the following metaphor to illustrate this point: 
When an alarm of fire is sounded in a crowded assembly hall, 
there is much that is indeterminate as regards the activities that 
may produce a favorable issue. One may get out safely or one 
may be trampled and burned. The fire is characterized, 
however, by some settled traits. It is, for example, located 
somewhere. Then the aisles and exits are at fixed places. Since 
they are settled or determinate in existence, the first step in 
institution of a problem is to settle them in observation. There 
are other factors which, while they are not as temporally and 
spatially fixed, are yet observable constituents; for example, the 
behavior and movements of other members of the audience. All 
of these observed conditions taken together constitute “the facts 
of the case.” They constitute the terms of the problem, because 
they are conditions that must be reckoned with or taken account 
of in any relevant solution that is proposed. (Brown 2012: 284) 
Inquiry is embedded in a specific context where the initial problem 
(what to do when one hears the fire alarm) is formulated into an explicit 
situation (fire in a crowded assembly hall), which can be resolved 
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through either exiting in an orderly way using the designated routes or 
causing panic and chaos. Dewey’s metaphor allows us to flesh out the 
role of values and evidence (evidential data) or facts in scientific 
inquiry. There are many relevant factors in this case including facts, 
ideas and values. For Dewey, the main role of facts in an inquiry is to 
determine what the problem is. Brown defines the Deweyan notion of 
fact as follows: 
Facts capture the fixed conditions with which inquiry must cope. 
They provide the resources for locating and formulating the 
problem of inquiry. The facts also suggest certain hypotheses 
for solving the problem […] facts for Dewey are not always 
singular or particular matters. Nor are there “atomic” or “basic” 
facts that transcend particular inquiries. (Brown 2012: 288) 
In addition to facts, Dewey also identifies ideas, which refers to any 
conceptual-theoretical material that plays a part in an inquiry. The 
important distinction between facts and ideas is that facts capture the 
present state of affairs, whereas ideas indicate possibilities. Both facts 
and ideas are operational; however, they are not the only important 
factors in inquiry. For Dewey, inquiry is a socially-conditioned practice, 
in which broader interests and values shape the inquiry by defining the 
problems addressed and the standards of a solution. Scientific 
practices are governed by normative values determining how scientists 
ought to ‘pursue their inquiries, what they may count as evidence, and 
what they are entitled to believe in specific situations’ (Brown 2012: 
301). Going back to the fire alarm example, facts can be thought of as 
the number of people in the room and where the exits are; the ideas 
are different ways one can exit the building (run ahead; get in an 
orderly queue; run around in a chaotic way, smashing windows and 
screaming for help), then values allow us make judgements at every 
step. According to Dewey, values play part in each stages of inquiry; 
however, it is important to note that the values are subject to change 
depending on the situation. Brown describes the role of values as 
follows: 
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The selection of data is an active and evaluative enterprise. 
Inquirers must decide which instruments and techniques to use, 
which operations of observation to perform, which data to select 
as relevant, and which tolerances to set and errors to control. All 
inquiry requires experiments, which are at base practical 
operations of making and doing, which as a type of practical 
activity require values. […] In many parts of inquiry, explicit 
judgments of value, or evaluations, are required. And indeed, 
the inability to make good judgments about value would 
severely impair the ability to do science well. (Brown 2012: 301) 
I agree with Brown’s that Dewey’s characterisation of inquiry is useful 
in the sense that it provides for an alternative understanding of 
scientific practices in which values play an integral role, along with 
other relevant factors in a given context. Dewey’s situationism and 
concept of inquiry provides links between pragmatism literature and the 
contemporary pluralism debate I argue for in my thesis.  
Earlier in section 5.2 and 5.3, I argued that the limits of pluralism are 
defined by pragmatic values. In section 6.1 I argued that the pragmatic 
values are linked to the aims of a particular set of scientific practices in 
specific contexts. The role of these values is to allow scientists (and 
other parties such as policy experts and medical professionals) 
involved in scientific practices to make judgements as to how they can 
fulfil their aim. In other words, in order to understand this, we need to 
understand how agents determine which approaches to employ to 
achieve a certain aim. Using Dewey’s account in the case of HAT, the 
WHO and DNDi are the actors determining the course of inquiry using 
facts and ideas to identify the problem and formulate certain sets of 
values that direct scientific practices to address this problem. The 
colonial history and the current socio-economic and political context of 
HAT, combined with our biomedical and environmental understanding 
of this disease provides alternative ways in which HAT can be 
controlled and eliminated. In order to understand how WHO selected 
and supported a given approach to the control and elimination of HAT 
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it is necessary to look at different values. Here, I focused on epistemic 
and pragmatic values, but it is necessary to note that there are broader 
political and ethical values at play.   
As I argued in chapter two, both epistemic and non-epistemic values 
play an important role in scientific practices. The epistemic and non-
epistemic distinction in value free ideal is to argue that internal 
processes in science (such as theory choice) is free from non-
epistemic. Using Longino’s and Douglas’s argument, I argued that 
scientists used both epistemic and non-epistemic values in all stages 
of scientific inquiry; thus, rejecting both the epistemic/non-epistemic 
distinction and the value free ideal. However, distinguishing between 
different sets of values is useful as long as such distinctions do not rely 
on the value free ideal. Moving beyond the value free ideal, I propose a 
new distinction between values: pragmatic and epistemic. Epistemic 
values are those that see the ultimate aim of scientific practices as to 
generate knowledge regardless of their context, whereas pragmatic 
values are thought to be values that asses the products of scientific 
practices with regards to particular aims that are products of their 
broader context. This distinction is instrumental, posed to differentiate 
the pragmatic limitations on scientific practices from a priori monist 
assumptions. Using the distinction between pragmatic and epistemic 
values, I argued that although plurality is valuable to scientific practices 
regarding the epistemic values, pluralism cannot be encouraged 
without limits. These limits are posed by the pragmatic context of 
inquiry.   
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions 
Throughout this thesis, I aimed to provide a philosophical account of 
pluralities in scientific practices, arguing that the multiplicities of 
accounts and approaches in scientific practices are an important 
characteristic of scientific inquiry. I argued that scientific practices 
ought to be pluralistic in order to explain and explore different aspects 
of phenomena. Whilst I acknowledge the benefits of plurality, I also 
argue that the extent of plurality in scientific practices is limited by 
pragmatic aims and values. Pragmatic values ought to be understood 
in the broader context of inquiry, with respect to particular aims of 
scientific practices. Herein, I supported my argument using examples 
from the scientific practices involved in current efforts to combat 
Human African Trypanosomiasis (HAT), headed by the WHO. Here, I 
provide a quick overview of the argument I put forward here, before 
providing the concluding remarks to my thesis. 
My work was primarily framed by scholars from philosophy of science 
literature, particularly philosophers with the philosophy of science in 
practice approach. Following Ankeny et al. (2011) I argue that the 
subject matter of philosophy ought not to be limited to scientific 
theories and rational processes in which these theories are confirmed. 
Here, I take scientific practices and the accounts they produce as the 
main subject matter of philosophy of science. The shift from 
understanding scientific inquiry through rational reconstructions of 
scientific reasoning to focusing on actual scientific practices reveals the 
multiplicity in accounts and approaches used by scientists to study the 
natural world. Moreover, the shift in subject underlines the role of a 
broad range of values in scientific practices and the plurality of aims in 
scientific inquiry.  
Following the philosophy of science in practice perspective, I focused 
on the scientific practices involved in the current efforts to combat HAT 
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as my main case study for investigating pluralities in scientific inquiry. 
The current control methods consist of active and passive screening 
campaigns, under which communities living in the disease-endemic 
regions are tested and patients diagnosed positive are treated. 
However, the current control methods have several limitations. The first 
is that the diagnostic and therapeutic tools are inadequate: diagnostic 
methods are invasive and painful, requiring specialised equipment for 
definite diagnosis. Furthermore, existing drugs are highly toxic, difficult 
to administer and have a long therapeutic window. Moreover, there are 
social taboos and barriers in the disease-endemic regions that 
negatively affect community participation in control campaigns. In 
addition to active and passive screening campaigns, there are other 
approaches (including environmental approaches and vector controls) 
that can be used to eliminate HAT. Some of these approaches were 
used usefully by different colonial administrations in the first half of the 
twentieth century, and the number of new cases reported fell below 
10,000 in the 1960s, thus providing a principle of proof that sustained 
efforts can lead to significant reduction and partial elimination of HAT. 
The reason for prioritising active and passive screening campaigns is 
based on the fact that environmental and vector control approaches 
require large-scale interventions with the physical nature of the 
disease-endemic regions, and these efforts must be sustained over a 
long period of time. On the other hand, treating the human population 
(which is the only known reservoir for T.b. gambiense) is likely to lead 
to elimination after several rounds of screening campaigns. However, 
the success of these campaigns relies on the development of new 
diagnostic and therapeutic tools. In this thesis, I focused on the drug 
discovery process, aiming to develop anti-parasitic drugs that match 
patients’ needs and are suitable for use in the local medical systems. 
Using anti-parasitic drug discovery, I argued that the scientist employs 
multiple approaches and accounts to develop drug candidates from 
scratch. Moreover, I argued that scientific practices are guided by set 
of overarching values listed in target product profiles (TPPs). 
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Using the HAT case study developed in chapter 3 and additional case 
studies from life sciences, in chapter 4 I developed the philosophical 
account of the apparent pluralities in scientific practices. The pluralist 
account I developed here was built on three arguments, put forward by 
Kellert et al., Chang and Mitchell. I mainly focused on these three 
arguments, given that they had a similar approach in that they all study 
scientific practices directly, in line with the philosophy of science in 
practice approach I employ here. Following these authors, I argued 
that pluralism is first and foremost a rejection of monist assumptions 
about scientific practices and their aims. I argued against the 
assumption that the aim of science is to provide a single, complete and 
coherent account of phenomena. Instead, I argued that there are 
multiple aims in science: different approaches have distinct aims, 
focusing on different aspects of phenomena; and each account is 
particular to the specific questions and aims of a particular approach.  
In chapter 4, I discussed possible objections to the pluralist argument I 
develop here. An argument that is often put forward to undermine 
pluralism comes in the form of integration and reduction, a process in 
which plurality of accounts and approaches are eliminated by reducing 
higher level accounts to more fundamental level explanations. Herein, I 
provided a pluralist argument for both integration and reduction, not as 
a way to remove plurality, but regarding both processes as part of 
scientific practices allowing ad hoc interaction between different 
accounts. I argued that neither integration or reduction as they happen 
in scientific practices remove plurality, but instead add to the 
multiplicity of accounts and approaches by proliferating new accounts 
of phenomena (in the case of reductive explanations in molecular 
biology, or integrative approaches in homology modelling for protein 
structures). 
The HAT case study showed that epistemic and methodological 
pluralism is required in order to explore and explain phenomena. Here, 
I argued that HAT has a complex aetiology and must be understood in 
its broader socio-economic and political context. As a consequence, 
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we saw that a plurality of approaches and accounts (both historical and 
current) had played a role in our efforts to study, control and eliminate 
HAT. Here, I argued that these pluralities are an important 
characteristic of scientific practices in this field that must inform 
philosophy of science.  
It is important to underline again one of my principal claims throughout 
this thesis: that the plurality of approaches in scientific practices is an 
important characteristic of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, I have argued 
in this thesis that in order to explain and explore different aspects of 
phenomena, scientific practices ought to be pluralistic. Following 
Chang’s normative and active claims, I asserted that the role of 
pluralism is to actively challenge and replace the monist assumptions 
that unnecessarily limit scientific practices. I describe these limitations 
as unnecessary given that they are only justified through a priori 
assumptions regarding the aims of science, the nature of the world or 
the nature of the scientific knowledge.  
I make a clear distinction between monist assumptions and pragmatic 
values. While both sets of assumptions and values limit the extent of 
plurality, unlike monist assumptions, pragmatic values are justified 
through the broader context of scientific practices. Here I argued that 
the extent of plurality in current efforts to eliminate HAT is due to 
limitations such as lack of resources, a short time-period in which to 
achieve the aim, and the particular patients’ needs.  
Here I do not wish to argue that limiting plurality using pragmatic 
values must not be questioned or rejected. Instead I want to argue that 
our philosophical analysis of scientific practices must distinguish 
between monist assumptions and pragmatic values in understanding 
the limits of plurality, and challenge them in different terms. In the HAT 
case, for instance, it is important to scrutinise the justificatory narrative 
provided by the WHO and DNDi to prioritise the screening campaigns, 
therefore justifying the prioritisation of anti-parasitic drug discovery and 
limiting the extent of approaches employed in scientific practices in this 
field.  
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Here I provided a philosophical argument that takes pluralities in 
scientific practices as necessary for exploring and explaining different 
aspects of phenomena. Moreover, I argued that the plurality of 
approaches and accounts employed in each case is limited by the 
pragmatic values of the broader context of inquiry.  Herein I provided a 
discussion of a pragmatic framework in which we can understand 
scientific practices within their broader context. My argument in this 
thesis focused mainly on one particular case study, and in the future I 
aim to revisit my philosophical claims using other case studies. My 
argument for pluralism provokes the question: what makes science 
different from other forms of inquiry? This question can be answered 
through describing what makes scientific inquiry epistemically 
privileged (for example the use of empirical evidence in assessing its 
central beliefs and assumptions). Or it can be approached from a 
Science and Technology Studies point of view to understand how the 
boundaries of science are constructed by different social actors 
including scientists themselves. The pragmatist framework I provide 
here can be used in a third way to understand what makes scientific 
inquiry different from other forms of inquiry, by using Dewey’s 
approach to understand the role of scientific practices within the 
broader context of inquiry. However, the details of this question must 
be addressed in future work in detail. 
My main claim here regards the role of philosophers of science. Here I 
argue that philosophers of science must engage with scientific 
practices, putting analytical tools of philosophy to use in understanding 
the state of affairs in scientific practices, scrutinising justificatory 
narratives and reflecting on the nature of scientific knowledge. Here I 
argued that the role of pluralist philosopher to go beyond asserting that 
in science ‘many things go’, to asking, ‘what goes and why?’  
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